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Failure
by Alhassan Allie MANSARAY
The primary objective of this thesis is to analyse the public private partnership (PPP)
framework for infrastructure development in developing countries across the six re-
gions of the world. The thesis utilises the World Bank’s private participation in
infrastructure (PPI) dataset for the period 1980 - 2014, and examines three thematic
areas. The first comprises of an exploratory analysis of the PPI dataset. The second
research area focuses on the relationship between countries’ attractiveness for PPPs
and the characteristics of the countries, including: macroeconomic and market; fis-
cal constraints; regulatory and governance; and experience in PPPs, by utilising the
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial and Cragg’s Double Hurdle models in an attempt
to model private investors’ decision to engage in PPPs as separate participation and
consumption decisions. The third research area employs the methodology of sur-
vival analysis to investigate the risk of failure of PPP projects based on the allocation
of residual facility ownership between the partners.
The thesis’ primary contributions include the utilisation of a wider and more infor-
mative range of econometric methodologies which have not been previously applied
to the PPI dataset, and for the first time also, provides a framework to select an ap-
propriate structure for PPPs that will enhance project survival. A key finding of the
thesis is that private investors prioritise macroeconomic and market variables, such
as price stability over regulatory and governance variables, such as corruption, in
their determination as to which country to engage in PPPs. Contrary to previous re-
search, corruption was found to be of no consequence to private investors who wish
to engage in PPPs even for developing countries. Another key finding is that PPP
projects which confer residual ownership on the public sector have lower risk of
failure than those for which such ownership is conferred on the private sector. Evi-
dence also suggests that the size of the project and the participation of multilateral
institutions in PPPs also affect the risk of project failure.
Keywords: public private partnership, residual ownership, incomplete contract,
Sub-Saharan Africa, public infrastructure, survival analysis.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Objectives of the Thesis
The overall objective of this thesis is to analyse the Public Private Partnership (PPP)
framework for the delivery of public infrastructure and related services in develop-
ing countries across the six regions of the world: East Asia and Pacific (EAP);
Europe and Central Asia (ECA); Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC); Middle
East and North Africa (MENA); South Asia (SA), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
Specifically, the thesis has two aims: to empirically analyse the factors that make
countries attractive for PPPs; and to ascertain whether residual facility ownership
affects the survival of PPP projects with a view to guiding policy-making on infras-
tructure development, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The first specific objective builds on the theories of X-efficiency postulated by
Leibenstein, (1975) and Transaction Cost Economics by Williamson, (1975). The
former theory views the public sector as inefficient/wasteful in the management of
its resources and therefore, needs to leverage the efficiency of the private sector so
as to achieve value for money, while the latter theory speaks to the potential cost to
private sector investors when engaging in a country’s PPPs including institutional,
economic and legal costs.
For the second specific objective, the relevant theory is the Incomplete Contracting
theory postulated by Grossman and Hart, (1986) and Hart and Moore, (1988), which
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attempts to explain the role of residual ownership in incentivising the partners’ ex-
ante investment for the maximisation of the partnership joint surplus. The aim is
to determine whether PPP projects which are structured to confer residual facility
ownership to the public sector such as build, operate and transfer (BOT), have lower
risk of failure or rather, higher probability of survival, than PPP projects which
confer such ownership to the private sector such as build, own and operate (BOO).
The thesis will focus specifically on the following tasks:
(i) conduct an exploratory analysis of the World Bank’s Private Participation in
Infrastructure (PPI) dataset for the period 1980 - 2014 with the aim of identi-
fying the general structure of the data through descriptive summaries that will
inform the more sophisticated confirmatory analyses in Chapters 4 and 5;
(ii) determine the most significant factors that explain countries’ attractiveness
for PPPs; and
(iii) determine the most appropriate structure of PPPs that will enhance the survival
of projects.
1.2 General Background
Many developing countries have come to the realisation that the development of
public infrastructure cannot be accelerated in a manner consistent with the achieve-
ment of the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which has
been transformed into the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), by relying solely
on public sector resources and expertise (Calderón and Servén, 2008; Foster and
Briceño-Garmendia, 2010).1 This is particularly true for Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries where a majority of the population do not have access to basic infrastructure
services and the governments in turn lack the wherewithal to make the necessary
1Goal 9 of the Sustainable Development Goals is specifically dedicated to infrastructure devel-
opment.
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provision (Banerjee et al., 2008). This lack of means to fund public infrastructure is
exacerbated by the recent financial and economic crisis and the on-going fiscal con-
solidation (fiscal austerity) by many developed countries, which limit the amount of
aid provided to poor countries for infrastructure development (Redifer, 2010).
Escribano et al., (2010) singled out infrastructure as the main constraining factor for
doing business in many African countries, depressing firms’ productivity by around
40 percent. Interestingly, Calderón and Servén, (2008) show that the marginal re-
turns on growth from infrastructure in Africa exceeds that of other structural poli-
cies, contributing 31 basis points more to growth over the period 1990 to 2005,
while Foster and Briceño-Garmendia, (2010) submit that if all African countries
had infrastructure as good as that of Mauritius, the leading infrastructure provider
in terms of access and quality in Sub-Saharan Africa, per capita growth in the region
could increase by 2.2 percentage points annually.
On another note, it is estimated that during the early 2000s Africa spent a total of
US$45 billion annually on infrastructure (financed mainly from domestic sources)
of which about US$17 billion was wasted through various kinds of inefficiencies,
including distribution losses, low revenue collection, under-pricing of services, lack
of maintenance, and under-execution of capital budgets (Briceño-Garmendia et al.,
2008). Therefore, according to Briceño-Garmendia et al., the elimination of these
inefficiencies alone is expected to narrow the infrastructure funding gap to US$31
billion per year. As a result, the question of how Sub-Saharan African countries,
particularly fragile states, can accelerate the development of public infrastructure
and related services in the midst of severe budgetary constraints is a very relevant
one that has eluded many practitioners and policy-makers. Consequently, many
scholars are of the view that the Public Private Partnership (PPP) framework, which
brings in the management expertise as well as the financial muscle of the private
sector in the delivery of public infrastructure could be an immediate solution, more
so when the framework has recorded some successes in other parts of the world (see
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Girmscheid, 2013b; Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2015).
It is believed by many researchers that PPP has the potential to bring significant dis-
cipline into project selection and implementation, thus leading to efficiency gains,
‘value for money’ and sustainability in the process of delivering public infrastruc-
ture and related services (see Hodge and Greve, 2007).2 In addition and as eluci-
dated by Engel et al., (2013) and Maskin and Tirole, (2008), the PPP framework is
being used by many governments around the world as a strategy to evade budgetary
constraints by taking liabilities off the balance sheet, thus increasing the poten-
tial for more explicit public sector borrowings. In short, the budgetary constraints
faced by many African governments in their quest to accelerate infrastructure de-
velopment could be alleviated by leveraging private sector resources under a PPP
framework.
Notwithstanding the seemingly plausible rationale for engaging in PPPs and the ef-
fective publicity stunts made by many multilateral institutions, including the United
Nations and the World Bank, to propagate this framework (see Kinnock, 1998), the
‘economics of PPP is still imperfectly understood’ as practice has preceded theory,
culminating in mixed experiences by many countries (Engel et al., 2013, p. 1).3
Some countries have registered gains from PPPs, while others are grappling with
the consequences of the plethora of risks assumed under the framework and are
therefore, having their contracts renegotiated with outcomes that are been affected
by regulatory taking (Guasch, 2004).
This conflicting tale of PPP calls for better understanding of the concept, particu-
larly for fragile states where making economic policy mistakes could have devas-
tating and potentially long lasting effects on the socio-economic and political well-
being of the population.
2‘Value for money’ is considered as the means of delivering a project with superior quality with
relatively no increase in cost (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005).
3According to Kinnock, most international and regional organisations have gone ahead to adapt
the concept of PPP into their programmatic tools for member countries.
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1.3 Motivation and Problem Statement
The above background serves as a precursor to the motivation of this thesis. How-
ever, to put this motivation into perspective, the thesis illustrates the Sierra Leone
scenario which best epitomises the difficulties faced by many developing countries,
more especially fragile states, in their quest to access private sector resources and
expertise for public infrastructure development and related services delivery.
Sierra Leone sits at the bottom tier in the Africa ranking for infrastructure, while
Africa in turn sits at the bottom of the global ranking by continent, making the coun-
try one of the worst in terms of infrastructure in the world (see figures 1.2 and 1.3).4
Like most fragile states, the country went through a decade long brutal civil conflict
that saw the displacement of nearly half of its population and the destruction of ma-
jor infrastructure, including telecommunication, energy and transportation. After
the war ended in 2002, the country embarked on several successive development
programmes with the most recent and on-going known as Agenda for Prosperity
(A4P), which focuses mainly on infrastructure development and related services
delivery. As luck may have it, around 2007, the fortune of the country changed dra-
matically with the discovery of huge deposits of iron ore. This discovery saw the
establishment of two major mining companies; African Minerals Ltd, and London
Mining Plc. In addition, the country’s real GDP growth rate sky-rocketed from 3.2
percent in 2009 to 15.2 percent in 2012, peaking at 20.1 percent in 2013.5
These episodes of growth put significant pressure on the government to accelerate
its infrastructure programme with more emphasis on power generation, which as
of 2010 stood at 50 mega watts with electrification ratio below 10 percent.6 As
a result, the government started looking out for non-traditional ways of financing
4See also Africa Infrastructure Development Index (AIDI), May 2013 edition.
5See IMF Country Reports No. 12/285, 2012 and 14/171, 2014
6See Infrastructure and growth in Sierra Leone, Summary Report, African Development Bank
2013.
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infrastructure, including PPPs. There was the strong belief amongst policy-makers
that entering into PPPs, especially in the energy sector, will not place significant
burden on the public sector budget because the market risk, which is considered as
one of the main risks under such arrangements, is expected to be accommodated
through the anticipated demand for power by the mining companies. At the same
time, there was a strong expectation that the foreign exchange proceeds from the
exportation of the minerals will mitigate both future foreign exchange volatility and
availability risks.
On the other hand, the country’s growth captured the interest of many private sector
investors in the energy sector. By 2014, the government had signed several mem-
oranda of understanding and was on the verge of concluding negotiations with two
major independent power producers (IPPs), Joule Africa (JA), and Copperbelt Elec-
trical Corporation (CEC) under a PPP framework, as well as implementing a power
purchase agreement with Addax Bioenergy (SL) for the supply of about 20 mega
watts of electricity through bio-energy. The initial estimated cost of the JA and
CEC projects stood at around 30 percent of the country’s GDP of US$4.8 billion
in fiscal year 2014, while, for example, total budget revenue was 16.4 percent of
GDP, including grants of 4.1 percent.7 This clearly shows that the government will
be saddled with heavy financial burden in the event of crystallisation of contingent
liabilities assumed under these two projects.
Unfortunately, while negotiations on the power projects were still on-going, the
country experienced a total reversal in its economic fortune. International com-
modity prices, including that of iron ore, plummeted significantly. In addition, the
country had an outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD), which started in early 2014
and worsened by the close of the same year. This twin problems resulted in a fall
in the stock price of London Mining Plc from a peak of 432.75 British pence in
July 2011 only to crash and be de-listed from the London Stock Exchange at the
7See IMF Country Reports No. 14/171, 2014.
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beginning of 2015 as shown in Figure 1.1. The second major mining company,
African Minerals Ltd, almost collapsed and had to go through financial and techni-
cal restructuring. By mid July 2015, Addax Bioenergy Company (SL) Ltd. faced
financial distress and had to shut down operations.
FIGURE 1.1: London Mining Plc Stock Price
Source: Bloomberg, 25th July 2015
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This unexpected change in Sierra Leone’s economic condition ushered in a whole
new dynamic into several on-going PPP negotiations. Some potential private part-
ners decided to withdraw interest from the arrangement, while others started ex-
hibiting predatory tendency of demanding higher premium and transferring risks
which they had hitherto accepted to the government, including newly identified
risks such as the event of an epidemic outbreak. As a result and in addition to other
factors including, institutional, governance and environmental, the government has
not been able to reach financial closure in any of its major PPP projects for infras-
tructure development, particularly in the energy sector.
While Sierra Leone has suffered immensely from these unfortunate events, its ex-
perience might not be unique as other Sub-Saharan African countries, including its
closest neighbours in the Mano River Union, Liberia and Guinea, are also faced or
are susceptible to similar conditions. This thesis is therefore, motivated by the need
to understand the complexities of PPP and how it can be structured to achieve value
for money, which according to Grimsey and Lewis, (2005, p. 347), is only possible
if the environment where it is implemented is competitive; residual rights as well as
risks are optimally allocated between the partners and; the comparison between the
financing options is handled in a fair, realistic and comprehensive manner.
Notwithstanding the conflicting outcomes of PPP, Figure 1.2 shows that the concept
has gained momentum in many parts of the world, particularly in the LAC and
EAP regions. The figure also shows that although the SSA region has seen some
significant PPP flows over the years, it is still trailing the other regions, except
for MENA. In addition, Figure 1.3 indicates that South Africa and Nigeria have
made some significant inroads in PPPs, particularly in recent years, while countries
such as Eritrea, Swaziland and Sierra Leone are still contending with very few PPP
projects.
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FIGURE 1.2: Total PPI Projects by Region (1980 - 2014)
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1.4 Research Questions
If the above background and motivation perspicuously present the need for devel-
oping countries to leverage private sector resources through PPPs in order to alle-
viate their infrastructural deficit, then the pertinent questions that should be asked
by practitioners and policy markers as well as scholars should relate mainly to is-
sues on the formation and success of the partnership. In this regard, this thesis will
attempt to provide answers to three main questions:
(1) What roles do countries’economic, governance, political, and experience in
PPPs play in attracting private sector investors into the relationship?
(2) Which amongst these identified channel of countries’ attractiveness outlined in
(1) are to be prioritised in order to achieve the much needed turnaround in the
infrastructure problems in developing countries?
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FIGURE 1.3: Total PPI Projects in Sub-Saharan African Countries
(1980 - 2014)
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(3) How should PPP projects be structured so as to mitigate their risk of failure?
The first empirical chapter, Chapter 4, will attempt to provide answers to questions
(1) and (2), while the second empirical chapter, Chapter 5, will answer question
(3). All of these questions would be answered by utilising the World Bank’s private
participation in infrastructure (PPI) dataset for the period ending 2014.
1.5 Significance and Contribution of the Thesis
As recently as 2013, Engel et al. point out that the economics of PPPs is still im-
perfectly understood as practice has run ahead of theory. In addition, the review of
empirical literature, which will be presented in Chapter 2, demonstrates the limited
number of studies that have been undertaken by researchers in this area and the
focus of these studies is mainly on the creation of a framework for optimal alloca-
tion of risks between the public and private partners. The value and significance
of this thesis therefore, rest immensely on its contributions to the empirical work
on PPPs as well as the application of contemporary theories and methodologies to
finding solution to some of the challenges faced by many governments wishing to
leverage private sector resources for infrastructure development or are experiencing
premature termination of PPP projects.
Specifically this thesis makes three key contributions. The first relates to the World
Bank’s PPI dataset, which is the main dataset used by most researchers, includ-
ing Hammami et al., (2006), to conduct empirical studies on PPPs. Unlike other
research that focus on just a subset of the PPI dataset, we are able to provide an
exploratory analysis of the entire dataset for the period 1980 - 2014 with the aim of
informing more sophisticated confirmatory analyses and policymaking (see Chapter
3). The exploratory analysis captures the flows of PPP projects, the amount of US
dollar invested in the projects as well as the number of sponsors that participated
in the projects. The analysis also identifies and links trends in the number of PPP
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projects to key changes in global macroeconomic and financial conditions as well as
provides a more comprehensive overview of PPP projects in the SSA region versus
the other regions.
The second contribution relates to the utilisation of a wider range of econometric
methodologies which, based on the knowledge of this research, have not been pre-
viously applied to the PPI dataset. In providing alternative and unique perspective
of the key factors that attract private investors’ participation into PPPs in the four
major infrastructure sectors: energy; transport; telecom; and water and sewerage,
the thesis employed Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial model and Cragg’s Double
Hurdle model. These models attempt to model private investors’ decision to en-
gage in PPPs as separate participation and consumption decisions, an approach that
has not been used before (see Chapter 4). To determine the effect of residual facility
ownership on the risk of PPP project failure, the thesis employed survival analysis,
a methodology that is novel in the field of project finance and in particular PPPs.
The third contribution is in the area of selecting the most appropriate structure for
PPP projects that will enhance project’ survival, an issue that has eluded practi-
tioners and policy-makers. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time an
empirical research is made in this area. The thesis draws from the theory of incom-
plete contracting, which has earned its main proponent, Oliver Hart, the Nobel Prize
in Economic Sciences in 2016. It was hypothesised and confirmed that PPP projects
which are structured to confer residual ownership to the public sector survive longer
or rather, have lower risk of failure, than those that bestowed such ownership upon
the private sector. The reason for this outcome reflects the problem of incentive
compatibility and the residual value risk associated with long-term projects such as
PPPs.
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1.6 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is organised around six chapters. As already shown above, Chapter 1
presents the general background, which elaborates on the infrastructure deficit of
Sub-Saharan African countries and the need for these countries to embark on PPPs.
It also presents the motivation for conducting the research, building mainly from
the Sierra Leone’s experience with PPPs in the midst of its economic challenges.
The chapter ends by asking the relevant questions that motivate the research and
presents a synopsis of the significance of the research and value-added in the field
of PPPs.
Chapter 2 will present the background on PPP, which will provide a review of the
history of PPPs, highlighting that the recent hype in the concept is attributable to the
shift in economic paradigms and the lack of consensus among scholars on a single
acceptable conceptual definition for PPP. The second set of reviews will relate to
the main theories that give credence to the concept of PPP, including game theory,
incomplete contracting theory, X-efficiency theory, transaction cost economic the-
ory, agency theory and public choice theory. The third set of reviews will focus on
more recent empirical studies under a number of different headings related to risk
allocation, value for money, fiscal risk and factors determining the success of PPPs.
The final section in this chapter will identify the research gap.
Chapter 3 will contextualise the issue of PPP by conducting an exploratory analysis
of the World Bank’s PPI dataset for the period 1980 to 2014 in an attempt to capture
the main characteristics of the dataset that could inform more sophisticated analysis
in the empirical Chapters 4 and 5.
Chapter 4 will present the first empirical chapter entitled, “Countries’ Attractive-
ness for Public Private Partnership”, which will examine the first major research
objective of identifying factors that attract private sector investors into PPPs. These
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factors will be put into four groups or channels: (i) macroeconomic and market
channel; (ii) government constraints channel; (iii) regulatory and governance chan-
nel; and (iv) experience in PPPs channel. An investigation will also be made on
which of these channels or factors within the channels to prioritise in order to
achieve an immediate turnaround in public sector engagements with the private
sector for infrastructure development. The chapter will use a variety of count and
limited dependent variable models in its analysis, including the Zero-inflated Neg-
ative Binomial model and the Cragg’s double hurdle model. The main finding in
this chapter is that macroeconomic and market variables, such as price stability and
GDP per capita, should be given priority over regulatory and governance variables,
such as rule of law and corruption, for countries to attract more private sector in-
vestors into PPPs.
Chapter 5 will present the second empirical chapter entitled, “Residual Facility
Ownership and the Risk of Public Private Partnership Project Failure”, which will
examine the second research objective of the effect of residual ownership on the risk
of PPP project failure, taking into consideration regional and sectoral heterogene-
ity. Specifically the chapter will investigate the main types of PPP arrangement:
build, operate and transfer, which confers residual ownership on the public sector
and; build, own and operate, in which the private sector retains residual ownership.
The chapter will be divided into two parts. The first part will utilise non-parametric
survival models, such as the Kaplan Meier model, and graphs to examine the re-
lationship between the main explanatory variable (PPP Sub-type) and some of the
control variables, particularly the time invariant ones, and the risk of project failure.
The second part will use discrete time survival models to establish a parametric re-
lationship between the two sets of variables. The main finding in this chapter is that
PPPs should be structured to confer residual facility ownership on the public sector
as a way of enhancing the survival of projects.
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Chapter 6 will conclude the thesis, summarising major findings as well as presenting
the limitations of the research and identifying areas for further studies.
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Chapter 2
Public Private Partnership – Theory
and Evidence
2.1 Introduction
Public Private Partnership (PPP) has gained huge popularity, particularly in recent
years as the concept is been embraced by many countries around the world as a
means to accelerate infrastructure development and increase efficiency in public ser-
vice delivery (see Bovaird, 2004). The speed of its acceptance is also facilitated by
international development organisations, such as the World Bank, the European In-
vestment Bank and the United Nations (see Brook, 2001; Hamilton, 2001) with the
notion that PPP will maximise the benefits for development through the collabora-
tion of the public and private sectors. As a matter of fact, most of these international
and regional organisations have adapted the concept into their programmatic tools
(Kinnock, 1998) as well as developed framework that guides national PPP policies
(Farquharson and Yescombe, 2011).1 Notwithstanding this proliferation, Engel et
al., (2013, p. 84) suggest that the economics of PPP is still imperfectly understood
as practice has outrun theory and many countries are joining the bandwagon without
truly understanding the nature of the concept.
The aim of this chapter therefore, is to provide, through selective references to some
of the theoretical and empirical literature, a thorough review of the concept of PPP
1For example, see the European Commission’s Guidelines for Successful Public Private Partner-
ship, (2003); and the National Public Partnership Policy Framework for Australia (2015).
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and factors influencing its success as well as the role of residual ownership in the
framework. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: immediately following
is a section providing the historical evidence and conceptual definition of PPP as
well as its international classification. Section 2.2 gives a survey of the key theories
that give credence to the concept of PPP, such as the game theory, the incomplete
contracting theory and the X-efficiency theory. Section 2.4 provides the relevant
empirical literature on PPP, while Section 2.5 concludes the chapter.
2.2 A Survey of Literature on the History of Public
Private Partnership
What is public private partnership? This question has eluded many policy-makers
and practitioners as well as scholars in the field of public infrastructure development
and services delivery. Several suggestions have been made in an attempt to answer
this crucial question with the starting point of acknowledging PPP from an historic
perspective.
To start with, Hodge and Greve, (2007) indicate that PPP could be traced back to
the era of the Roman Empire when tax collection was outsourced to private indi-
viduals such as Apostle Matthew in the Bible. They also trace the relationship to
the Elizabethan era when 162 out of the 197 military vessels in Sir Francis Drakes’
fleet to conquer the Spanish Armada in 1588 was provided by private businesses.
De Vries and Yehoue, (2013) attribute the emergence of PPP to the modern eco-
nomic development of the Dutch society in the early 17th century. They note that the
conspicuous economic growth of Amsterdam during the seventeenth century posed
significant challenges on public authorities to enhance urban planning and devel-
opment amidst limited public resources. To partly ameliorate these challenges, the
Dutch government had to organise the financial participation of private individuals
into infrastructure development.
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In Great Britain, the same authors traced evidence of PPP to the Turnpike Trust
in late 17th century to early 18th century, the Canal Mania in mid 18th century,
and the railway development in the early 19th century. As they elucidate, the legal
framework for the Turnpike Trust was established in 1714 to enhance the mainte-
nance and expansion of roads in various localities in Britain. The supervision of the
Trust was placed in the hands of the parish, while its management was outsourced
to trustees, comprising of land owners and merchants. The nominated trustees had
the responsibility to collect tolls and raise financing from the public with the aim of
maintaining and improving the roads and other public infrastructure.
The scale of collaboration between the public and private sectors in Britain ex-
panded further as the country enters the industrial revolution in the 18th century.
The government embarked on massive infrastructure projects, including the Mersey
and its tributaries in 1740, which established water connection between Liverpool
and Manchester. This improvement did not only halve the cost of transporting
goods, but also established Liverpool as a major seaport in England (Arnold and
McCartney, 2008, p. 6). By the 1830s, the private sector has got a strong foothold
in infrastructure development as they entirely initiate and finance the development
of the railways in Britain with the role of the public sector limited to granting of
right of way to private companies (De Vries and Yehoue, 2013, p. 15). In essence,
as the collaborative between the public and private sectors progressed, the private
sector assumed increasingly dominant role in the provision of public infrastructure
in Great Britain. As a result, what started up as a public led initiative ended up with
the private sector on the driving wheel.
In the United States, Forrer et al., (2010) traced PPP to the Revolutionary War in the
late 18th century when the Continental Congress authorized the use of privateers to
harass the British Navy, intercepting their vessels carrying munitions and supplies
to military contingents in America (Bowen-Hassell et al., 2003). Further historical
evidence of PPP in the United States was provided by (De Vries and Yehoue, 2013)
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who referenced the Turnpike history similar to that of Britain. They offer that the
history of Turnpike in the United States started in Pennsylvania in 1792, but unlike
Britain where a medium of trustee was created, Turnpike in the United States was
purely a private sector affair with some exceptional cases in which the public sector
in some states provides subsidies to private companies. Priest, (1993) highlights that
throughout the early 20th century, many states municipalities in the United States
were granting franchises to private institutions for the delivery of public infrastruc-
ture and services.
Reflecting the argument of Wettenhall, (2005), Wang, (2009) summarises that the
reason behind the earliest PPPs was a combination of ambition and greed, as gov-
ernments were ambitious but incapable and the private sector was greedy but re-
sourceful; thus laying the foundation for mutual collaboration.
Notwithstanding the above history, Fosler and Berger, (1982) reveal that the PPP la-
bel came into use at around the late 1970s, and it first appeared in the United States.
However, some researchers argue that the concept of PPP as a means for public ser-
vices delivery was first introduced by the Labour government in the United King-
dom in the late 1980s to early 1990s under the nomenclature of Private Finance
Initiative (PFI) with the aim to accelerate infrastructure development without plac-
ing significant burden on the public budget (Bing et al., 2005; Ghobadian et al.,
2004; Spackman, 2002; Tieman, 2003; Wettenhall, 2007)
The question therefore is, if the concept of PPP has been around for centuries as
reflected in the historical background provided by various scholars, why then do
some practitioners consider it a new phenomenon and making such a hype about it?
Weihe, (2008, p. 436) encapsulate this quagmire by saying that “there still remains
some ambiguity as to what exactly constitutes PPP”. He argues that the concept of
PPP is quite vague as it allows for greater variance across parameters, institutional
framework and types of goods and services produced as well as participants to the
arrangement. Linder, (1999) submits that the confusion about the concept of PPP
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occurs because there is little explicit acknowledgement of the different perspectives
and limited communication that takes place across the different approaches to the
concept.
In all, the reasons for the confusion about the concept of PPP could be referenced
from the changes in economic paradigms and economic linguistics right down to
the lack of a single acceptable definition amongst scholars and practitioners. The
immediate sections discuss the issues in greater depth.
2.2.1 Public Private Partnership – A Paradigm Shift
It is acknowledged that changes in economic paradigms bring about changes in eco-
nomic management and the role of government. For instance, De Vries and Yehoue,
(2013) explain that the first half of the 20th century witnessed increased national-
ization of public concessionaires as government increased its role in the delivery
of public services. This transformation was borne out of the prevailing intellectual
climate which advocates nationalisation resulting from the success of the Keyne-
sian stabilization policy after the second world war (De Vries and Yehoue, 2013;
Shleifer, 1998). However, by the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, industrialised
nations were hit by stagflation coupled with excessive taxes and high level of public
sector inefficiencies. These conditions led to a rethink in the intellectual circle of
the merit of more government involvement in the delivery of public services. As a
result, a paradigm shift occurred that advocates for the downsizing of government
and the introduction of private ownership of state owned enterprises (De Vries and
Yehoue, 2013). The economic jargon then transformed from ‘nationalisation’ to
‘privatisation’.
As the ills of privatisation later became visible, there was a need for another eco-
nomic phrase that would capture the minds and zest of practitioners, researchers and
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ordinary citizens alike. The new phrase that eventuated was ‘Public Private Part-
nership’, a concept that is expected to bring the public and private sectors together
in a bid to maximise their collaborative output for the greater good of society.
This paradigm shift accentuates the belief by many researchers that there is noth-
ing new about PPP but its name because collaboration between the two sectors has
always been in existence. For instance, Teisman and Klijn, (2002) argue that the
recent hype of the word ‘partnership’ is merely a language game that is played
by politicians to romanticize formally ill conceived relationship between the pub-
lic and private sectors, thus insinuating the old adage of ‘old wine in new bottle’.
This view was shared by Wel, (2004) who coined the topic of his paper on PPP as
‘Privatization by Stealth:...’. Hodge and Greve, (2007) also refer to PPP as a game
designed to cloud other strategies and purposes such as privatisation. Even one of
the proponents of privatisation, Savas, (2000) , acknowledges that ‘contracting out’
and ‘privatisation’ are terms that generate opposition quickly and that expression
such as public private partnership are more acceptable. Savas, (2000) suggests that
with PPP, the private sector will have the opportunity to claim some of the market
share of public service provision without isolating the public sector.
Some scholars have described PPP as ‘a loose term’ (Stern and Harding, 2002,
p. 127) while others refer to it as ‘just a fashionable word’ (Bovaird, 1984; Gibel-
man and Demone, 1983; Kettner and Martin, 1986). Therefore, Linder, (1999),
Savas, (2000), Stern and Harding, (2002), and Teisman and Klijn, (2002), all writ-
ing from different perspectives, agree that the use of the term ‘public private part-
nership’ can be seen as a pejorative term like ‘contracting out’ and ‘privatisation’
(see also Khanom, 2010). Greve, (2003) sees PPP as an attractive word used by
governments in the bid to promote the more mundane contracting for public ser-
vices arrangements. Grimsey and Lewis, (2004) note that the acceptance of PPP
emanates mainly from the changes in the attitude and expectation of society of the
role of governments in the delivery of public services.
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In essence, economists and practitioners are oscillating and vacillating along the
spectrum of privatization at the one extreme, and nationalization at the other, with
PPP considered as a compromising candidate between the two.
2.2.2 Public Private Partnership – Conceptual Definition
The second reason advanced for the ambiguity of the concept of PPP is the diffi-
culty to reach a consensus among scholars and practitioners on a definition for PPP
(Daube et al., 2008; Hodge and Greve, 2007; Meidute¯ and Paliulis, 2011; Teisman
and Klijn, 2002). Many authors view PPP from a broader perspective, believing
that almost any modern organizational innovation with public and private elements
could be regarded as PPP (Kernaghan, 1993; Savas, 2000) .
Hodge and Greve, (2007) broadly define the concept as a cooperative arrangement
between the public and private sectors. Teisman and Klijn, (2002) explain PPP as
a form of co-production between government and the private sector in which the
goal is to achieve surplus value, arguing that surplus value does not result from a
simple adoption of private efficiency in conducting public affairs, but from synergy
that generates positive externalities.
This broad conceptual definition of PPP, where the two sectors collaborate to op-
timise their mutual gains while society benefit from the surplus value created, en-
compasses engagements ranging from outsourcing and issuing franchises to enter-
ing into concession agreements as well as some aspects of privatisation as reflected
in the historical background of PPP.
Notwithstanding, Forrer et al., (2010) warn against confusing PPP with other public
sector reforms that involved the private sector such as outsourcing of government
functions in an effort to gain greater fiscal control and more efficient service de-
livery. They argue that there is nothing intrinsic about outsourcing that requires
partnership and that government outsourcing to the private sector is an application
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of the classic make-or-buy decision of government operations. The belief is that
the private sector could deliver some public services more cheaply than govern-
ment agencies (Savas, 2000). Therefore, Forrer et al., (2010) further argue that
privatization does not constitute partnership as it involves government eliminating
direct control and ownership of service delivery (full privatisation), or retain some
influence as a shareholder, but rather, the intention is for government to relinquish
control of public service delivery while limiting itself to the role of a regulator. As
a result and in line with Grimsey and Lewis, (2004), Forrer et al., (2010) view PPP
as a unique relationship between government and private firms whereby the govern-
ment retains ultimate responsibility for the delivery of public goods and services,
but becomes partner with the private sector in the decision making and implemen-
tation process.
In an attempt to consolidate the concept of PPP, Klijn and Teisman, (2003) argue
that there are two major forms of PPPs:
(i) contracts and partnerships – where the government is the client specifying the
problem, solution and product, and the private party is the contractor providing
the required product; and
(ii) co-production partnership – where a more strategic collaboration (synergy)
between the public and private party is required from the inception of the
project.
To further alleviate some of the misconception of PPP, Linder, (1999) puts the con-
cept into six definitional perspectives:
(i) Partnership as a management reform – in which the collaborative process is
more of a mentoring relationship rather than joint undertakings. It severs PPP
from its historical roots and linked it instead to the privatisation objective of
efficiency gains;
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(ii) Partnership as problem conversion – where PPP is viewed as a tool for fixing
inefficiency in the delivery of public service;
(iii) Partnership as a moral regeneration – this relates to the concept of bringing
government closer to the market;
(iv) Partnership as risk shifting – this relates to public officials circumventing fiscal
stringencies by collaborating and transferring certain risk, including financial
risk, to the private sector in the provision of public infrastructure and related
services;
(v) Partnership as restructuring public service – this allows for the movement from
public to private workforce, one that is disciplined by the labour market; and
(vi) Partnership as power sharing – this highlights the devolution of control, espe-
cially regulatory, as well as fostering the collaboration in the distribution of
basic rights and obligations between the public and private sectors.
While Linder was able to provide a definitional framework for PPP, Weihe, (2006)
elaborates further by positing that PPP could be viewed from the perspective of four
different approaches that form the underlying rationale for such collaboration:
(i) The Urban Regeneration Approach – this concept was borrowed from the
American urban governance, which focuses on PPP in relation to urban eco-
nomic renewal and development. It is initiated by the response of private
businesses to urban crises such as high unemployment, high crime rates and
deteriorating revenue base.
(ii) The Policy Approach – this approach is identified within the American pub-
lic policy literature. Its focus is not on PPP for collaborative projects, but
rather, on the institutional set-up of public-private cooperation in different pol-
icy fields.
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(iii) The Infrastructure Approach – this approach makes PPP synonymous to the
concept of private provision of infrastructure and associated services (Evans
and Bowman, 2005). That is ‘arrangements whereby private parties participate
in, or provide support for, the provision of infrastructure ’and the delivery of
public infrastructure-based services (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004, p. 2)
(iv) The Development Approach – this approach focuses on PPP as a means to
advance development. This concept was brought to the fore mainly by the
United Nations under its Global Compact in 2000 and was further strength-
ened at the World Summit for Sustainable Development in 2002 (Reed and
Reed, 2009). This approach focuses on achieving development goals whereby
PPP is viewed as a means to achieving broad ends such as reducing poverty
and social deprivation as well as reducing corruption and environmental im-
provement. It also makes provision for the integration of non-governmental
development aid organisation into the equation of PPP.
The Development Approach reflects the argument that PPP is an important tool
for promoting and maximising the benefits of development through collaboration
(Agere, 2000; Paoletto, 2000) and enhanced efficiency (Brinkerhoff, 2002).
Notwithstanding the attempt to consolidate the definition, many authors, including
Nijkamp et al., (2002) and Akintoye et al., (1999) suggest the way of getting around
the conceptual rigmarole is to specify the characteristics and nature of what actually
constitutes PPP in formulating a definition of PPP. Nijkamp et al., (2002, p. 1869)
describe PPP as an initiative that brings together the public and private sector for
long term partnerships of mutual benefit and as “an institutionalised form of co-
operation of public and private actors who, on the basis of their own indigenous
objectives, work together towards a joint target, in which both parties accept in-
vestment risks on the basis of a predetermined distribution of revenues and costs”.
Similarly, Van Ham and Koppenjan, (2001, p. 598) relates PPP to a ‘cooperation
of some sort of durability between public and private actors in which they jointly
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develop products and services, and share risks, costs, and resources which are con-
nected with these products’. These two definitions brought to the fore several fea-
tures of PPP. First, the establishment of a time frame for the cooperative engage-
ment, which is indicated as long-termed (durability).2 Second, it emphasises risk
sharing, which is viewed as an important incentive for the engagement as it leads
to value for money. Third, the joint production of output from which both parties,
implicitly or explicitly, stand to gain from the mutual effort.
The European Commission prescribes the characteristics of PPPs by outlining the
advantages of the concept, including: allowing for the acceleration of infrastructure
provision; better risk allocation; better incentive to perform; improved quality of
service; generation of additional revenues from third parties; and enhance public
management.3
Similarly, the World Bank’s Public Private Partnership Reference Guide for 2014
reflects on the need for PPP, but with greater emphasis on its role in infrastructure
financing and development. The guidelines just stop short of referencing PPP as
a panacea to solving the infrastructure challenges of many countries. While ac-
knowledging that there is no unique definition for PPP, the World Bank, however,
concocted a definition that refers to PPP as “a long-term contract between a private
party and a government agency for providing a public asset or service in which the
private party bears significant risk and management responsibility”. This definition
presents PPP as providers of Greenfield as well as Brownfield projects. Further-
more, the Bank indicates that the goods and/or services produced by the private
party should be paid for entirely by the service users and/or the government.
It can be deduced that the definition provided by the World Bank made provision for
two direct partners, the government and private partners, and an indirect partner, the
end users, who are not party to the formal agreement yet bears most of the impact of
2Further support of this feature is provided by Broadbent and Laughlin, (2003, p. 332), Carr,
(1998, p. 1) and Bovaird, (2004, p. 199)
3See the European Commission Guidelines on Public Private Partnerships (2003, p. 15)
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the outcome of the decision made by the direct partners. The Bank was also quick
to mention the tenure of the partnership, which is to be long-termed consistent with
the prescription of Nijkamp et al., (2002).
While there is no unique definition for PPP, it is clear that the numerous character-
istics of the concept allow each region or country to locate its own unique motive
for engaging in the relationship. As succinctly summarised by Prof. Gomez-Ibanez
in one of his presentations in the World Bank’s course on PPP, there are basically
three motives for the collaboration between the public and private sectors:
(i) to tap into the capital market;
(ii) to transfer resources to alleviate immediate budget constraints; and
(iii) to incentivise real efficiency gains.
However, he believes that every country will locate itself within one or more of these
three motives, but for ultimate success, efficiency gain should not be compromised
for anything.
2.2.3 Public Private Partnership - International Classification
PPPs are classified in different ways and the name ascribed to each classification
clearly depicts the responsibility of each partner in the arrangement as well as the
ownership of the residual asset (Morallos and Amekudzi, 2008). The two main
international bodies that have provided standardized classification of PPPs are the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
In 2004, the IMF came up with a list of PPP classification as shown in Table 2.1.
This classification relates to long-termed engagement between the public and pri-
vate sectors for the provision of infrastructure and related services as well as the
transfer of risks and rewards. The arrangement ranges from built-own-operate-and-
transfer (BOOT) right down to built-transfer-and-operate (BTO). In the former the
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private sector investor builds the facility and is allowed to own and operate it un-
til she fully recoups her investment, while in the latter, the private sector investor
builds the asset, transfer it to the public sector which in turn lease or rent the asset
back to the private sector for operations over a specific period of time.
According to the IMF, the most common form of PPP is the design-build-finance-
and-operate (DBFO), followed by build, operate and transfer (BOT). Under DBFO
scheme, the government specifies broadly the anticipated output of the project and
allow the private sector to innovate by bundling the functions of design, build, fi-
nance and ultimately operate the ensuing asset for greater efficiency. This scheme
usually involves performance based payment to incentivise the private sector in-
vestor as well as ensuring value for money for government. The DBFO contrasts
with the traditional investment mechanism whereby the role of the private sector is
limited to the development of the asset while the financing, operations and main-
tenance as well as immediate ownership of the asset go to the government. It also
reflects the notion that bundling and transferring of responsibilities to the private
sector would yield greater efficiency in the delivery of services, which is the ulti-
mate objective of PPP.
In the case of the World Bank’s, PPPs are put into four major categories:
(i) Greenfield - this relates to the collaboration between the public and private
sectors for the provision of new physical infrastructure and/or infrastructure
based services.
(ii) Concession - under this arrangement, the private sector has the responsibility
to manage and operate the project and to provide the bulk of the finances.
(iii) Divestiture - in this arrangement, the public sector relinquishes its ownership
interest in public infrastructure and related services to the private sector. This
arrangement relates mainly to ‘Brownfield projects’, which are projects that
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have some pre-existing asset belonging to the public section on which the
private partner builds upon.
(iv) Management Contract - this arrangement confers the maintenance and oper-
ation control right to the private sector, but all obligations including project
funding, remain with the public sector.
Within these four major categories and similar to the IMF classification, the Bank
was able to derive sub-categories of PPPs, including: management contract (MC);
build, operate and transfer (BOT); build, own and operate (BOO); rehabilitate, oper-
ate and transfer (ROT); build, rehabilitate, operate and transfer (BROT); merchant
(MCT); partial divestiture (PD); full divestiture (FD); lease contract (LC); Build,
lease and transfer (BLT); Rental (RT); and Rehabilitate-lease-or-rent-and-transfer
(RLRT).4 Amongst these sub-classification, BOT is the most popular, constituting
about 35 percent of all PPP projects undertaken between the period 1987 to 2014.5
Comparing the IMF and World Bank classification of PPP, it could be seen that some
of the nomenclatures are different, albeit the fundamentals for the classification
remain almost the same. These differences could also accentuate the conceptual
dilemma of PPP.
2.3 A Survey of Key Theories relating to Public Pri-
vate Partnership
To set the stage for the review of the main theories that relate to PPP, the concept of
PPP is viewed in terms of the infrastructure approach referenced by many authors,
including Evans and Bowman, (2005), Grimsey and Lewis, (2004), Linder, (1999),
and Weihe, (2008) as well as multilateral institutions such as the World Bank. This
approach describes PPP as an arrangement whereby the public and private sectors
4Further information on World Bank’s classification of PPP is provided in Chapter 3
5See World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database.
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collaborate for the provision of infrastructure and related services that were hitherto
provided by the government or were the primary responsibility of the government.
As succinctly put by Leruth, (2012), there is no economic theory that is specifically
devoted to PPP, but it is clear that the general frameworks of game theory, con-
tract theory, project financing theory and theory of incentives, directly apply to this
subject area.
While the private sector investor is regarded as a partner in the arrangement, she is
also acting as an agent on behalf of the government, albeit assuming significant level
of risks with the expectation of fostering efficiency in the delivery of the joint out-
put. At the same time, the partnership is considered to be long termed and usually
calls for the establishment of a legally separate project company (special purpose
vehicle) through which additional debt capital can be raised from lenders with the
aim of achieving affordability. This relationship between the partners as well as the
debt providers can be explained by the agency theory under asymmetric information
(Bentz et al., 2002; Hart, 2003; Hart et al., 1996; Leruth, 2012; Vickerman, 2004).
The issue of optimal risk allocation in PPPs is said to be embedded in game the-
ory (Ho, 2006; Ho and Tsui, 2009, 2010; Ping Ho, 2005) and further expatiated in
the Incomplete Contracting Theory (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Aghion and Tirole,
1997; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Hart, 1995, 2003; Hart and Moore, 1988,
1999; Hart et al., 1996; Rausser and Ameden, 2003; Rausser and Stevens, 2009).
The institutional aspect and the rationale for the partnership are explained with ref-
erence to Transaction Cost Economics (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Jin, 2010)
and X-efficiency theory (Hammami et al., 2006).
This section therefore, provides a survey of these relevant theories which give cre-
dence to the concept of PPP.
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2.3.1 Game Theory
Notwithstanding the broad application of game theory in the study of economics
and other discipline, its history with PPP is quite recent. Peckiene et al., (2013)
show that only about 9 percent of the work done on allocation of risks in PPPs
employs game theory. Ho and Tsui, (2009) believe that more use should be made of
game theory as it can provide further insight to practitioners, including government
officials, developers and bankers, to better cooperate, with higher efficiency.
The theoretical literature on optimal risk allocation in PPP is expected to begin
with game theory because conflicts and strategic interactions between the partners
are very common and play crucial role in the performance of projects. In fact,
Myerson, (1991, p. 65) defines game theory as “the study of mathematical models
of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers”. Many
difficult issues such as opportunism, negotiations, competitive biddings, as well as
the relationship in the partnership itself constitute several rounds of games where the
partners exhibit their bargaining prowess to secure favourable outcomes. As noted
by Rausser and Ameden, (2013), achieving optimal risk allocation, for example, is
a function of the parties’ bargaining power. Binmore et al., (1992) concur that all
human interaction can be seen as a form of bargaining, which is at the core of game
theory.
In his paper, Nash Jr, (1950) introduced the bargaining problem as involving two
individuals who have the opportunity to collaborate for mutual benefit in more than
one way. He proposes that the negotiations between the parties must be formal-
ized and restricted, but in such a way that each participant is still able to utilize all
essential strength of his position.
The formal bargaining problem reflects a condition where two parties engage in
a bargaining process with the expectation of reaching an agreement and making
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themselves better off. To create the framework for analysing the bargaining process,
Nash Jr, (1950) assumes that:
(i) the parties are highly rational, which requires that there is a particular outcome
that accords each individual more utility than the individual could achieve on
his own elsewhere (see also Svejnar, 1986);6
(ii) the parties have symmetrical bargaining power;
(iii) each party can accurately compare his desires for various things;
(iv) each party has full knowledge of the tastes and preferences of the other; and
(v) the parties have concave Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, which
allows utility maximisation to be based on the attitude of the parties towards
risk rather than time.
However, the sequential bargaining theory, which was first introduced by Ståhl,
(1972) , attempts to resolve the indeterminacy by modelling the bargaining pro-
cess as series of offers and counter offers, which cannot go on endlessly as time
is of significant essence. Accordingly, Cross, (1965, p. 72) remarks that, “if it did
not matter when people agreed, it would not matter whether or not they agreed at
all”. Binmore et al., (1992) suggest therefore, that the parties’ time preference may
be highly relevant to the outcome of the bargaining. They also assume parties to
be impatience with the unproductive passage of time. To account for time, Ståhl,
(1972, 1988) used backward induction in finite horizon game and postulates non-
stationarity time preference in an infinite horizon game that led to the existence
of a “critical period” at which one party prefers to yield rather than to continue,
independently of what might happen next. Usually, the party that is seriously con-
strained by time will find prolong negotiations increasing his cost of disagreement.
This is usually the case for governments in Sub-Saharan Africa countries that are
desperate to score political goal by speedily concluding PPP projects.
6Roth and Malouf, (1979) shows that the assumption of strong individual rationality can be used
to replace the assumption of Pareto optimality in deriving the Nash Jr solution.
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Bargaining power is acknowledged to be the most crucial factor in allocating risks
between the parties in a PPP arrangement. Rausser and Ameden, (2013) note that
achieving optimal risk allocation is a function of the parties’ bargaining power
while Svejnar, (1986), Aghion et al., (1994) and Dür and Mateo, (2008b), all agree
that bargaining power is the main exogenous factor that enhances the gains of a
party in negotiations.
As noted by Svejnar, (1986, p. 1057), a party with no bargaining power can receive
a pay-off corresponding to the disagreement outcome while a party with complete
bargaining power appropriate the entire subject of bargaining. Since the bargaining
outcome is also seen as depending on each party’s unwillingness to suffer the cost of
disagreement, Svejnar defines fear of disagreement as the party’s aversion to risking
the disagreement outcome. However, he indicates that while experience bargaining
partners occasionally disagree about the current value of each other’s bargaining
power, “disagreement could arise because of changes in economic and institutional
conditions which, at least in the short run, asymmetrically affect the parties’ per-
ception of their relative power” (p. 1063). The findings of Ashenfelter and Johnson,
(1969) stroke the first chord by showing how parties’ bargaining power is affected
by changes in certain economic variables as well as sudden institutional factors.
The foregoing clearly indicates that game theory and its appendages could help
explain the expediency of time in reaching agreement in PPP negotiations, which
could help lower the cost of the project, as well as the effect of a party’s bargaining
power in the ultimate distribution of risks. In short, game theory could form the
basis for understanding the heterogeneity of partnership agreements and incentives
provided to private sector investors across countries and regions.
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2.3.2 Incomplete Contracting Theory (ICT)
Another theoretical basis for risk allocation and the ownership of residual facility in
PPPs is the Incomplete Contracting Theory, which is associated with the works of
Aghion and Bolton, (1992), Grossman and Hart, (1986), Hart, (1995), and Hart and
Moore, (1990), albeit some authors believe the theory originated from the works
of Williamson, (1975) who emphasises that market relations are problematic when
they require relationship-specific investments in a complex and uncertain environ-
ment.
The basic tenet of the theory is that if the parties have trouble anticipating all possi-
ble contingencies in a relationship, they may end up writing contracts that ex-ante
specify only the possible known pay-off contingencies and later on when the state
of the world is realised, they can fill in the additional details through a process
of renegotiations. The main problem with such arrangement relates to incentive-
compatibility, i.e., whether the parties have the propensity to be truthful in their
dealings under such circumstance (Dewatripont and Legros, 2005).
The uncertainty of the behaviour of the parties in the event of unanticipated shocks
which are not captured in the initial contract could lead to underinvestment in the re-
lationship due to fear of ex-post renegotiation. Specifically, a party that over-invests
ex-ante could find itself been robbed of the surplus generated from the investment
by the party that under-invested during ex-post renegotiations (Hart, 2003). As such,
“incomplete contracts typically fail to fully protect the parties against opportunis-
tic behaviour when it is difficult for a court to distinguish good-faith renegotiation
demands, (e.g., when exogenous market conditions have changed) from bad-faith
ones (those specifically triggered to take advantage of higher investment by the
other party)” (Dewatripont and Legros, 2005, p. 123).
According to Grossman and Hart, (1986) when two parties enter into a relationship
in which the asset will be used to generate income, the parties can, in principle,
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contractually specify exactly who will have control over each dimension of each
asset in each particular future contingency. To explain the theory, Grossman and
Hart, (1986), Hart, (2003), and Hart and Moore, (1990) focused on the ownership
of residual rights in a two-period model of integration of two parties, where the
product of the relationship is a private good. In period 1, the two parties form
a contract that allocates control rights and allows each party to make relationship
specific investments. In period 2, each party makes production decisions based
on the control rights designated under the contract. The production decisions and
market outcomes determine the partnership value for each party. In the first period,
the investments and the production decisions are not contractible. However, because
the partnership’s value is likely to be maximized with cooperative decisions, the
parties benefit from renegotiation in period 2 after observing investment. On the
assumption of symmetric information, renegotiation will lead to an efficient ex-
post allocation. The distribution of ex-post surplus, however, depends on the initial
allocation of ownership rights, and thus distorts ex-ante investment decisions. If
the parties are assumed to divide the partnership surplus symmetrically, both parties
under-invest, failing to achieve efficiency. Grossman and Hart, (1986) conclude that
if the first-period investment of one party has a larger effect on the partnership’s
value than that of the other party, the contract should assign the party with the more
valuable investment full control rights over decision making in the second period,
giving this party an incentive to invest optimally, thus maximizing the partnership
joint surplus. Therefore, in the case of jointly produced private good, assignment
of control rights to parties based on the value generated by investments can help
prevent under-investment.
Besley and Ghatak, (2001) extended the model to evaluate a partnership that pro-
duces public good, i.e., a products that is non-rivalry and non-excludable. In their
model, the two parties make relationship-specific investments, which is dependent
on their investment decisions. The parties are assumed to have different valuations
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of the project. If the contract is incomplete, in that the investments cannot be spec-
ified ex-ante, each party holds bargaining power after investments have been made
and the first best levels of investment are generally not reached. Unlike Gross-
man and Hart, Besley and Ghatak show that by allocating full ownership, and thus
all control rights, to the partner with the highest valuation of the project, which
might not necessarily be the one with the highest investment, joint surplus can be
maximized. Given this assignment of authority, the high-valuation partner has the
incentive and ability to invest optimally.
The works of Besley and Ghatak, (2001) and Grossman and Hart, (1986) focus on
the distribution of control rights in the provision of private and public goods re-
spectively. However, while this may provide important insights, it does not provide
a full framework for evaluating most PPP that generate impure goods. For exam-
ple, in the area of natural resources, PPPs produce impure goods such as environ-
mental remediation, water sanitation, infrastructure, or scientific research (Rausser
and Ameden, 2013). Francesconi and Muthoo, (2006) attempt to develop a frame-
work for evaluating PPP that generates impure goods and allows control rights to
be shared between the two partners rather than full delegation of rights to a single
party as recommended by Grossman and Hart as well as Besley and Ghatak. Their
model starts with a stage where the partners choose the allocation of control rights
and invest in the project. The partners then move on to the second stage where they
can make unilateral or joint decision through cooperative bargaining, rather than
invoking the control rights to optimize the surplus result. If the partners do not co-
operate, the project’s value, as determined by the allocation of control rights, will
be less than if they cooperate and thus, the ex-post bargaining affects the marginal
returns to investment for each partner, which are influenced in turn by the disagree-
ment payoffs coming from the ex-ante allocated control rights. At the second stage,
if the partners are confronted with unanticipated shocks, they move on to the third
stage, which may either lead to termination of the partnership or renegotiations of
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rights allocation similar to the first stage (see De Vries and Yehoue, 2013).
Francesconi and Muthoo, (2006) show that when the level of impurity is small (i.e.,
the partnership product is primarily a public good), control right should go to the
partner that values the results of the partnership the highest, consistent with Besley
and Ghatak, (2001). When the degree of impurity is large (i.e., the partnership
product is primarily a private good), control right should be allocated to the largest
investor, consistent with Grossman and Hart, (1986). If the degree of impurity is
large and investments are roughly equal, it is optimal for control rights to be shared,
with relatively greater share going to the low-valuation partner. If the degree of
impurity is neither small (i.e., public good) nor large (i.e., private good) and the
investment are of similar importance, it is optimal to allocate control rights to the
low-valuation partner.
It follows from Incomplete Contracting Theory that efficient assignment of residual
rights/facilities in PPP could help incentivise the partners’ ex-ante investment and
hence, maximise the partnership joint surplus. The efficient allocation of residual
facility could also be crucial for the survival of the relationship, which is an area
that is yet to be explored.
2.3.3 Theory of Transaction Cost Economics
The Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory has gained its importance in the
study of PPPs because it integrates economics, organization theory, contract law and
behavioural assumptions in an interdisciplinary study of organizational phenomena
(Williamson, 1981). The suitability also arises from many features of PPPs, which
include incomplete contracting, long-term partnerships, heavy investment in assets,
complex uncertainty, etc. (Jin et al., 2007). In addition, any issue that can be formu-
lated as a contracting problem can be investigated using transaction cost economics
(Williamson, 1985).
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The approach was developed out of institutional economics, which focuses on un-
derstanding the role of the evolutionary process and of individuals and institutions
in shaping economic behaviour. The origin of TCE can be traced from Coase’s
seminar paper, presented in 1937 entitled, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, where he ar-
gues that in the absence of transaction costs, there is no economic basis for the
existence of the firm. He focused his explanation on the cost of using markets to
effect contracts and exchanges, and argues that activities would be included within
the firm whenever the costs of using markets were greater than the costs of using
direct authority.
Arrow, (1969) refers to transaction cost as the costs of running the economic sys-
tem, which according to De Bettignies and Ross, (2004, p. 140), arises because
both the provider and the customer want to appropriate that surplus from trade, and
the bargaining and opportunistic behaviour that is generated may in itself be costly.
Such costs are the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems and are dis-
tinguished from production costs (Williamson, 1985). TCE poses the problem of
economic organization as a problem of contracting and assumes that human agents
are:
(i) subject to bounded rationality, where behaviour is ‘intendedly rational but
only limitedly so’ (Simon, 1957, p. xxiv); and
(ii) given to opportunism, which is a condition of ‘self-interest seeking with guile’
(Williamson, 1979, p. 234). This entails conveying false, misleading or dis-
torting information about one’s past, current or proposed future actions as long
as it is in one’s interest to do so.
According to Williamson, (1979), the purpose of economic organization is to devise
contract and governance structures that have the purpose and effect of economizing
on bounded rationality while simultaneously safeguarding transactions against the
hazards of opportunism. This implies that transactions with different attributes align
with the most efficient governance structures that minimize the costs associated with
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bounded rationality and opportunism. The theory further elucidates that there are
rational economic reasons for transactions to be organised in different ways. The
principal dimension to which transactions differ includes among other things, asset
specificity, which reflects the ease of asset mobility and redeployment to alternative
uses without sacrificing productive value (see Jin and Doloi, 2008; Williamson,
1996). Williamson, (1985) also notes that by assigning transactions to governance
structures in a discriminating way, transaction costs are economized.
TCE recognizes that the costs of using the pricing system gives rise to various forms
of economic organizations (Coase, 1998). The analysis of TCE is believed to super-
sede neoclassical economic analysis, which assumes that economic activities can
be coordinated costlessly by a system of prices and tells nothing about the organi-
zational structure (Hart and Moore, 1990). The approach draws upon additional
features of investment projects that are project financed, namely the investment
in transaction-specific (physical) assets that requires a large initial capital outlay.
When an asset has features that are highly specific to a particular use and has a
low alternative use value, any party that under a supply contract to supply one or
more necessary input for the use of that asset has an incentive to engage in ex-post
opportunistic behaviour (see De Vries and Yehoue, 2013). This is referred to as
the hold-up problem as the supplier has an incentive to hold-up the production by
refusing to supply the required inputs (Williamson, 1985). There are several costs
that may result from hold-up problems such as more frequent bargaining, all in a
bid to improve a party’s bargaining position.
According to De Bettignies and Ross, (2004, p. 140), one way to mitigate these so-
called ex-post inefficiencies is to limit opportunities for negotiations and bargaining
by writing long-term contracts between the partners in a PPP engagement. However,
he acknowledges that long term engagements such as PPPs are often very complex
and uncertain, which makes it impossible to plan for every potential contingencies,
and, even if every contingency could be predicted, it would probably be difficult
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to write them down in a contract that is enforceable by law.7 It is for this reason
mainly that governments/public sector partners who can assure the minimisation of
the transaction cost associated with PPPs have greater chances of attracting more
private sector investors (both in terms of number of investors and value of invest-
ment) into PPPs.
2.3.4 Agency Theory
As noted by Bentz et al., (2002), Hart, (2003), Hart et al., (1996), Leruth, (2012),
and Vickerman, (2004), the relationship between the partners in a PPP as well as
the debt providers can be explained by the agency theory under asymmetric infor-
mation.
In 1976, Jensen and Meckling proposed the Agency theory based on the precept
that the specification and distribution of rights determines how costs and rewards
will be allocated between contracting parties. As they puts it, “since the specifica-
tion of rights is generally effected through contracting (implicit as well as explicit),
individual’s behaviour will depend upon the nature of these contracts”(p. 308). As
a result, they define the agency relationship as a contract under which the principal
(the public sector partner), engages the agent (the private sector partner), to perform
some services on his behalf (e.g. to develop and operate an infrastructure project).
This relationship usually includes the principal delegating some decision-making
control to the agent and thus results in a separation of ownership from control.
Under the assumption that the parties are utility maximisers, there is the possibility
that the agent, in assuming certain control, may work contrary to the interest of the
principal. As such, it is impossible to draw up a perfect contract that will completely
stipulate every possible action of the agent when his actions affect the welfare of
the principal. The ensuing problem is how to optimally induce the agent to act
7This is consistent with the theory of incomplete contracting.
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in the best interest of the principal, particularly when the agent may have private
information that could affect the value of the output to the principal.
One of the ways in which the principal can align her interest to that of the agent
is by establishing appropriate incentive mechanisms, including paying the agent to
expend resources (bonding cost) to guarantee that she will not execute actions that
are considered detrimental to her. The principal can also incur monitoring costs
designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. Because it is impossible to
secure total alignment of interest between the parties, the principal is usually left
at a sub-optimal welfare position. The monetary value of the reduction in welfare
experienced by the principal due to this divergence of interest is also a cost of the
agency relationship and is referred to as the ‘residual loss’. In summary, the cost
incurred in attempting to induce the desired behaviour from the agent is referred
to as the agency cost, which is defined by Jensen and Meckling, (1976, p. 308)
as the sum of: (i) the monitoring expenditures by the principal; (ii) the bonding
expenditures by the agent; and (iii) the residual loss.
Jensen and Meckling argue that to further enhance the alignment of the interest of
the principal and agent, there is the need for a third party (an outsider ) in the rela-
tionship, the bond holder/bank. They assume that the riskiness of a project is known
only to the insiders (agent and principal) but not to potential outside investor (bond
holder) whose inclusion will not only allow the venture to benefit from tax shield,
but at the same time impose additional constraints on the behaviour of the insiders
such as the maintenance of a certain level of working capital and debt service cov-
erage ratio. All costs associated with such covenants are referred to as monitoring
costs and because both the external and internal monitoring costs are imposed on
the principal, it is in her interest to see that the monitoring is performed at the lowest
possible cost. This entails reducing the costs associated with asymmetric informa-
tion such as signalling costs for the agent, and screening and monitoring costs for
the principal.
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It is therefore, not surprising that the agency theory fits very well in the framework
of PPPs. Notwithstanding, until recently, very few authors have directly linked both
concepts, including Bentz et al., (2002), Leruth, (2012), and Vickerman, (2004), and
some indirectly, including Hart, (2003) and Hart et al., (1996). The principal-agent
model helps to identify risks associated with moral hazard that are not necessarily
different from those identified in PPPs. In addition, the theory provides ways to
limit moral hazard and suggests that risk should be assessed in terms of the ability
of the principal to obtain correct information from the agent. Leruth, (2012) notes
however, that the principal-agent theory has its limitation in the application of PPPs
because it does not cover all possible ‘vertical’ risks (those that affect the principal
as a result of moral hazard), but it certainly helps to explore important elements in
PPP contracts.
2.3.5 X-efficiency Theory
Some authors believe that the theoretical underpinning of the concept of PPP could
be attributed to the theory of X-efficiency developed by Leibenstein in 1966 (Fourie
and Burger, 2000; Hammami et al., 2006; Vining et al., 2005). Leibenstein postu-
lates a non-allocative effect of market power, which he believes will not only drive
a wedge between price and marginal cost, but will also raise the firm’s costs above
the technologically minimum levels. However, the precise nature of this inefficiency
was unclear to him and hence, he named it X (Frantz, 1992). Accordingly, Frantz
conclude that the existence of X-inefficiencies meant resource allocation could be
greatly improved in excess to what is originally conceived and that there is a possi-
bility for free-lunch.
According to the theory, inefficiency in the public sector emanates from the bu-
reaucratic behaviour of government officials who are considered to be motivated
not only by their duties towards governance, but also by their own aspirations (e.g.
maximising power and status) and value systems (Fourie and Burger, 2000). Such
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bureaucratic behaviour is assumed to cause misallocation of resources and an over-
supply of public goods (Brown et al., 1990). De Vries and Yehoue, (2013) note that
the inefficiency in the public sector was the main reason for the emergence of the
New Public Management in the UK under Margaret Thatcher and in other coun-
tries. The main goal of this paradigm shift was to implicitly introduce in the public
sector the functioning principles of the private sector (Hammami et al., 2006), with
the notion that public sector inefficiencies can be grossly minimized through part-
nership with the private sector because a profit maximising private sector partner
acting under competitive pressures is more likely to be efficient.
Though the public sector is presumed inefficient, it is believed that it cannot fail so
long as “official financial and monetary policies are expansionary enough to bail
them out or to limit their probability of failure” (Hammami et al., 2006, p. 5).
Therefore, an amalgamation of the public sector, which is presumed to be inefficient
but capable to meet short and long-term obligations, and the private sector, which is
presumed to be efficient, will culminate in greater value for money in the delivery
of infrastructure and related services. It is expected that the private sector will bring
into the relationship more flexibility, better management, better delivery of services
for the same price, as well as greater reduction in the operation and maintenance
cost of the asset.
Fourie and Burger, (2000) relates the efficiency of the private sector to be premised
on two core ideas:
(i) the pursuit of profits and the promise of personal financial gain for owners
and managers create powerful incentives to push the production and market-
ing processes to their most efficient and cost-minimising limits via good man-
agement and;
(ii) in a market environment, the pressure of competition from existing competi-
tors as well as potential entrants into the market, acts as a powerful disciplining
force on firms to be efficient in order to survive.
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They however, argue that the assumption about private sector efficiency is not nec-
essarily valid for some public sector activities, and its validity depends decisively
on the actual product and the context within which the production occurs (p. 5)
Notwithstanding its appeal in explaining the importance of the welfare impact of
market power, the theory of X-efficiency has attracted it own fair share of criti-
cism over the years. One of such criticisms relates to the assumption that individ-
uals are (constrained) fully rational decision makers and therefore, tries to mini-
mize ‘avoidable’ costs of production because ‘unavoidable’ costs are outside their
control. It is explained that for workers with a “taste for laziness” most costs of
production are unavoidable as lazy workers are not X-inefficient, but constrained
utility-maximizers (Frantz, 1992).
Another variant of this criticism, as explained by Frantz, (1992), is that higher costs
are due to rent-seeking, arguing that in any industry where rent-seeking is known
or suspected, higher costs must be due to (rational) rent-seeking and it becomes an
unavoidable cost (p. 435). Therefore, it is implicit in the criticism that allocative
inefficiency (a failure of the market) exists only if the individuals work for mo-
nopolist, but a rational utility-maximizing individuals can never be inefficient, and
hence, X-inefficiency cannot exist.
2.3.6 Public Choice Theory
The criticism of Frantz, (1992) is consistent with the assertion of Public Choice The-
ory, which modelled the government as comprising of officials who, aside of pur-
suing the public interest, seek to maximize their own self interest, thereby replacing
efficiency for personal gains (Buchanan, 2014; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Niska-
nen, 2008; Tullock, 2003). It will therefore, be wrong to assume that the actions of
these public officials are irrational, rather they are deliberate in order to gain access
to the resulting monopoly rent.
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Another major claim is that most political activities are a form of rent-seeking and
as Bhagwati, (1982), Krueger, (1974), and Tullock, (1989) argue, rent-seeking has
caused considerable waste of public resources, especially in developing countries
(McChesney, 2001). It is noted that such rent extraction happens when public offi-
cials use threats or bureaucratic bottle-neck to extort payments from private parties
whose desire is to achieve competitive hedge over rivals.
Studies have shown that transactions between the public and private sectors are
tainted with fraud (Nellis, 2003) and many a times users have not benefited from
the efficiency gained anticipated with private sector involvement in public service
delivery (Bloomgarden and Blumenfeld, 2013).
The above issues therefore, solicit the need for a government that is effective and
sincere in its dealings with the private sector in order to fully leverage the sec-
tor’efficiency for the development of public infrastructure and related services. This
brings into play the issue of corruption and other institutional as well administrative
bottlenecks that impede the success of the partnership.
2.4 Survey of Empirical Literature
2.4.1 Risk Allocation
Various researchers have suggested that the raison d’être for PPP is because it al-
lows the public sector to transfer risks to the private sector and leverage on the sec-
tor’s efficiency in the delivery of public infrastructure and related services (Broad-
bent and Laughlin, 2003; English, 2006). The notion is that the private sector will
bring into the partnership greater efficiency in the management of most of these
risks and thus ensuring greater possibility for long term success of the project. Also,
by transferring risks, the public sector partner ensures that the private sector part-
ner behaves in a manner appropriate for achieving value for money (Buxbaum and
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Ortiz, 2007; Edwards and Shaoul, 2003; Forrer et al., 2010; Kochendörfer and Ja-
cob, 2002). On a similar note, Girmscheid, (2013a) suggests that PPP is intended
to tap into the extra output created by the synergetic effect resulting from the amal-
gamation of the two sectors, which in turn is made possible through optimal risk
allocation that reflects the partners’ capacity. This means that there is need to trans-
fer the appropriate risks to the private sector partner otherwise she may respond by
escalating the provision for contingencies within the project or request for higher
premium or worse still, delivers low quality output.
It is with respect to the above that optimal risk allocation has been identified as
the most crucial factor responsible for the success of PPPs. As a result, many re-
searchers have attempted to develop framework that will capture the distribution
of risks between the public and private sectors in way that maximises value for
money. The survey conducted by Peckiene et al., (2013) shows that the most popu-
lar methodology for identifying and allocating risks in PPPs is questionnaire surveys
(55%), followed by Fuzzy Analytical and Hierarchical Process (Fuzzy AHP) (18%),
Fuzzy Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Situation (Fuzzy TOP-
SIS) (9%), Delphi survey (9%) and game theory (9%).
Rahman and Kumaraswamy, (2002) used a questionnaire approach to identified 41
risks elements in PPP infrastructure projects in Hong Kong. To allocate these risks
between the contracting parties, respondents’ perception of risk were captured on
a wider percentage scale to allow for more precise measurement and interpreta-
tion by the researchers. The research found that individual respondents within the
same group have different opinions, which can be in extreme divergence on the per-
centage risk allocation scale (e.g. 0% vs. 100%). This divergence in opinion is
explained to be largely attributed to respondents own experience. They concluded
that most of the risks should be shared between the parties, albeit at varying degrees,
which they say requires “joint and dynamic risk management, under the canopy of
flexible contract conditions with provisions for amicable adjustment processes and
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rapid coordinated multi-party responses to emerging problem scenarios”(p. 53).
Bing et al., (2005) used similar questionnaire approach to allocate risks between
partners in PPP construction projects in the UK. They were able to place a set of 46
risk elements into 13 risk categories, which were further placed into 3 meta-levels:
(i) Macro risks – containing political and governmental risks, macroeconomic
risks, legal risks, social risks and natural risks;
(ii) Meso risks – containing project selection risks, project finance risks, residual
risks, design risks, construction risks and operation risks; and
(iii) Micro risks – containing relationship risks and third party risks.
The risks were distributed to the partners based on the level of majority opinion of
the respondents. If over 50% of the respondents are in favour of allocating the risk
factor to the public sector, then the allocation approach of this risk factor is cate-
gorised as “allocated to the public sector” and so on. The research results show
that five risks (11% of the total risks identified) should be retained by the public
sector including; nationalisation/expropriation risk, poor political decision making
process risk, political opposition risk, site availability risk and government stabil-
ity risk. Relationship risks, force majeure risks and the risks of legislation changes
should be shared by both parties. The majority of the remaining project risks (70%),
especially those at the meso risk level (i.e., directly associated with the project it-
self), should be allocated to the private sector partner. Four risk factors; level of
public support, project approval and permits, contract variation and lack of experi-
ence cannot easily be allocated to a particular party nor shared. These results were
slightly different to those of Rahman and Kumaraswamy, (2002), which emphasise
the sharing of most of the risk as oppose to allocating them to the private sector.
Chung et al., (2010) find evidence that the perception of parties to bear risks af-
fects valuation of the risks. They conducted in-depth interviews with the aim of
qualitatively examining risk perceptions of different stakeholder groups to PPP toll
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roads in Australia. They found that experience accumulated over time and across
projects has contributed to the betterment of risk sharing optimisation amongst PPP
parties, yet many PPPs have encountered several problems due to misconceptions,
and hence the misallocation of risks. The findings suggest that most risks should be
best shared by both parties even though they may be perceived to be in the domain
of respective party’s field of expertise. In addition, the findings confirm that risk
perceptions about which party is best able to manage certain risks bear a powerful
influence on final risk allocation. The public sector perceives that the private sector
has developed sophisticated approaches to manage commercial risks, partly due to
accumulated experience, and partly due to the increasing market competition. The
most prominent commercial risks in toll roads are identified as traffic risk, financial
risk and risks associated with ownership.
When analysing risk allocation in China’s PPP, Ke et al., (2010) deviated slightly
from the ordinary interview and questionnaire surveys approach to using a Delphi
survey technique. This technique was developed by Dalkey and Helmer in 1963
and it seeks to achieve convergence of opinion concerning real-world knowledge
solicited from experts within certain topic areas through several rounds of intensive
questionnaires interspersed with controlled opinion feedback and with results of
each round being fed into the next round (Ludwig, 1997) and disagreement amongst
respondents are used as a trigger for deeper analysis. Using this technique, Ke et al.,
(2010) were able to identify 37 potential types of risks and distribute these risks into
five categories:
(i) Risks with a mean score smaller than 1.5 should be solely allocated to the
public sector;
(ii) risks with a mean score greater than or equal to 1.5 and smaller than 2.5 should
be mostly allocated to the public sector;
(iii) risks with a mean score greater than or equal to 2.5 and smaller than 3.5 should
be equally shared by both parties;
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(iv) risks with a mean score greater than or equal to 3.5 and smaller than 4.5 that
should be mostly allocated to the private sector; and
(v) risks with a mean score greater than or equal to 4.5 should be solely allocated
to the private sector.
The results show that no risk should be allocated to the private sector. The expla-
nation forwarded by the authors is that the respondents maybe of the belief that the
private investors will inevitably encounter problems caused by government officials
and their actions during the implementation of the agreement. This finding is sim-
ilar to that of Sachs et al., (2007) and Wang et al., (2004) who indicate that China
lacks the discipline and requisite experience to follow through on PPP agreements.
Therefore, having the government sharing or assuming all the risks is expedient for
the success of the partnership.
To provide for a more robust analysis on risk allocation, KarimiAzari et al., (2011)
and Xu et al., (2010) used different variants of Fuzzy set theory to allocate risk
between the contracting partners. Fuzzy set theory was developed and first pub-
lished by Zadeh and Goguen in 1965 to generalize the classical notion of a set and a
proposition to accommodate fuzziness contained in human language. According to
Zadeh, (1996), the notion of a fuzzy set provides a “convenient point of departure
for the construction of a conceptual framework which parallels in many respects the
framework used in the case of ordinary sets, but is more general than the latter” (p.
339). It is considered as a modelling language in situations wherein fuzzy relations,
criteria, and phenomena exist (Zimmermann, 2010).
Using data from contracting parties and experts from Hong Kong, and employing
the fuzzy logic theory, which transforms the linguistic principles and experiential
expert knowledge into a more usable and systematic quantitative base analysis, Lam
et al., (2007) distributed 16 risk events between the public and private sectors. These
risk events were placed into five thematic groups: (i) capability risks (ii) contractual
and legal risks (iii) economic risks (iv) physical factors risks and (v) political and
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societal risks. The results show that the entire capacity and economic risks should
be allocated to the private sector partner while the entire contractual and legal risks
should be allocated to the public sector partner. Of the physical risk, ground con-
dition and access to site should be allocated to the public sector while quantitative
variation and inclement weather should go to the private sector partner. Similarly,
of the political and societal risk, labour dispute and strike is to be allocated to the
private sector partner; public disorder is to be allocated to the public sector partner
while changes in laws and regulations is to be shared between the partners. The re-
sults of the research were compared against the risk identified from the Hong Kong
Railway General Conditions of Contract for Civil Engineering and Building Works
(RGCC) and was discovered to be quite similar except for the ownership of inflation
and inclement weather risks, which RGCC suggests sharing rather than transferring
to the private sector.
Xu et al., (2010) used a combination of Delphi Questionnaire Survey and Fuzzy Set
Theory to identify and prioritise a total of 17 critical PPP risks in China and subse-
quently used Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) technique to form the underlying
cluster of relative importance of these PPP risks.8 To obtain the critical risk factors
(CRF), they used a Varimax Rotation factor extraction method along with Kaiser
Normalization. The results show that under China’s specific political, economic,
cultural and legal circumstances, PPP risks can be placed into 6 groups (i) Macroe-
conomic risk (ii) Construction & operation risk (iii) Government maturity risk (iv)
Market environment risk (v) Economic viability risk and (vi) Government interven-
tion risk. However, the top two risk groups identified were government intervention
risk and government maturity risk, which they believe is caused by inefficient leg-
islative and supervisory systems for PPP projects, thus placing critical barriers to
the successful implementation of PPPs in China.
8See Fabrigar and Wegener, (2011) for further explanation on EFA
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2.4.2 Public Private Partnership and Value for Money
In spite of the attempt by many researchers to distribute risks between the parties
in PPPs, the fundamental reason for such distribution, which is to achieve value for
money (VfM), did not come out clearly in most of the studies. Achieving VfM has
been the main justification for governments around the world to engage in PPPs.
The notion is that the private sector will assume certain risks that would have oth-
erwise proved challenging and probably too costly for the public sector to manage,
and also brings greater efficiency in the delivery of public infrastructure and related
services. This section review literature related to the achievement of VfM in PPPs.
Arndt, (1998) presented one of the earliest empirical works that attempts to link
risk allocation and efficiency to VfM. To make the connection, Arndt used an in-
depth interview technique to gather data on PPP risks in Australia to tested several
hypotheses including:
(i) Hypothesis: the creation of a mutually acceptable risk allocation framework
would provide certainty to the market and would help to reduce the time taken
up with risk allocation negotiations, which reduces transaction cost and hence
the price paid for the joint output.
(a) Finding: the findings of the survey confirms this hypothesis as many re-
spondents expressed desire for the government to focus on reducing the
very high transaction costs that exist in prolonged negotiations.
(ii) Hypothesis: the level of risk aversion of private sector sponsors would re-
duce as they gained more experience and became comfortable with the risks
involved, thereby requesting for lower premium for assumed risk, which trans-
late to higher value for money.
(a) Finding: the findings support this hypothesis in part by the observed trend
that the party with greater experience seemed to be less concerned about
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certain risks, indicating that the party will be happier to accept contractual
solutions that had been agreed to in past projects.
To identify the factors that hamper the achievement of VfM in PPP procurement
across Britain, Asenova et al., (2003) conducted 68 interviews with senior man-
agers from public and private sector organisations. The private sector respondents
were selected on basis of their records of expertise in PPP procurement, while the
interviewees from the public sector were selected on the basis of having partici-
pated in at least one PPP project. The study found that inexperience of the public
sector in commercial deal making, and specifically in PPP procurement, is the prin-
ciple reason for not achieving VfM. Another difficulty highlighted is the pace of the
procurement process, which was indicated to be highly unsatisfactory and the over-
all negotiation time was unnecessarily long, exceeding, in some cases, two years.
The lengthy negotiation period was attributed to the public sector’s bureaucratic at-
titudes, slow decision making process and tendency of the public sector to make
alterations quite late in the project, requiring contractual issues to be re-assessed in
the light of new changes. The study also found that the client’s ability to finance
a project also often leads to delays as the private partners are not willing to com-
mit resources only to find out mid-project that there was a lack of funding from
other source, e.g., banks. Based on these challenges, the study concludes that in
order for PPP to become more effective and deliver VfM, the engagement should
be de-politicised.
The research conducted by Li et al., (2005) using similar methodology gave fur-
ther credence to the work of Asenova et al., (2003) by highlighting the general
hindrances to achieving VfM in PPPs in the UK. The results show that VfM is un-
achievable if: (i) risks are inefficiently allocated to and managed by the partners;
(ii) cost of PPP procurement is high due mainly to private partner extra spending in
putting up bids that they are not guaranteed to win and public sector partner often
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relying heavily on expensive professional; (iii) negotiations are lengthy and com-
plex, a process that could stretch into several months or years, which may result in
‘bidding fatigue’; (iv) the difficulty to specify the quality of a service compared to
specifying a tangible asset. Sometimes the precise definition of a high quality ser-
vice may be elusive, which allows different interpretations and can result in post-
contract disputes; and (v) financial management services are priced in a vacuum
during the bidding stage.
2.4.3 Other Factors affecting the Success of Public Private Part-
nership
As mentioned earlier, many scholars have alluded that private investors take into
consideration several factors before making investments or deciding against termi-
nating existing investments in a particular country. Some of these factors relate to
the country’s institution - e.g. legal and regulatory framework - economic - e.g.
inflation and exchange rate - and fiscal constraints - e.g. public sector debt burden -
all of which in cognisance of the transaction cost of doing business in the country.
In their empirical work, Hammami et al., (2006) tested several hypotheses with the
aim of identifying the determinants of a country’s PPP for infrastructure develop-
ment and related services. The methodology used for the analysis was based on the
nature of the dependent variable. In the case where the dependent variable is the
number of PPP projects (i.e., discrete count dependent variable), they used Poisson
or Negative Binomial regression models; in the case where the dependent variable
is the non-negative US dollar value of investments in PPP projects (i.e., a contin-
uous non-negative dependent variable), they used Tobit regression model and; in
the case where the dependent variable is the extent of private participation in PPP
arrangements, they used Ordered Logit model.
The results indicate that the market condition channel, which reflects the demand
risk of the project output, is the most important channel for determining the success
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of PPP projects. This suggests that lack of price stability as well as the offering by
government of exchange rate guarantees increase the possibility of high solvency
risk and limit the number of PPPs. The results further emphasise the positive im-
pact of a country’s previous PPP experience as well as the beneficial role played by
some multilateral and regional development institutions in enhancing the success of
PPPs. They note that multilateral institutions provide a combination of expertise,
guarantees, loans, equity finance and risk management facilities for PPP projects.
The political environment channel was also found to be significant as it indicates
that ethnically fractionalized societies, political biases, and the lack of checks and
balances from the legislature discourage the formation of PPPs. More generally,
government involvement makes PPP decisions difficult even in the absence of pol-
itics. Finally, the results show a statistically significant lead in the number of PPPs
in Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe and Central Asia over the other
regions.
Applying ordered probit and generalise least squared (GLS) regression techniques,
Yehoue, (2013) found that Institutional factors affecting bureaucracy quality, gov-
ernment stability, and corruption are important for PPPs through their impacts on
GDP growth. He elaborates on the quality of a country’s institution as having direct
link with its risk profile, noting that as PPP is founded on a contractual relationship,
it is critical for the existence of a well functioning institutional environment, par-
ticularly the regulatory environment. He went on to outline the main elements for
regulatory environment to include: specific and transparent PPP law; clear mecha-
nisms for litigation and early termination; guidelines for risk allocation and; formal
rules on accounting. He also notes that a good legal system promotes lasting rela-
tionship between the partners, an issue that is in sync with the assertions of Pistor et
al., (2000) and Berkowitz et al., (2003). Pistor et al. point out that the effectiveness
of legal institutions has much stronger impact on the availability of external finance
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than do laws on the books, while Berkowitz et al. indicate that legal technical as-
sistance programs that focus primarily on improving the statutory laws in develop-
ing countries without ensuring effective implementation have proved useless, thus
insinuating that laws without enforcement is tantamount to wasted resources. In
addition, countries with strong democratic accountability are more likely to attract
bigger PPP investment.
Aside from institutional factors, Yehoue, (2013) also found that governments that
establish stable macroeconomic conditions, adequate tariff regimes, a track record
of meeting obligations, as well consistent economic policies will find itself in a
pool of private sector investors and efficient infrastructure service providers. One
such macroeconomic factor that is referenced by the private sector to join PPP ar-
rangements, is the country’s exchange rate. This factor is particularly important
for developing and emerging countries that enter into PPP arrangements where the
proceeds from the PPP output are generated in local currencies while obligations
to sponsors and lenders are met in foreign currencies. Under such circumstance,
an unanticipated depreciation of the local currency will have significant effect on
the project profitability. Another macroeconomic factor is the level of income (or
purchasing power) of the potential customers for the PPP output, which indicates
the ability of the final consumer to pay for the services at market prices.
Like Hammami et al., (2006), Yehoue, (2013) referenced the positive influence of
countries’ experience in PPPs on the success of the relationship, indicating that as
a country implements more PPPs, there is the tendency for it to accumulate a pool
of expert negotiators and limit unnecessary bureaucratic bottlenecks.
2.4.4 Fiscal Risk emanating from Public Private Partnership
It is acknowledged that for PPP to deliver value for money, rights and obligations,
including risks, must be optimally distributed between the public and private sector
partners with the presumption that each partner is capable of absorbing the impact
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of the eventuating contingencies. The risks and other obligations assumed by the
public sector under the partnership could pose significant financial burden on the
public sector budget, which may stifle a country’s economy and/or undermine gov-
ernance (Aslan and Duarte, 2014). The risk emanating from PPPs is part of the
overall risk of the government, which is referred to as fiscal risk.
According to Lusinyan et al., (2009, p. 4), fiscal risk is broadly defined as the ‘devi-
ations of fiscal outcomes from what was expected at the time of the budget or other
forecast’, which may arise from macroeconomic shocks (economic growth, com-
modity prices, interest rates, or exchange rates) and the realization of contingent
liabilities (obligations triggered by an uncertain event including: explicit liabilities
– those defined by law or contract, e.g., debt guarantees – and implicit liabilities –
those relating to moral or expected obligations for the government, based on public
expectations or pressures, e.g., bailouts of banks or public sector entities).
The view held by many researchers is that contingent liabilities have become a
very significant part of fiscal performance in many countries, requiring effective
monitoring and management. According to Polackova Brixi and Schick, (2002),
many countries have fallen foul of the effect of eventuating contingent liabilities,
including Malaysia, Mexico, and Pakistan where government debts have risen from
unexpected defaults on government guarantees that had been issued to promote par-
ticipation in PPP for infrastructure projects. The research undertaken by Lusinyan
et al., (2009) reaffirms this finding by indicating that ‘during the 1990s, calls on
demand guarantees related to PPPs in power, telecoms, and toll roads in Colombia
resulted in cumulative payments of 2 percent of GDP by 2004. Substantial obli-
gations on PPP contracts in power plants and roads also became due in Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Thailand during the Asian crisis’ (p. 13).
Kharas and Mishra, (2001) found that across nearly 50 countries, the large increases
in the stock of government debt cannot be explained by the governments’ reported
budget deficits, but rather from off-budget transactions. They therefore, referred
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to this annual increase in government debt in excess of budget deficit as “hidden
deficit” and further show that hidden deficit stems mainly from the cost of realized
contingencies. They note that for developing and transition countries, contingent
liabilities have contributed, on average, to hidden deficit of more than 2 percent
of GDP annually over a period of more than 10 years. Cangiano et al., (2006)
show that PPPs have been the main source of fiscal risk in many advanced market
economies, particularly for large investment projects in transportation infrastructure
and the power sector.
With all the potential fiscal risks associated with contingent liabilities from PPPs,
the study undertaken by OECD/ITF, (2008) shows an increase number of govern-
ments around the world, including Australia, Hungary, Mexico, and the United
Kingdom, dishing out more guarantees and providing equity contribution as well
operating subsidies for PPP infrastructure projects. Lusinyan et al., (2009) estimate
the gross costs for individual projects on governments to amount to 1
2
percent of the
respective country’s GDP.
2.5 Conclusion and Research Gap
This chapter was divided into three main sections. The first section provides his-
torical evidence on the existence of PPP and suggests that the concept of PPP has
always been in the history of development as societies traverse along the spectrum
of various economic paradigms. It highlights that the recent hype in the concept
of PPP emanates from countries’ need to accelerate and bring greater efficiency in
the delivery of public infrastructure and related services. It was noted in the sec-
tion that the main reason for the partnership between the private and public sectors
is to minimise inefficiency and maximise value for money. It was indicated how-
ever, that many countries have suffered from the fiscal risks emanating from PPP
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arrangements, particularly when such risks remain unmanaged or the public partner
lacks the wherewithal to meet eventuating obligations.
The second section highlights some of the relevant theories that give credence to
PPP, which includes:
(i) Game theory - this theory explains the bargaining process between the partners
in reaching optimal risk allocation;
(ii) Incomplete Contracting theory - the incomplete contracting theory highlights
the difficulty, or rather impossibility, of producing an ultimate contract that
captures all seen and unforeseen contingencies in the partnership and how this
incompleteness of contracts affect the investment decision of the partners;
(iii) Theory of Transaction Cost Economics - this theory focuses on the role of
individuals and institutions in shaping economic behaviour;
(iv) Agency theory - the theory shows the effect of non-alignment of interest be-
tween the principal (government) and the agent (private sector) and the need
to provide both internal and external incentives to bridge the interest gap;
(v) X-efficiency theory - this theory views the public sector as inefficient and
therefore, to achieve greater value for money in the delivery of public in-
frastructure, there is the need for this sector to collaboration with the private
sector, which is considered to be efficient in the management of resources.
(vi) Public Policy theory - this theory does not view public sector official as being
inefficient, but rather whose action are geared towards maximising their self
interest. In such a case therefore, policies and laws should be implemented
that limit this selfish behaviour, thus giving confidence to potential private
sector investors to engage in PPPs.
The third section presents the empirical literature on PPPs. It shows that various
researchers have employed the technique of interview, questionnaire, Delphi survey
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and fuzzy set theory to create a framework for the distribution of risks between
the partners in PPPs. It however, appears that there is no consensus among these
researchers as to the level and types of risks that should be shouldered by each of the
partner that will lead to the achievement of value for money. Some of the researchers
intimate that because of the strong possibility for governments interference in the
operations of such long-term relationship, all the risks should be allocated to the
public sector, while others think that because of the ability of the private sector to
efficiently manage resources, all risks should be transfer to this sector. Yet still,
others took a middle ground and proffer that risks should be shared between the
two partners depending on each ability and perception to manage the risk.
The other set of empirical work attempts for the first time to establish economic
relationships between institutional, economic, governance and political variables
on the one hand, and the success of PPP projects for infrastructure development
on the other, using mainly the World Bank’s private participation in infrastructure
dataset and applying various regression techniques.
In all, the review illuminates that scholars have, to a great extent, connected theories
to the PPP framework. However, the empirical research on this framework is still
limited as the focus has been on the optimal allocation of risks between the partners
with very few research attempting to analyse how these risks affect the success of
the partnership as well as the decision making process of the partners, particularly
the private sector partner.
While De Vries and Yehoue, (2013) and Hammami et al., (2006) have used regres-
sion techniques to show how some of these risk factors affect the outcome of PPPs,
there has been significant proliferation in PPP projects since they conducted their
research.9 This therefore, calls for an update in the relationship and an inspection
9The work of Hammami et al., (2006) used PPI dataset ending 2003, while that of De Vries and
Yehoue, (2013) used the dataset ending 2008. As seen in Figure 1.2, there is a sizeable number
of projects implemented between the period 2004 to 2014 across many countries within different
regions and the dynamics of PPPs have changed over time.
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of additional variables that are of relevance in explaining such proliferation. To this
end, the first empirical chapter (Chapter 4) of this thesis will attempt to provide an
update of the relationship of certain relevant risk factors and the attractiveness of
countries for PPP engagements, using appropriate regression techniques.
Another fundamental issue in almost all the theories mentioned in Section 2.3 is
that of incentive compatibility arising from the incompleteness of PPP contracts
and partners lack of propensity to be truthful in their dealings in the event of ex-
post renegotiation, which could result to a hold-up problem. This hold-up problem
has the tendency of increasing the transaction cost of the partnership as well as
impacting negatively on the partners ex-ante investment, thus reducing the partner-
ship joint surplus. The theory of incomplete contracting has referenced the role of
residual ownership as a way of mitigating the hold-up problem and incentivising
partners ex-ante investment. The need for empirical research to make the connec-
tion between residual ownership and the success of PPP projects therefore, is very
vital in enhancing understanding in this subject area. To this end, the second empiri-
cal chapter (Chapter 5) of this thesis will attempt to establish a relationship between
residual facility ownership and the survival of PPP projects using the methodology
of survival analysis.
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TABLE 2.1: IMF Classification of Public Private Partnerships
PPP Schemes Modalities
Build-own operate (BOO) The private sector designs, builds, owns, develops, operates and manages
Build-develop-operate (BDO) an asset with no obligation to transfer ownership to the government.
Design-construct-manage-finance (DCMF) These are variants of design-build-finance-operate (DBFO) scheme
Buy-build-operate (BBO) The private sector buys or leases an existing asset from the government,
Lease-develop-operate (LDO) renovates, modernizes, and/or expands it, and then operates the asset,
Wrap-around addition (WAA) again with no obligation transfer ownership back to the government.
Build-operate-transfer (BOT) The private sector designs and builds an asset, operates it, and the
Build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) transfers it to the government when the operating contract ends, or
Build-rent-own-transfer (BROT) at some other pre-specified time. The private partner may
Build-lease-operate-transfer (BLOT) subsequently rent or lease the asset from the government.
Build-transfer-operate (BTO)
Source: International Monetary Fund (2004)
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Chapter 3
Exploratory Analysis of the Private
Participation in Infrastructure
Dataset
3.1 Introduction
Like most research on public private partnership (PPP) for infrastructure develop-
ment and related services, including De Vries and Yehoue, (2013) and Hammami
et al., (2006), this research utilises the World Bank’s Private Participation in In-
frastructure (PPI) database as the main source of data.1 The database provides a
comprehensive set of data for infrastructure projects that have the participation of
private sector investors in countries around the world. However, this thesis focuses
on low and middle income countries across the six regions of the world with the
aim of assessing how Sub-Saharan Africa, as a region, compares with other re-
gions and what lessons can be learnt from the high performing regions. To this end,
this chapter will attempt to motivate sophisticated empirical work by providing an
exploratory analysis of the PPP dataset for the year ending 2014, which includes
longitudinal data on public infrastructure projects for the period 1980 to 2014.
As elucidated by Chatfield, (1986), exploratory data analysis (EDA) helps to bring
out the general structure of data through descriptive summaries that will inform
more sophisticated analyses. The concept of EDA was brought to the fore after
1PPP and PPI are used interchangeably consistent with other studies including De Vries and
Yehoue, (2013) and Hammami et al., (2006)
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the book published by Tukey in 1977 entitled, “Exploratory Data Analysis” (see
Tukey, 1980). However, some scholars still prefer to use different nomenclature to
describe the same concept of providing greater insight into datasets, for example,
Cox and Snell, (1981) refer to it as ‘Preliminary Data Analysis’.
As noted above, this chapter will attempt, through exploratory analysis, to extract
relevant information from the PPP dataset that will help provide answers to some
of the questions faced by researchers, practitioners and policy-makers in the devel-
opment of public infrastructure and related services through the PPP framework as
well as to inform the empirical analyses in Chapters 4 and 5. Some of the questions
making the round include:
(i) Are countries embracing the idea of private sector involvement in the delivery
of public infrastructure and related services?
(ii) Which of the four major infrastructure sectors, energy, transport, telecom,
and water and sewerage, have benefited the most from private sector involve-
ment?2
(iii) Do countries attract more projects because of their regional, sectoral, income
and International Development Association (IDA) grouping?
(iv) Is the performance of PPP projects affected by their regional, sectoral, income
and IDA grouping?
(v) How have different PPP arrangements (greenfield, concession etc.) performed
over the years and which PPP sub-type (build, operate and transfer (BOT);
2
(i) The energy sector comprises of electricity generation, transmission and distribution as well as
natural gas transmission and distribution.
(ii) The telecom sector comprises of fixed and mobile local telephony, and fixed and mobile inter-
national long-distance telephony.
(iii) Transport sector comprises of airport runways and terminals; railway fixed assets, freight, and
passenger service; roads, bridges, highways, and tunnels; and seaport channel dredging and
terminals.
(iv) The water and sewerage sector comprises of potable water generation and distribution, as well
as sewage collection and treatment.
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build, own and operate (BOO); rehabilitate, operate and transfer (ROT), etc.)
has attracted the most projects?
(vi) Do the participation of multilateral institutions in the PPP arrangement affects
the outcome of the project?
The rest of the chapter begins with an overview of the PPP dataset, followed by
three sections with headings: Trend of PPPs, Distribution of PPPs and Status of
PPPs, which attempt to answer the questions highlighted above, and ends with a
final section that gives a brief conclusion of the chapter.
3.2 Overview of the PPP Dataset (1980 - 2014)
The PPP dataset is compiled by the World Bank and it provides longitudinal data
on the characteristics of public infrastructure projects that have the participation of
the private sector. Table 3.1 gives a snapshot of the dataset, indicating a total of 38
fields (variables).3 The general dataset consists of a total of 6530 projects, which are
implemented in the four major infrastructure sectors in 139 low and middle income
countries.
The countries are placed into three income groupings; low, lower middle and up-
per middle income, as well as three IDA status groupings (IDA-only, Blended and
Non-IDA), which indicates the World Bank’s window through which the country
is eligible to access development financing.The dataset shows four main types of
PPP projects (concession, divestiture, greenfield, and management and lease) and
twelve sub-types (see Figure 3.9) as well as indicates the statuses of the project, i.e.,
whether the project is cancelled, merged, operational, in distress, under construc-
tion or successfully concluded, alongside the dates when the statuses were updated.
It also shows the anticipated duration of the project, the sponsors (private investors)
that participated in the project, the banks financing the project and the multilateral
3A description of the fields in the dataset is found in the World Bank’s PPI website
Chapter 3. Exploratory Data Analysis 65
institutions that are part of the project arrangement amongst other things. For the
sponsors, the country of domicile indicates whether they are foreign or local, and
for multilateral institutions, the type and value of financing (equity or loan) are in-
dicated as well as whether loan financing are provided through syndication. Of the
845 PPP projects that have the participation of multilateral institutions, the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation (IFC), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) took part in about 34,
11 and 10 percent of them respectively. The dataset also gives the value of govern-
ment support towards the project, albeit very few observations are available.
TABLE 3.1: Snapshot of the PPP Dataset
Data Fields (Variables) Structure Sample of Observations
Region fctr Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, La...
Country fctr St. Lucia, Botswana, Antigua and Barbuda, Chile, Chile,...
IncomeGroup fctr Upper middle income, Upper middle income, Upper middle ...
IDA.Status fctr Blended, Non-IDA, Non-IDA, Non-IDA, Non-IDA, Non-IDA, N...
Financial.closure.year int 1980, 1980, 1981, 1981, 1982, 1982, 1982, 1984, 1984, 19...
Financial.closure.Month fctr January, March, January, January, June, June, June, Dec...
Project.name fctr Cable and Wireless St Lucia Operating Unit, Botswana Te...
RelatedNames fctr , Be Mobile, , Complejo Manufacturero de Equipos, TelCo...
Type.of.PPP fctr Greenfield project, Management and lease contract, Gree...
Subtype.of.PPP fctr Build, own, and operate, Management contract, Build, ow...
Project.status fctr Operational, Concluded, Operational, Operational, Opera...
Primary.sector fctr Telecom, Telecom, Telecom, Telecom, Telecom, Telecom, T...
Secondary.sector fctr N/A, N/A, N/A, N/A, N/A, N/A, N/A, N/A, N/A, N/A, N/A, ...
Subsector fctr Telecom, Telecom, Telecom, Telecom, Telecom, Telecom, T...
Segment fctr Fixed access, mobile access, and long distance, Fixed a...
Location fctr , , , Metropolitan, V, VI, VII and VIII Region., , , , ...
ContractPeriod fctr , 15, , , , , , , , , , 13, 10, 15, 18, 20, 6, 6, 6, , ...
TerminationYear fctr , 1995, , , , , , , , , , 2000, 1994, 1999, 2003, 2016,...
GovtGrantingContract fctr .., .., .., .., .., .., .., .., .., .., .., .., .., ..,...
TypeOfGovtSupport fctr , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,...
InvestmentYear int 1980, 1980, 1981, 1981, 1982, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1984, 19...
PercentPrivate dbl 100, NA, 100, NA, NA, NA, NA, 90, 100, NA, NA, 100, 100,...
GovtPaymentCommitments fctr 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1.8, 2....
TotalInvestment dbl 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 14.8, 0.0, 13.0, 62.0, 12.2, 13.0, 0...
dateStatusUpdated fctr , , , , , , , , , , , 06/01/2000, 06/01/1994, 06/01/199...
CapacityType fctr Number of connections (thousands), , , , , , , MW , , ,...
Capacity fctr 30, , , , , , , 63.5, , , , 71, 130, 27, , , 450, 389, ...
Technology fctr Cable, Cable, Cable, Cable, Cable, Cable, Cable, Diesel...
BidCriteria fctr Not Applicable, Not Applicable, Not Applicable, Not App...
AwardMethod fctr , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Direct negoti...
Sponsors fctr Cable and Wireless (.. / United Kingdom), Cable and Wir...
MultiLateralSupport fctr , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,...
Revenue.Source fctr User fees, , , User fees, User fees, User fees, User fe...
ProjectGrid fctr , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,...
DebtEquityGrantRatio fctr , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,...
EquityFundingPrivateSources dbl NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, ...
ConcessionPeriodType fctr , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,...
ProjectBanks fctr , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Bank of China...
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3.3 Trends in PPPs (1980 - 2014)
As can be seen from Figure 3.1, the PPP concept gained momentum from around
the mid 1990s. Before this time just a few PPP projects were implemented. For
example, in 1980 only 2 projects were implemented and in 1991 the number rose
to 28. However, after 1991 there was dramatic increasing in the number of projects
with 380 projects implemented in 1997, reflecting the full embracement of the PPP
concept by many countries, particularly in South Asia, and Latin America and the
Caribbean (see also Figure ??). After 1997 up until around 2005 there was a fall
in the total number of projects implemented, reflecting some of the impact of the
Asian financial crisis, which started around 1997 and raised fears of a worldwide
economic meltdown due to financial contagion (Hunter et al., 2012). This crisis
FIGURE 3.1: Annual flows of PPP Projects in the Four Sectors
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saw a drastic fall in capital flows to Asian economies and a spillover effects in other
parts of the world. Again, the global financial crisis which occurred around 2008
caused another noticeable movement in capital around the world (see Fratzscher,
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2012), leading to a brief period of reduction in project implementation. After this
stint of reduction, the number of projects implemented rose significantly to reach
its highest ever recorded for a single year in 2011 (441 projects), albeit showing a
downward trajectory thereafter. On average, a total of 192 projects are implemented
each year over the period under consideration.
As portrayed in Figure 3.1, the energy sector has been the biggest benefactor in
attracting PPP projects. However, Figure 3.2 indicates that it was the telecom sector
that first rose to prominence as it attracted the greatest number of projects in the
early 1990s.
FIGURE 3.2: Density Plot of number of PPP Projects (1980 - 2014)
(log-scale)
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
de
ns
ity
Primary.sector Energy Telecom Transport Water and sewerage
This figure helps to show how important the different sectors have
been over the years. It indicates that the telecom sector rose to promi-
nence early as it attracted most of the PPP projects between 1990 to
2000, followed by the water and sewerage, and energy sectors.
Projects implemented in the water and sewerage sector increased steadily over the
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FIGURE 3.3: Annual PPP projects Implementation by Region and
Sector
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years until 2007 when it started to decline, while the energy sector projects main-
tained consistent increase for the longest period of time. Noticeably, the trans-
port sector witnessed cycles of boom and slumps in project implementation over
the years. At a regional level, Figure 3.3 indicates that the Latin America and the
Caribbean (LAC) region seems to have a relatively good mixture of distribution of
project implementation amongst the various sectors. The region appears to be the
earliest embracer of the PPP concept and shows a consistent increase in project im-
plementation each year until around the year 2000 when the total number of projects
fell to a new sustained level and also the focus moved from telecom to energy. Like
LAC, the East Asia and Pacific (EAP) region also embraced the concept of PPP at
its nascent stage, but with comparatively less projects implemented. Europe and
Central Asia (ECA) experienced a sustained decline in PPP projects implementa-
tion from a high level of around 400 projects in 1995 to 23 projects in 2013. The
South Asia region underwent a complete transformation from telecom to energy and
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transport projects, while nearly all the projects in the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) re-
gion are implemented in the telecom sector, likewise in the Middle East and North
Africa region, albeit with lesser number of projects.
FIGURE 3.4: IDA Status of Countries within each Income Group
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3.4 Distribution of PPPs
As indicated in Section 3.2, countries are placed into three IDA groups: IDA-only,
Blended and Non-IDA. IDA-only countries are those that have difficulties to ac-
cess finance from the international capital market and therefore, eligible to borrow
from the concessional window of the World Bank (IDA-window). The Non-IDA
countries have the capacity to access the international capital market as well as the
commercial lending window of the World Bank (IBRD-window).4 Blended coun-
tries can have a mixture of IDA and IBRD loans. Figure 3.4 shows that most of the
4IDA is the acronym for International Development Association and IBRD stands for Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
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IDA countries are low and lower middle income (LMIC) countries, while Non-IDA
countries are mainly upper middle income (UMIC) countries. Although there are
more IDA-only lower middle income countries compared to Non-IDA and Blended,
most of the PPP projects to lower middle income countries went to those classified
as Blended. Nearly all of the projects in the upper middle income countries are
attracted to those classified as Non-IDA (see Figure 3.5). In other words, upper
middle income countries attracted about 65 percent of all PPP projects between the
period 1980 and 2014 of which countries that are classified as Non-IDA attracted
more than 95 percent of the projects. In essence, PPP projects are more attracted
to countries with high income with greater possibility to access the international
capital market. From Table 3.9, it can be seen that the top five countries that at-
tracted the greatest PPP investments in each region are those with greater access to
international capital in there respective regions, for example, China, Russia, Brazil,
Morocco, India and South Africa.
FIGURE 3.5: IDA Status of Projects within each Income Group
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Figure 3.7 presents density graphs for the log of the nominal US dollar investment
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FIGURE 3.6: IDA Status of Countries within each Regional Group
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in PPP projects in the various sectors and regions. The figure shows that with the
exception of the ECA region, most of the high valued projects in the other regions
are implemented in the telecom sector, followed by the energy sector for the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) and SSA regions, and transport sector for the South
Asia (SA) and East Asia and Pacific (EAP) regions. The Europe and Central Asia
(ECA) region appears to have an even spread of project value amongst the different
sectors.
3.5 Status of PPP Projects
As noted earlier, the PPP dataset indicates six statuses of projects: (i) operational
(ii) cancelled prior to its originally anticipated end date (iii) merged with another
project during implementation (iv) successfully concluded (v) under construction
and (vi) in distress.5 This section attempts to articulate the status of PPP projects
5See the World Bank Glossary of Terms for definition of the various statuses.
Chapter 3. Exploratory Data Analysis 72
FIGURE 3.7: Density Plot of US Dollar Investment within each Sec-
tor and Region
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relative to regional, sectoral, income level, and PPP types and sub-types groupings.
From Figure 3.8, it can be seen that majority of the PPP projects are either oper-
ational or under construction across all the regions as well as sectors. The trans-
port sector appears to have comparatively registered more cancelled and concluded
projects, while the telecom sector has experienced high level of mergers, particu-
larly in the ECA region. A further look at the dataset indicates that 68 percent of
all merged PPP projects happened to take place in the Russia Federation of which
78 percent occurred during the period 1991 to 1995. This period coincided with
the post-Soviet reforms, which resulted in massive privatization of Russia’s state-
owned enterprises, including mainly telecommunication and energy assets (Sachs,
1992). Projects in the water and sewerage sector in MENA, SA and SSA have seen
mixed outcomes compared to the other regions.
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FIGURE 3.8: PPP Status by Regions and Sectors
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As noted above, the PPP dataset gives four classification of PPP types in an at-
tempt to clarify whether the project is entirely a new one (generally referred to as
greenfield project) or there were some existing assets which the project builds upon
(brownfield project), and twelve PPP sub-types, which indicate which of the part-
ners (public or private) is conferred residual ownership of the project facilities as
well as which of the project risks the partner bears.6
Figure 3.9 shows that most of the projects are greenfield, falling mainly under the
sub-categories of build, operate and transfer (BOT) and build, own and operate
(BOO). Most of the projects under these two sub-categories appear to be opera-
tional or under construction as at the of the study period. A preponderance of the
merged projects are under the sub-categories of partial divestiture (PDiv) and mer-
chant (Mct).
6Chart 3.2 highlights some of the risks and rewards associated with the various PPP sub-types
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FIGURE 3.9: PPP Status by Types and Sub-types
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Finally, Figure 3.10 illustrates the PPP projects with and without the support of mul-
tilateral institutions. It is seen that the majority of projects do not have the support
of multilateral institutions and those that have, the influence of such support on the
outcome of the projects is a bit unclear as some projects that are indicated as can-
celled (Cand) and under distress (Dstr) have the support of multilateral institutions,
so also those indicated as successfully concluded (Cond).
FIGURE 3.10: PPP Status and Multilateral Supports
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3.6 Conclusion
This chapter presents an exploratory analysis of the PPP dataset for the period end-
ing 2014 in an attempt to set the stage for confirmatory analysis on issues relating
to PPP for delivery of public infrastructure and related services.
The exploratory analysis indicates that the concept of private participation in public
infrastructure development and related services delivery is now well grounded in
many countries around the world as an average of 192 PPP projects are implemented
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each year in low and middle income countries. The LAC region and the EAP regions
were amongst the first regions that embraced the concept of PPP and have benefited
immensely from it both in terms of number of projects and US dollar investments
(see Tables 3.3 and 3.4).
Most of the PPP projects are implemented in the energy sector (47.4%), followed
by the transport sector (25.4%) (see Table 3.4). It may be inferred that the regional,
sectoral, income and IDA groupings affects the number of project implemented in a
country as projects find their way mainly to high income countries that have greater
chance of accessing the international capital market.
Greenfield projects, which are structured mainly as build, operate and transfer, and
build, own and operate, and which require the development of entirely new assets,
are found to have attracted the most PPPs (see Table 3.5). The dataset also indicates
that most of the projects are either operational or under construction (see Table
3.3) and the ones that are indicated to have been merged reflects mainly the trans-
formation of the Russian economy during the period 1991 to 1995 as the country
embarked on a massive privatisation of state-owned enterprises.
Although Sub-Saharan Africa has seen some levels of increase in PPP investment
over the years, however, most of these investment have gone into the telecom sector,
which, arguably, is less sensitive to countries’ risk factors. It is only in recent years
that the region has starting attracting PPP investment in the other sectors, but they
are still far between.
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TABLE 3.2: PPP Sub-types, Ownership and Responsibility
Types of PPP Control Funding Market Risk Ownership
(Operation & Maintenance) (Capital Investment) (Residual Asset)
Management contract (MC) Private Public Public Public
Rental and Lease Contract (RLC) Private Public Partly-Private Public
Rehabilitate, operate, and transfer (ROT) Private Private Partly-Private Public
Rehabilitate, lease or rent, and transfer (RLRT) Private Private Partly-Private Public
Build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer (BROT) Private Private Private Public
Build, operate, and transfer (BOT) Private Private Private Public
Build, own, and operate (BOO) Private Private Private Private
Partial & Full Privatisation Private Private Private Private
Source: Hammami et al (2006), World Bank PPI Database, and author’s modification
TABLE 3.3: Regional and Status Distribution of PPP Projects
Project Status (No. of Projects )
Region No. of Countries Invesment (US$’mn) Total Projects Cancelled Concluded Construction Distressed Merged Operational
Cand Cond Const Dstr Mrgd Optl
East Asia and Pacific EAP 21 413,454.50 1863 80 43 465 11 5 1259
Europe and Central Asia ECA 22 375,851.80 871 35 18 109 5 229 475
Latin America and the Caribbean LAC 29 962,225.60 2009 105 86 165 43 54 1556
Middle East and North Africa MENA 12 103,199.30 163 7 10 40 0 2 104
South Asia SA 8 395,350.80 1110 35 16 297 5 21 736
Sub-Saharan Africa SSA 47 154,514.10 514 45 48 68 16 8 329
Total 139 2,404,596.10 6530 307 221 1144 80 319 4459
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TABLE 3.4: Regional and Sectoral Distribution of PPP Projects
Primary Sector (No. of Projects)
Region Energy Telecom Transport Water and sewerage Total
ENE TEL TRA WAT
East Asia and Pacific EAP 890 86 395 492 1863
Europe and Central Asia ECA 454 293 78 46 871
Latin America and the Caribbean LAC 967 168 592 282 2009
Middle East and North Africa MENA 54 48 35 26 163
South Asia SA 560 80 455 15 1110
Sub-Saharan Africa SSA 169 212 103 30 514
Total 3094 887 1658 891 6530
TABLE 3.5: Project Distribution by PPP Types
PPP Type No. of Projects Invesment (US$’mn)
Concession Conc 1561 459,565.53
Divestiture Divest 765 551,186.71
Green Field Gfield 3906 1,385,738.94
Management and Lease Contract MgtLC 298 8,104.98
Total 6530 2,404,596.16
TABLE 3.6: Project Distribution by PPP Sub-type
PPP Sub-type No. of Projects Invesment (US$’mn)
Build, lease, and transfer ROT 22 3,082.42
Build, operate, and transfer BOT 1766 387,487.01
Build, own, and operate BOO 1363 349,776.52
Build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer Mct 932 371,567.51
Full Divestiture BROT 197 221,263.50
Lease contract MgtC 107 7,100.17
Management contract PDiv 191 1,004.81
Merchant LC 695 644,206.93
Partial Divestiture RLRT 569 331,278.21
Rehabilitate, lease or rent, and transfer FDiv 58 13,452.77
Rehabilitate, operate, and transfer BLT 570 73,190.25
Rental Rent 60 1,186.07
Total 6530 2,404,596.16
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TABLE 3.7: Project Distribution by IDA Grouping
IDA Group No. of Countries No. of Projects Invesment (US$’mn)
IDA-only IDA 63 740 408,446.90
Blended Blended 16 1134 157,176.40
Non-IDA Non-IDA 60 4656 1,838,972.90
Total 139 6530 2,404,596.20
TABLE 3.8: Project Distribution by Income Grouping
No. of Countries No. of Projects Invesment (US$’mn)
Low Income Countries LIC 36 401 61,669.27
Lower Middle Income Countries LMIC 54 1877 726,528.26
Upper Middle Income Countries UMIC 49 4252 1,616,398.63
Total 6530 2,404,596.16
TABLE 3.9: Top Five Countries with the Highest Investment in each
Region
Region Country Investment (US$’mn)
East Asia and Pacific China 135,935.76
East Asia and Pacific Indonesia 67,426.97
East Asia and Pacific Malaysia 66,403.51
East Asia and Pacific Philippines 63,070.90
East Asia and Pacific Thailand 49,904.10
Europe and Central Asia Russian Federation 150,439.61
Europe and Central Asia Turkey 114,484.54
Europe and Central Asia Romania 26,038.30
Europe and Central Asia Ukraine 14,640.06
Europe and Central Asia Bulgaria 13,725.73
Latin America and the Caribbean Brazil 494,604.33
Latin America and the Caribbean Mexico 138,277.28
Latin America and the Caribbean Argentina 93,904.93
Latin America and the Caribbean Chile 63,755.92
Latin America and the Caribbean Colombia 47,073.08
Middle East and North Africa Morocco 27,529.28
Middle East and North Africa Egypt, Arab Rep. 24,811.87
Middle East and North Africa Algeria 13,236.54
Middle East and North Africa Iraq 10,362.60
Middle East and North Africa Jordan 9,383.00
South Asia India 338,640.11
South Asia Pakistan 34,634.70
South Asia Bangladesh 12,260.52
South Asia Sri Lanka 6,149.58
South Asia Afghanistan 1,684.38
Sub-Saharan Africa South Africa 44,177.90
Sub-Saharan Africa Nigeria 37,961.13
Sub-Saharan Africa Kenya 8,935.40
Sub-Saharan Africa Ghana 7,580.58
Sub-Saharan Africa Côte d’Ivoire 4,941.70
Total 2,121,974.30
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TABLE 3.10: Countries in the Dataset
Region IncomeGroup IDA.Status Country
East Asia and Pacific Low income IDA Cambodia
East Asia and Pacific Low income IDA Myanmar
East Asia and Pacific Low income Non-IDA Korea, Dem. Rep.
East Asia and Pacific Lower middle income Blended Papua New Guinea
East Asia and Pacific Lower middle income Blended Vietnam
East Asia and Pacific Lower middle income IDA Kiribati
East Asia and Pacific Lower middle income IDA Lao PDR
East Asia and Pacific Lower middle income IDA Mongolia
East Asia and Pacific Lower middle income IDA Samoa
East Asia and Pacific Lower middle income IDA Solomon Islands
East Asia and Pacific Lower middle income IDA Timor-Leste
East Asia and Pacific Lower middle income IDA Tonga
East Asia and Pacific Lower middle income IDA Vanuatu
East Asia and Pacific Lower middle income Non-IDA Fiji
East Asia and Pacific Lower middle income Non-IDA Indonesia
East Asia and Pacific Lower middle income Non-IDA Micronesia, Fed. Sts.
East Asia and Pacific Lower middle income Non-IDA Philippines
East Asia and Pacific Upper middle income Non-IDA American Samoa
East Asia and Pacific Upper middle income Non-IDA China
East Asia and Pacific Upper middle income Non-IDA Malaysia
East Asia and Pacific Upper middle income Non-IDA Thailand
Europe and Central Asia Low income IDA Kyrgyz Republic
Europe and Central Asia Low income IDA Tajikistan
Europe and Central Asia Lower middle income Blended Armenia
Europe and Central Asia Lower middle income Blended Georgia
Europe and Central Asia Lower middle income Blended Uzbekistan
Europe and Central Asia Lower middle income IDA Moldova
Europe and Central Asia Lower middle income Non-IDA Kosovo
Europe and Central Asia Lower middle income Non-IDA Turkmenistan
Europe and Central Asia Lower middle income Non-IDA Ukraine
Europe and Central Asia Upper middle income Blended Azerbaijan
Europe and Central Asia Upper middle income Blended Bosnia and Herzegovina
Europe and Central Asia Upper middle income Non-IDA Albania
Europe and Central Asia Upper middle income Non-IDA Belarus
Europe and Central Asia Upper middle income Non-IDA Bulgaria
Europe and Central Asia Upper middle income Non-IDA Kazakhstan
Europe and Central Asia Upper middle income Non-IDA Lithuania
Europe and Central Asia Upper middle income Non-IDA Macedonia, FYR
Europe and Central Asia Upper middle income Non-IDA Montenegro
Europe and Central Asia Upper middle income Non-IDA Romania
Europe and Central Asia Upper middle income Non-IDA Russian Federation
Europe and Central Asia Upper middle income Non-IDA Serbia
Europe and Central Asia Upper middle income Non-IDA Turkey
Latin America and the Caribbean Low income IDA Haiti
Latin America and the Caribbean Lower middle income Blended Bolivia
Latin America and the Caribbean Lower middle income IDA Guyana, CR
Latin America and the Caribbean Lower middle income IDA Honduras
Latin America and the Caribbean Lower middle income IDA Nicaragua
Latin America and the Caribbean Lower middle income Non-IDA Belize
Latin America and the Caribbean Lower middle income Non-IDA El Salvador
Latin America and the Caribbean Lower middle income Non-IDA Guatemala
Latin America and the Caribbean Lower middle income Non-IDA Paraguay
Latin America and the Caribbean Upper middle income Blended Dominica
Latin America and the Caribbean Upper middle income Blended Grenada
Latin America and the Caribbean Upper middle income Blended St. Lucia
Latin America and the Caribbean Upper middle income Blended St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Latin America and the Caribbean Upper middle income Non-IDA Antigua and Barbuda
Latin America and the Caribbean Upper middle income Non-IDA Argentina
Latin America and the Caribbean Upper middle income Non-IDA Brazil
Latin America and the Caribbean Upper middle income Non-IDA Chile
Latin America and the Caribbean Upper middle income Non-IDA Colombia
Latin America and the Caribbean Upper middle income Non-IDA Costa Rica
Latin America and the Caribbean Upper middle income Non-IDA Cuba
Latin America and the Caribbean Upper middle income Non-IDA Dominican Republic
Latin America and the Caribbean Upper middle income Non-IDA Ecuador
Latin America and the Caribbean Upper middle income Non-IDA Jamaica
Latin America and the Caribbean Upper middle income Non-IDA Mexico
Latin America and the Caribbean Upper middle income Non-IDA Panama
Latin America and the Caribbean Upper middle income Non-IDA Peru
Latin America and the Caribbean Upper middle income Non-IDA Suriname
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TABLE 3.11: Countries in the Dataset
Region IncomeGroup IDA.Status Country
Latin America and the Caribbean Upper middle income Non-IDA Uruguay
Latin America and the Caribbean Upper middle income Non-IDA Venezuela, RB
Middle East and North Africa Lower middle income IDA Djibouti
Middle East and North Africa Lower middle income IDA Yemen, Rep.
Middle East and North Africa Lower middle income Non-IDA Egypt, Arab Rep.
Middle East and North Africa Lower middle income Non-IDA Iraq
Middle East and North Africa Lower middle income Non-IDA Morocco
Middle East and North Africa Lower middle income Non-IDA Syrian Arab Republic
Middle East and North Africa Lower middle income Non-IDA West Bank and Gaza
Middle East and North Africa Upper middle income Non-IDA Algeria
Middle East and North Africa Upper middle income Non-IDA Iran, Islamic Rep.
Middle East and North Africa Upper middle income Non-IDA Jordan
Middle East and North Africa Upper middle income Non-IDA Lebanon
Middle East and North Africa Upper middle income Non-IDA Tunisia
South Asia Low income IDA Afghanistan
South Asia Low income IDA Bangladesh
South Asia Low income IDA Nepal
South Asia Lower middle income Blended India
South Asia Lower middle income Blended Pakistan
South Asia Lower middle income IDA Bhutan
South Asia Lower middle income IDA Sri Lanka
South Asia Upper middle income IDA Maldives
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income Blended Zimbabwe
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Benin
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Burkina Faso
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Burundi
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Central African Republic
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Chad
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Comoros
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Congo, Dem. Rep.
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Eritrea
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Ethiopia
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Gambia, The
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Guinea
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Guinea-Bissau
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Kenya
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Liberia
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Madagascar
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Malawi
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Mali
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Mozambique
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Niger
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Rwanda
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Sierra Leone
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Somalia
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA South Sudan
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Tanzania
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Togo
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income IDA Uganda
Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income Blended Cape Verde
Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income IDA Angola
Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income IDA Cameroon
Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income IDA Congo, Rep.
Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income IDA Côte d’Ivoire
Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income IDA Ghana
Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income IDA Lesotho
Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income IDA Mauritania
Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income IDA Nigeria
Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income IDA São Tomé and Principe
Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income IDA Senegal
Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income IDA Sudan
Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income IDA Zambia
Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income Non-IDA Swaziland
Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income Non-IDA Botswana
Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income Non-IDA Gabon
Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income Non-IDA Mauritius
Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income Non-IDA Namibia
Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income Non-IDA Seychelles
Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income Non-IDA South Africa
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Chapter 4
Countries’ Attractiveness for Public
Private Partnerships for
Infrastructure Development
4.1 Introduction
The conflicting tales of public private partnership (PPP), which narrate how some
countries have registered successes while others are grappling with the consequences
of the plethora of risks assumed under the framework (Engel et al., 2013; Guasch,
2004; Maskin and Tirole, 2008), have not hindered the desire by many countries to
partake in this arrangement. As reflected in Chapter 1, some countries, particularly
those in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), are desperately aspiring to engage in PPPs as a
way of leveraging private sector resources and expertise to accelerate infrastructure
development in order to alleviate poverty and other social malaise. In fact, Escrib-
ano et al., (2010) hints that the lack of infrastructure is depressing firms’ production
in Africa by 40 percent, which, if improved to the standard of Mauritius, the leading
infrastructure provider in terms of access and quality, could increase growth by 2.2
percentage points annually.
An important potential problem however, is that private sector resources do not just
flow into countries at random, but are attracted by several characteristics of their
impending destinations. Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and
East Asia and Pacific (EAP) have made major inroads in attracting private sector
participation in the delivery of public infrastructure and related services. As shown
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in Figure 4.1, over the period 1984 to 2014, these two regions have registered the
highest value of PPP investments, amounting to US$962 billion and US$413 billion
respectively, while SSA has lagged behind all the other regions, except Middle East
and North Africa (MENA), which again can be argued that in terms of per capita
project investment (Total US dollar investment/population) MENA has faired better
than SSA. The question emanating thereof, which constitutes the main motivation
for this chapter’s research, is: why is that some countries have been able to attract
more private sector participation in PPPs than others?
FIGURE 4.1: PPP Projects and Investments by Region (1984 - 2014)
Source: World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Dataset
It has been suggested that uncertainties about the political, economic, governance,
legal and institutional environments, among others, can create decision-making
dilemma for private investors wishing to invest in a particular country or venture
(Darby and Piscitelli, 1999; Lucas, 1990). Some studies have even suggested that
the assurance of greater certainty on some of the above variables can make one
country more attractive than the other for PPPs (see De Vries and Yehoue, 2013).
In short, investors are attracted into countries where the transaction cost of their
engagement is minimal (De Vries and Yehoue, 2013; Hammami et al., 2006). As a
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result therefore, and given the aforementioned importance of infrastructural devel-
opment and PPPs for development and welfare, this chapter aims to investigate the
key channels through which countries’ gain their attractiveness for PPPs and how
the Sub-Saharan African region has performed vis-a´-vis the other regions.
To measure countries’ attractiveness, the research primarily uses the number of pri-
vate investors/institutions engaged in PPP projects. However, as a way of increasing
the options for policymaking, two other variables, the number of PPP projects and
the US dollar investments, were also used as measures of attractiveness. These lat-
ter variables were adopted by Hammami et al., (2006) when attempting to identify
the determinants of PPPs, and by De Vries and Yehoue, (2013) when investigating
the institutional and macroeconomic determinants of PPPs.
To account for the count-nature and excess zeroes in two of the dependent variables
(number of sponsors, and number of projects), which are discrete count variables,
the research uses the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) model. This model is
known to have clear advantages over other count variable models as it corrects for
over-dispersion in Poisson and Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) models and for excess
zeroes in Poisson and Negative Binomial models (see Ridout et al., 2001), while at
the same time separates private sector investors’ decision as to whether or not to
participate in PPPs and the decision as to the level of participation, which is funda-
mental for this research.1 The third variable, US dollar investment, is a continuous
dependent variable that is limited at one end and therefore, several variants of the
Tobit model, which account for such limitations, were investigated resting on the
Cragg’s Double Hurdle Model, which was found to be consistent with the objective
of this chapter.
The sources of countries’ attractiveness were grouped into four main channels:
1Figure 4.3, which is produced by Erdman et al., (2008), shows a graphical presentation of the
various count models and how the results from the ZINB model are closer than any of the other
models to the actual observation.
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macroeconomic and market; fiscal constraints; regulatory and governance; and ex-
perience in PPPs. A peek at the results indicates that of these four channels, pri-
vate investors put significant premium on the first, third and fourth, suggesting that
they are more concerned about the size of the market, the purchasing power of the
end-users and price stability as well as the rule of law, which highlights investors’
perception about the quality of contract enforcement, judicial system and property
rights in the country. Country’s experience in executing PPP transactions also em-
anates as a compelling factor, particularly for PPP projects in the transportation,
energy, and water and sewerage sectors. However, issues such as corruption,which
has commanded significant number commentaries in development economics, is of
no consequence to private investors who wish to engage in PPPs.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 attempts to throw light
on the relevant literature which leads to the development of the various testable
hypotheses; Section 4.3 presents a description of the sample dataset and the sub-
stantive predictors; Section 4.4 elucidates on the the models and empirical method-
ology; Section 4.5 presents the main results and ensuing discussions and finally;
Section 5.7 concludes the chapter and articulates the policy recommendations ema-
nating thereof.
4.1.1 Research Questions
As indicated in the preceding section, the research attempts to specifically provide
answers to the following questions:
(1) What is the economic and statistical significance of the following channels in
enhancing a countries’ attractiveness for PPPs for the delivery of public infras-
tructure and related services?
(a) Macroeconomic and Market channel;
(b) Regulatory and Governance channel;
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(c) Government Constraints channel; and
(d) Experience in PPP channel.
(2) What lessons could be learnt by countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from countries
in the other regions that have made significant inroads in PPPs?
4.1.2 Motivation and Contribution
This chapter is inspired mainly by the need to develop a framework that will sug-
gest ways in which Sub-Saharan African countries can sequence their reform pro-
grammes in a bid to secure optimal participation of private sector investors in the
delivery of public infrastructure and related services.
As referenced in Section 4.1, some of the extant literature have outlined the lack
of macroeconomic, political stability and weak institutional environments as some
of the main factors responsible for the dismal level of private investment in infras-
tructure in many Sub-Saharan African countries, thus preventing these countries
from achieving their development agendas (see Asiedu, 2002; Calderón and Servén,
2008). To reverse this misfortune, most of these countries have embarked on vari-
ous reform programmes geared towards attracting private resources to complement
public resources for infrastructure development. For instance, Sierra Leone is cur-
rently implementing its third generation development programme, which is known
as the Agenda for Prosperity (A4P), with the overarching objective of promoting
rapid infrastructure development and economic growth, mainly on the backs of pri-
vate sector capital and expertise.2 However, like Sierra Leone, most developing
countries lack the resources that would enable them to simultaneously undertake
all the reform programmes necessary to achieve the desired turnaround. As such,
one of the main concerns for practitioners, researchers and policymakers alike, is
how to select the set of reforms that would yield the greatest impact on the drive
2See Sierra Leone’s Agenda for Prosperity (http://www.sierra-leone.org/Agenda
%204%20Prosperity.pdf
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for rapid infrastructure development, particularly when the intention is to leverage
private sector resources (Meier and Rauch, 1989; Weingast, 1995). To this end,
the research contributes by determining the impact of certain critical factors that
are considered in the literature as the necessary stimulants for the collaboration be-
tween the public and private sectors for the delivery of public infrastructure and
related services.
The research is also able to develop on the works of others, including Hammami
et al., (2006) who attempt to find the determinants of PPP investments using the
PPI dataset for the period 1990 to 2003, in the following ways:
(i) Increase the scope of the data from 2003 to 2014 - Figures 1.2 in Chapter 1
and 4.1 in this chapter show that there was a significant flow of private sector
resources into PPPs during the period 2004 and 2014, which is outside the
scope of most of the recent research in the area and might have made redun-
dant some of the factors that were once very important in the determination
of PPPs. It is therefore, imperative to throw light on the key factors that may
be responsible for this recent surge in both the number of private investors as
well as the value of US dollar investment in PPPs.
(ii) Choice of dependent variable - this research used the variable, ‘number of
private institutions/sponsors’, to measure a countries’ attractiveness for PPP,
while using the number of projects and the US dollar investment, which are
the dependent variables used by other researchers, to expand the options for
policymaking and robustness of the research. The aim here is to gauge the
decision making process of the private investors themselves as to whether or
not they find a country attractive for PPPs.
(iii) Additional methodology - in addition to the Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) model
applied by Hammami et al. to the count dependent variable, this research used
Zero Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB), which was found to be the most
appropriate model to capture both the over-dispersion in the Possion model
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and excess zeroes which characterise the observations of the variables. On
the continuous limited dependent variable, in addition to the Tobit model, the
study also used the Cragg’s Double Hurdle model to account for possible dif-
ferences in private investors’ decision as to whether or not to engage in PPPs
and on the amount of US dollar investment they eventually make.
4.2 Related Literature and Testable Hypotheses
PPP is normally a very complex arrangement in which the public and private sec-
tors collaborate to maximise mutual gains. Some scholars, including Grimsey and
Lewis, (2002), illuminate that the public sector is motivated into the relationship to
maximise value for money, while the private sector aims at maximizing profit. The
synchronisation of these objectives is paramount for the success of the relationship.
As highlighted in Section 4.1, the main objective of this chapter is to determine the
factors that make countries attractive to private investors for public private partner-
ship for infrastructure development and related services delivery. In other words,
the factors that minimise the transaction cost and risk and hence, maximise and cre-
ate sustainability in profitability for private sector investors. As referenced earlier,
many scholars have highlighted the uncertainties about the political, economic, gov-
ernance, legal and institutional environments as creating decision making dilemma
for private investors wishing to invest in a particular country or venture, and that the
assurances of greater certainty make some countries more attractive than others for
PPP engagements (Darby and Piscitelli, 1999; De Vries and Yehoue, 2013; Lucas,
1990).
This section therefore, attempts to highlight some of the relevant literature and
testable hypotheses of the various channels through which countries’ gain their at-
tractiveness for PPPs. Table 4.14 summarises the explanatory variables under each
channel.
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4.2.1 Macroeconomic and Market Channel
Hodge and Greve, (2007) argue that PPP encompasses arrangements ranging from
outsourcing and contracting-out to entering into concession agreements and issuing
franchises, as well as some aspects of privatisation. In a PPP arrangement, par-
ticularly those within the vicinity of privatisation, where the private sector partner
assumes almost the entire risks as well as rewards, a stable macroeconomic environ-
ment and market for the output can be very crucial. This is said to be particularly
important in countries where there were previously no or very few private sector
providers of public infrastructure and where potential demand for the project out-
put is unknown, or tariffs on public services were formerly heavily subsidized and
collection poor (Hammami et al., 2006). As the name implies, the channel has both
macroeconomic and market variables that are deemed very relevant to this research.
The following are hypothesized under this channel and are discussed in the imme-
diate sections below.
Hypothesis 1: The Macroeconomic and Market channel is important for
countries’ attractiveness for PPPs
† Auxilliary hypothesis 1A (macroeconomic variables): Countries with sta-
ble macroeconomic conditions are likely to attract more private sector par-
ticipation into PPPs for public infrastructure development and related ser-
vices delivery.
† Auxilliary hypothesis 1B (market variables): Countries with higher po-
tential demand for PPP projects outputs are likely to attract more private
sector participation into PPPs for public infrastructure development and
related services delivery.
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4.2.1.1 Macroeconomic Variables
Given the huge upfront cost that is normally required for the development of pub-
lic infrastructure and the associated lengthy period to recoup such investment, it is
expected that stable macroeconomic environment, which assures future profitabil-
ity of the venture, affects the incentive of private investors to participate in PPP
arrangements (Galilea and Medda, 2010). It therefore, follows that as a country’s
macroeconomic conditions improve, the public sector acquires greater capacity to
attract resources from the private sector (Dailami and Klein, 1998).
According to Mota and Moreira, (2015), the economic policies pursued by govern-
ments could greatly contribute to the creation and maintenance of a stable macroe-
conomic environment. Fischer, (1993, p. 487) describes macroeconomic stability
as a situation wherein ‘inflation is low and predictable, real interest rates are appro-
priate, fiscal policy is stable and sustainable, the real exchange rate is competitive
and predictable, and the balance of payments situation is perceived as viable’.
Inflation is considered as the single most important indicator of the overall ability of
the government to manage the economy (Fischer, 1993). Ferderer, (1993) notes that
investors tend to reduce exposure to irreversible investments, such as infrastructure,
in an environment with price uncertainty, which is said to have negative effect on
credit liquidity and hence, growth. Aizenman and Marion, (1993) examined the
effect of inflation and other uncertainty factors on private investments in a group of
40 developing countries during the period 1970-1985 and found significant negative
effects of inflation on investment and growth. Bernoth and Colavecchio, (2014) also
found a strong negative relationship between inflation and private equity investment
in 16 selected countries in both Western, and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
over the period 2001 to 2011.
The stability and availability of foreign exchange have also featured prominently
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in the literature of PPPs, especially for infrastructure projects in developing coun-
tries which are financed almost entirely with foreign capital in the forms of loans
and equities. Huge volatility in a country’s exchange rate could impair revenue pre-
dictability and project profitability for foreign investors (Baum et al., 2001; Shapiro,
1975), while inadequate foreign exchange reserves could make payments to loan
and equity providers almost impossible, noting that PPP proceeds are usually gen-
erated in local currencies while repayments to fund providers are usually made in
foreign currencies (see Cushman, 1985; Hooper and Kohlhagen, 1978). Both sce-
narios have the possibility of reducing the incentive of private investors to engage
in PPPs. The problem with foreign exchange was noted as being one of the rea-
sons for the failure of many PPPs in the 1990s, notably in the LAC and SA regions
(Kaminsky et al., 1998). In Sierra Leone, the shortage of foreign exchange in the
1980s and early 1990s led to the accumulation of huge public sector debt owed to
private sector investors, particularly non-residents.3
It therefore, follows that PPP projects which are mainly financed with foreign re-
sources (as is the case with the projects in this research) and are implemented in
countries with weak financial systems, both foreign exchange volatility and avail-
ability risks become crucially important to the private investors and hence, coun-
tries’ attractiveness.
4.2.1.2 Market Variables
The market environment reflects the importance of the demand for the final out-
put produced through PPPs. Mota and Moreira, (2015) note that potential private
sector partners must be assured of a clear and perceptible need for the PPP output,
otherwise they may hesitate to invest. In their research, Scaperlanda and Mauer,
(1969) found that for Western Europe, it is the size of the market that significantly
affects the allocation of private investment and not the economic growth rate or
3This obligation was classified as pipeline debts (see IMF Report No.07/68, February 2007)
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tariff policy, while Asiedu, (2006) found similar results relating to market size for
countries in Africa. As elucidated by Scaperlanda and Mauer, (1969), the market
size hypothesis is based on the assumption that inadequate market size stifles spe-
cialization of productive factors in that such market are insufficient to efficiently
absorb the technology which the private investor intends to introduce. Therefore,
the hypothesis has it that private investment, particularly from non-residents, will
take place as soon as the local market becomes large enough to ensure the cap-
turing of economies of scale (p. 560). Other scholars have been able to confirm
that the market size and purchasing power of the consumers are inextricable factors
for countries’ attractiveness for PPPs (Cheung et al., 2009; De Vries and Yehoue,
2013; Ng et al., 2012).
4.2.2 Government Constraints Channel
In most PPPs, the public sector/government is required to take up substantial level of
risks and other obligations in order to assure the success of the relationship, some of
which are outlined by Dailami and Klein, (1998) in Table 4.1. Prominent amongst
these obligations, particularly when it comes to energy projects, is the public sector
guarantee for the market of the PPP output, which is normally articulated under off-
take agreements and usually in the form of a take-or-pay arrangement. This type of
guarantee requires the public sector to pay for a contractually specified minimum
quantity of the output, even if delivery is not taken (Masten and Crocker, 1985,
p. 1083). In terms of risk, the public sector is normally required to partially or
wholly absorb: (i) policy/political risk, which gives confidence to the private sector
partner that the repatriation of proceeds from her investment will not be an issue and
at the same time will be made whole in the event of political shocks; (ii) financial
market fluctuation risk, which is aimed at assuring the private sector partner of a
real return on her investment; and (iii) market risk, which assures the private sector
partner that demand shortfall will be fully compensated for.
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TABLE 4.1: Types of Government Guarantees
Types of Guarantee Example of Projects
1) Contractual Obligation of Government
- Guarantee of off-take in power projects Birecik Hydro Power Plant, Turkey;
Electricidad de cores, Hungary; Paguthan
& Dabhol Power Plants, India; Mt. Aop
Geothermal Plant, Philippines
Guarantee of fuel supply in power projects Termopaipa Power Plant, Colombia; Lal
Pir Power, Pakistan
2) Policy/ Political Risk
- Guarantee of currency convertibility and transferability Lal Pir Power, Pakistan
- Guarantee in case of changes of law or regulatory regime Rousch Power, Pakistan; Izmit Su Water
Treatment Plant and Pipeline, Turkey
3) Financial Market Disruption/Fluctuation
- Guarantee of interest rate North-South Expressway, Malaysia
- Guarantee of exchange rate North-South Expressway, Malaysia
- Debt guarantee Toll road, Mexico; Termopaipa Power
Plant, Colombia
4) Market Risk
- Guarantee of tariff rate/sales risk guarantee Don Muang Tollway, Thailand; Western
Harbour Tunnel, Hong Kong; Buga- Tulua
Highway, Colombia; Toll roads, Mexico
- Revenue guarantee South access of Concepcion, Chile; M5
Motorway, Hungary
Source: Dailami and Klein, (1998)
Given the plethora of risks and other obligations assumed by the public sector under
PPPs, it is imperative for private investors to undertake due diligence on the factors
that may inhibit the public sector’s ability to meet its commitments. The follow-
ing is hypothesised under this channel and subsequently discussed in the sections
immediately below.
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Hypothesis 2: The Fiscal Constraints channel is important for countries’
attractiveness for PPPs
† Auxiliary Hypothesis 2A: Countries with low debt burden are likely to at-
tract more private sector participation in PPPs for public infrastructure de-
velopment and related services delivery.
† Auxiliary Hypothesis 2B: Countries where the governments have high rev-
enue generating potential are likely to attract more private sector partici-
pation in PPPs for public infrastructure development and related services
delivery.
4.2.2.1 Public Debt Burden
As indicated above, most governments provide guarantees to cover certain risks
in PPPs. The ability to meet the obligations emanating from the crystallisation of
these guarantees could be an enticing factor to the private investors for participating
in PPPs. Most governments, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa, are unable
to make adequate provisions, if any, in their budgets to cater for eventuating con-
tingencies under PPPs. An alternative means by which these governments could
meet such unanticipated obligations is to raise debt from the international capital
market or local financial market. However, the ease with which governments are
able to raise debt resources is contingent on several indicators, more especially on
on public sector solvency and liquidity.
TABLE 4.2: Thresholds for Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF)
CPIA
Debt Burden Threshold under DSF
Pressent Value of Debt (in %) Debt Service (in %)
Solvency Ratios Liquidity Ratios
Exports GDP Revenue Exports Revenue
Weak Policy 100 30 200 15 18
Medium 150 40 250 20 20
Strong 200 50 300 25 22
Source: IMF Fact Sheet
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The debt of most developing countries, particularly those that have gone through the
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief
Initiative (MDRI), are being constantly monitored by the IMF and World Bank,
through regular debt sustainability analysis in order to ensure that they are within
the prescribed sustainability thresholds as shown in Table 4.2.4 These thresholds
reflect the country’s policies and institutional arrangement (CPIA) with strong per-
forming countries allotted higher threshold, thus giving them greater latitude to raise
finances. Countries that find themselves at or close to these prescribed thresholds,
which suggests a risk of experiencing some form of debt distress, are more likely to
be less attractive to private investors for PPP engagements, albeit such countries are
usually the ones soliciting PPPs to bypass some of these fiscal challenges (Cheung
et al., 2009; Engel et al., 2013).
While the solvency indicator attempts to illustrate the ability of the public sector to
meet long-term obligations, the liquidity indicators show whether the government
has the wherewithal to meet short-term commitments in term of revenue and foreign
exchange.
4.2.2.2 Government Revenue
Another indicator that reflects public sector’s ability to meet its obligations under
PPPs is the level of government’s revenue. A buoyant government with the ability
to mobilise revenue could entice the private investors into PPPs. For some PPP en-
gagements in some developing and emerging countries, particularly those involving
Chinese investors, the assurance of revenue from natural resource exploitation is
very crucial as the proceeds from such resources could be ringed fence to guarantee
payments under public infrastructure projects. By leveraging these proceeds from
natural resources, the Chinese investors are suggested to be less sensitive to most
4All the IDA countries went through these two initiatives
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of the risk factors associated with investments in public infrastructure (see Cassel
et al., 2010).
4.2.3 Regulatory and Governance Channel
PPP arrangements are contractual in nature and involve the allocation of rights and
obligations to the parties involved. The sustainability of the relationship depends
crucially on the quality of the legal and regulatory framework as well as the gov-
ernance structure of the country. As noted by Pistor et al., (2000) and Hammami
et al., (2006), strong institutions and effective rule of law are important for secur-
ing more PPPs as these factors have a much stronger impact on the availability of
external finances. The importance of good legal and regulatory framework is also
captured by Smith, (1776) in his ‘Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations’. As Smith puts it,
“Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not
enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves
secure in the possession of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not
supported by law, and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be
regularly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able
to pay. Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish in any state in
which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of government.”
The following is therefore, hypothesised under this channel and subsequently dis-
cussed in the sections below.
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Hypothesis 3: The Regulatory and Governance channel is important for
countries’ attractiveness for PPPs
† Auxiliary Hypothesis 3A: Countries with better regulatory system in the
form of rule of law, regulatory quality and speed of contract enforcement
are likely to attract more private sector participation in PPPs for public
infrastructure development and related services delivery.
† Auxiliary Hypothesis 3B: Countries with better governance system in the
form of government effectiveness, control of corruption and political sta-
bility are likely to attract more private sector participation in PPPs for pub-
lic infrastructure development and related services delivery.
4.2.3.1 Regulatory System
As noted above, strong legislative framework that fosters the existence of a smooth
PPP relationship could serve as an attraction for the private investors into PPPs.
North, (1990) emphasizes the importance of an efficient judicial system to enforce
contracts as a crucial determinant of economic performance while Hume, (2012)
submits that the freedom and extent of human commerce depend entirely on a fi-
delity with regard to promises. In essence, formulating laws that guides the distri-
bution of rights and obligations is important, yet what is more important is for these
laws to stand the test of time. Pistor et al., (2000) note that ‘the effectiveness of legal
institutions has a much stronger impact on the availability of external finance than
does the laws on the books· · · ’. Relatedly, Daude and Stein, (2007) found that one
standard deviation improvement in the regulatory quality of a country increases for-
eign direct investment (FDI) by a factor of around 2, but they warn against excessive
regulatory burden which could deter FDIs.
Another important ingredient in the regulatory system is the timely dispensation of
justice. It is commonly said that ‘justice delayed is justice denied’. This idea of the
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link between delay and denial of justice has been in existence for a very long time
(see cf. 1215 Magna Carta - “to no man will we sell or deny, or delay rights or
justice”).5
4.2.3.2 Governance System
Some scholars believe that the concept of PPP could be traced back to the theory
of X-efficiency postulated by Leibenstein in 1966 (Fourie and Burger, 2000; Ham-
mami et al., 2006; Vining et al., 2005). The theory is borne out of the precept that
the public sector is inefficient and such inefficiency emanates from the bureaucratic
behaviour of government officials who are considered to be motivated not only by
their duties towards governance, but also by their own aspirations (e.g. maximis-
ing power and status) and value systems (Fourie and Burger, 2000). Accordingly,
Leibenstein, (1975) affirms a non-allocative effect of market power, which he be-
lieves will not only drive a wedge between price and marginal cost, but will also
raise the firm’s costs above the technologically minimum levels. In other words,
a fragmented and bureaucratic public sector creates risk to private investors as de-
lays and undocumented processes can increase the overall cost of projects as well
as the level of uncertainty in projects delivery. As articulated by Mauro, (1995),
cumbersome and dishonest bureaucracies may delay the distribution of permits and
licenses, thereby slowing down productivity.
Another important issue of governance is control of corruption. As succinctly put
by Bardhan, (1997, p. 1320),
“Just as it is impossible not to taste the honey (or the poison) that finds itself at the
tip of the tongue, so it is impossible for a government servant not to eat up, at least,
a bit of the king‘s revenue. Just as fish moving under water cannot possibly be found
out either as drinking or not drinking water, so government servants employed in
the government work cannot be found out (while) taking money (for themselves)”.6
5Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs (https://books.google.co.uk /books?isbn=019
1580015)
6 Bardhan, (1997) produced this modified version of Kangle, (1969) quote on corruption.
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It is believed that bureaucratic bottleneck is an antecedent to corruption, and cor-
ruption in turn significantly affects private sector participation in PPPs for infras-
tructure development. Corruption is generally considered as an implicit tax and
“one that is of a particularly pernicious nature, given the need for secrecy and the
uncertainty that comes with it - which reduces incentive to invest” (Mauro, 1997,
p. 89). Murphy et al., (1993) argue that countries with weak and, therefore, unsta-
ble governments can experience a very deleterious type of corruption, in which an
entrepreneur may have to bribe several public officials and still face the possibility
of not having the project to proceed. Such decentralized type of corruption, as ref-
erenced by Bardhan, (1997), could stifle private investments. Mauro, (1997) found
that corruption lowers private investment, thereby reducing economic growth, even
in countries in which bureaucratic regulations are very cumbersome.
In addition to government effectiveness and corruption, the stability of the politi-
cal system could also incentivise private sector participation in PPPs. Most PPP
projects have heavy initial investments and long expected life span and therefore,
the likelihood of political conflicts, which may see change of governments or cul-
minates in the destruction of lives and properties, will discourage the private sec-
tor into PPP arrangements. In an unstable political environment, the possibility of
amending PPP agreements as governments change through undemocratic means is
highly likely (Alesina et al., 2000) and may affect the profitability and continuity of
projects, as well as disadvantage the private sector partner in the event of contract
renegotiations (Hart, 2003; Hart et al., 1996). Bennett and Green, (1972) found
that although political instability does not discourage investment in Latin American
nations, it does in the less developed nations in the other parts of the world.
4.2.4 Experience Channel
As the saying goes, ‘practice makes perfect’. It is common knowledge that expe-
rience is a good teacher. Even past failures lead to the accumulation of experience
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and thus, the prevention of future failures. It is believed that the avoidance of fu-
ture mistakes due to past experience, increases the probability of success for new
PPP arrangements (Meunier and Quinet, 2010). Galilea and Medda, (2010) argue
that previous experience in PPPs serves not only as an important learning asset but
also as a revelling feature of the public sector‘s reputation in honouring its obli-
gations under contracts. Furthermore, countries that have undertaken several PPP
projects over time are more likely to have experienced negotiators that can prevent
unnecessary delays in reaching agreement and close deals on time, thus reducing the
transaction cost, which may translate into project affordability as well as increase
the possibility for project bankability (see Dür and Mateo, 2008a; Svejnar, 1986).
From these arguments the following hypothesis, which relates experience in previ-
ous PPP transactions and countries attractiveness is formulated:
Hypothesis 4: The Experience channel is important for countries’ at-
tractiveness for PPPs
† Countries with better experience in implementing PPP projects are likely to
attract more private sector participation into PPPs for public infrastructure
development and related services delivery.
4.3 Data and Variable Description
As reflected in Chapter 2, PPP has acquired various nomenclatures and definitions
in different countries across different regions. For example, in the United Kingdom
it is referred to as Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in a bid to emphasise the need
to secure private financing and risk sharing for public infrastructure development
(Cheung et al., 2009; Grimsey and Lewis, 2002; Mota and Moreira, 2015). PPP has
also been used interchangeably with private participation in infrastructure (PPI) (see
Hammami et al., 2006), in which case any private investment in public infrastructure
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and related services could be regarded as PPP irrespective of the level of risks and
rewards shared between the partners.
This chapter will tow the line of Hammami et al. and adopts the PPI concept
whereby all private sector intervention in the provision of public infrastructure and
related services are considered PPP. Likewise, the World Bank’s PPI dataset will
be utilized. This section therefore, provides a description of the data as well as the
variables used in this research.
4.3.1 Data Description
To recall, the PPI dataset ending 2014, which is the main dataset used in this study,
provides longitudinal data for the period 1980 - 2014 on PPP projects implemented
in four major infrastructure sectors (energy, telecom, transport and water and sewer-
age) in 139 low and middle income countries across six regions. However, because
of unavailability of data related mainly to some of the channels through which coun-
tries gain their attractiveness as outlined in Section 4.2, a total of 101 countries were
investigated over the period 1995 to 2014 Furthermore, the selection of the time
frame is to help capture trends in PPP implementation, particularly for countries in
the Middle East and North African region where the first PPP project was registered
in 1990.
The final data sample consists of a total of 7184 private sector investors (sponsors)
who participated in 5270 PPP projects of total value of US$15.9 trillion over the
period 1995 to 2014. Table 4.3 gives a summary of the regional profile of PPPs,
which shows that over a third of the countries sampled are from SSA, but the re-
gion accounts for only about 8 percent of the total number of sponsors as well as
projects, and 12 percent of the total US dollar PPP investments. On the other hand,
the EAP region, which has far less number of countries in the sample when com-
pared to SSA, ECA and LAC, accounts for about 31, 28 and 21 percent of the total
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number of sponsors, total number of projects and total US dollar PPP investments
respectively. Table 4.4 shows that the energy sector attracted approximately half of
the total number of sponsors, projects and US dollar investment.
TABLE 4.3: Regional Distribution of PPP (1995 – 2014)
Total Number of Total Investment
Region Countries Sponsors Projects US$ (in million) Percent
EAP 11 2000 1651 3,353,755 21%
ECA 17 605 485 1,793,953 11%
LAC 21 2378 1523 5,680,744 36%
MENA 8 198 127 499,711 3%
SA 7 1408 1076 2,654,570 17%
SSA 37 595 408 1,921,398 12%
Total 101 7184 5270 15,904,131 100%
Source: World Bank PPI Dataset 2014
TABLE 4.4: Sectoral Distribution of PPPs (1995 – 2014)
Total Number of Total Investment
Sector Sponsors Projects US$ (in million) Percent
Energy 3507 2671 6,617,782 42%
Telecom 580 453 5,204,110 33%
Transport 2045 1356 2,845,498 18%
Water and Sewerage 1052 790 1,236,741 8%
Total 7184 5270 15,904,131 100%
Source: World Bank PPI Dataset 2014
4.3.2 Variable Description
This section gives details of both the dependent and explanatory variables used in
this research. Table 4.14 outlines all the variables and their a priori expected signs.
4.3.2.1 Dependent Variable - Countries’ Attractiveness
As mentioned earlier, the main variable used in this study to measure countries’
attractiveness for PPP is the number of private investors (referred to as ‘Sponsors’
in the PPI dataset) that are actually engaged in the PPP project arrangement. This
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variable attempts to capture the people or institutions behind the investments rather
than the value of the investment. It helps to show how private individuals or insti-
tutions could collaborate amongst themselves and with the public sector for public
infrastructure development. For example, a total of four private institutions came
together to undertake the Yangpu Power Project in Hainan Island, China. These
institutions came from three different continents, but find china attractive for PPPs
(Kumagai Gumi Co. Ltd and Maeda Corporation both from Japan; Siemens AG
from Germany and; Ringo Trading Ltd from the United States of America).
To derive this dependent variable, a count is made of every investor that partakes
in every project as shown in the ‘Sponsors’ field in the dataset. For example, a
particular project might have three sponsors while another of equivalent US dollar
value might have only one sponsor, in which case, the former is counted as three
while the latter as one. Furthermore, for projects that do not specify the the names
of the sponsors, but rather the word ‘others’ is used in the Sponsor field, a count of
one is given for ease of comparison. After counting the number of sponsors in each
project, we then group them based on the respective projects financial closure year
to create a panel of observations.
As a way of providing more options for policymakers, two other variables were
used to measure countries’ attractiveness, the number of projects and the US dollar
investments. For the former, a count is made of all the projects that reached financial
closure in the same year, while the latter adds all the US dollar investment made
under each project, expressed as a percent of GDP.
4.3.3 Substantive Predictors
As outlined in Section 4.2, the study identified four main channels through which
countries gain their attractiveness for PPPs including: (i) macroeconomic and mar-
ket channel; (ii) government constrain channel; (iii) regulatory and governance
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channel; and (iv) experience channel. This section describes the variables that con-
stitutes these channels.
Macroeconomic and Market Channel
This channel consists of the following variables:
(i) Price Stability - Like most studies, including Bernoth and Colavecchio, (2014),
this variable is measured by the inflation rate, which is the annual percentage
change in a country’s consumer price index (CPI).
(ii) Exchange Rate Stability - in this research, exchange rate is defined as the rate
at which a country’s currency is exchanged for one unit of the United State
dollar. This means that an increase in the exchange rate reflects a deprecia-
tion/devaluation of the country’s currency relative to the US dollar, while an
increase represents appreciation/revaluation. In line with Clark et al., (2004)
and other authors, exchange rate stability/volatility is measured by the stan-
dard deviation of the percentage changes in the exchange rate between con-
secutive years.
(iii) Exchange Rate Availability - this variable is measured by the country’s inter-
national reserves in months of imports.
(iv) Market Size and Potential Effective Demand/Purchasing Power - Like Ham-
mami et al., (2006), market size is measured by the country’s population, while
potential effective demand is captured by real GDP per capita.
Government Constraints Channel
This channel consists of the following variables:
(i) Public Debt Burden - in this research the public debt burden is measured in
terms of solvency and liquidity consistent with the World Bank’s approach.
For solvency, the research utilises the public and publicly guaranteed external
debt stock (otherwise referred to as public and publicly guaranteed disbursed
and outstanding debt) relative to exports, while for liquidity, two indicators
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were used, public debt service to exports of goods and services, and public
debt service to domestic budget revenue.
(ii) Supplemental Revenue Source - to account for supplementary revenue to the
government, the study uses the variable, natural resource rent as percent of
GDP.
Regulatory and Governance Channel7
This channel consists of the following variables:
(i) Rule of Law - this variable is an index that attempts to capture perceptions of
the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society,
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, and the
courts. This indicator allocates values to countries on a scale of 100 with high
values representing better rule of law.
(ii) Regulatory Quality - this is an index which captures the perceptions of the
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and reg-
ulations that permit and promote private sector development. Like rule of law,
this index allots values to countries on a scale of 100 with high values repre-
senting better regulatory quality.
(iii) Time Required to enforce Contracts - this variable measures the number of
days required to enforce contracts and to implement sound policies and regu-
lations that permit and promote private sector development.
(iv) Government Effectiveness - this variable captures among other things, the
perceptions of the quality of public services and the credibility of the gov-
ernment’s commitment to its policies. Countries are allocated higher values
up to a maximum of 100 as the perception of their government effectiveness
improves.
7For further explanation on the variables that constitutes the channel see Worldwide Governance
Indicators 2015
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(v) Control of Corruption – this variable captures among other things, percep-
tions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. Under
this index, countries are given higher values up to a maximum of 100 as the
perception on control of corruption improves.
(vi) Political Stability and Absence of Violence - this variable measures percep-
tions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated vio-
lence, including terrorism. This variable allocates higher values to more stable
countries.
Experience Channel
This channel consists of only one variable, countries’ experience, which is mea-
sured by cumulating the number of projects implemented in a particular country on
an annual basis. The more PPP projects executed by a country, the more experience
the country is assumed to have in dealing with matters relating to the successful
implementation of PPPs.
4.4 Models and Empirical Methodology
To reiterate, this study uses the number of private sector investors who are actually
engaged in PPP transactions as a measure of countries’ attractiveness for PPPs. To
construct this variable, a count is made of all the investors that participated in the
PPP projects. In such a case where the dependent variable is derived from discrete
count data, which makes it highly non-normal, the use of OLS regression will pro-
duce bias results and therefore, the most appropriate methodology for estimating
the relationship between this variable and its substantive predictors rest on count
variable models such as the Poisson model and its variants (Coxe et al., 2009).
A common element of count variable models is the use of maximum likelihood
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technique to estimate the unknown coefficients, (βs). Maximum likelihood estima-
tors (MLEs) are said to be asymptotically efficient among consistent and asymptot-
ically normally distributed estimators (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013). MLE assumes
the parameters are fixed and unknown and estimate their values by maximising the
likelihood or log likelihood function, which represents the product of the probability
function for each sample of the explained variable. The estimator examines every
possible value of the slope parameter until it chooses the outcome that is most likely
to have produced the distribution. Maximum Likelihood estimation is noted to be
similar to the Ordinary Least Square estimation except that it has a number of large
sample or asymptotic properties that makes it a more attractive candidate for this
study. In addition, Harvey, (1976, p. 465) outlines three main attractive attributes of
MLE:
(i) The likelihood function is bounded and no problem arise due to estimated
variance being negative or zero;
(ii) The error terms are (asymptotically) homoscedastic and so the estimated co-
variance matrix is consistent; and
(iii) The likelihood ratio test has a much simpler form, which can easily accom-
modate alternative forms of heteroscedasticity.
4.4.1 Count Variable Models
This section examines in greater detail the development and specification of the
count variable models used in this study, which includes the Poission, Negative Bi-
nomial (NB), Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) and the Zero Inflated Negative Binomial
(ZINB) models.
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4.4.1.1 The Poisson Model
Count data represents data type in which the observations can take only the non-
negative integer values 0, 1, 2, 3, · · ·, and where these integers arise from counting
rather than ranking. The statistical treatment for count data is different from that of
binary data, where the observations can take only two values, usually represented
by 0 and 1; and from ordinal data, which may also consist of integers but where the
individual values fall on an arbitrary scale and only the relative ranking is important.
Therefore, in developing an econometric model where the dependent variable rep-
resents a count data, requires two main initial assumptions (Cameron and Trivedi,
2013):
(i) First, due to the fact that the dependent variable, yi (countries’ attractiveness
represented by the number of investors) is non-negative, a functional form that
produces non-negative conditional expectations must be used, i.e.
E{yi|xi} = exp{xiβ} (4.4.1)
(ii) The second assumption relates to the distribution to be used when evaluating
the probability of a particular outcome, for example, P{yi = 1|xi}.
From stochastic process theory (see Cox and Miller, 1977), natural model for count
data is given as:
yi ∼ Poission[λ].
The Poission model states that the probability that the dependent variable Y will be
equal to a certain number y is given as:
Pr[Y = y|λ] = e
−λλy
y!
(4.4.2)
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where: λ = E(yi|xi) = exp(xiβ), which is the mean or expected value as well
as the variance of the Poisson distribution. This equality of the mean and variance
imposes a restriction of equi-dispersion on the data.
The maximum likelihood estimation of β (a vector of coefficients of the covariates)
can be carried out using the following:
L(β|y, x) =
N∏
i=1
Pr(yi|λi) =
N∏
i=1
exp(−λi)λyii
y!
(4.4.3)
The simple interpretation of the coefficients is that one unit increase in x will in-
crease/decrease the average number of the dependent variable, which in this case
is a country’s attractiveness, by the coefficient expressed as a percentage. This in-
terpretation can be derived by using Equation (4.4.1) to calculate the change in the
expected count for a unit change in xij , i.e. evaluate exp(βj). This is also known
as Incidence Rate Ratio. Alternatively, one can calculate the impact of a marginal
change upon the expected value of yi for a continuous variable xij , (keeping all
other variables fixed) using the formula:
∂E{yi|xi}
∂xij
= exp(xiβ)βj (4.4.4)
It can be seen from Equation (4.4.4) that βj represents the semi-elasticity of yi with
respect to a continuous variable xij as:
∂E(y|x)
∂xj
= βjexp(x
′
iβ) (4.4.5)
Thus βj denotes the percentage change in the expected value of yi for a one-unit
change in the jth explanatory continuous variable. Similarly, elasticities denoting
the percentage change in the expected value of yi for a percentage change in the jth
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explanatory continuous variable can be written as,
∂E{yi|xi}
∂xij
1
E{yi|xi} = βj (4.4.6)
In spite of its simplicity, a key limitation of the Poisson model as mentioned above is
the equality of its mean and variance, which impose a restriction of equi-dispersion
of the data. This implies that the conditional variance of yi is also equal to the
expected value, exp{xiβ}. In other words, the Poisson model accounts for only
observed heterogeneity by specifying the conditional variance as a function of the
observed explanatory variables.8 The problem with this assumption is the possi-
bility that the Poisson model will underestimate the amount of dispersion in the
outcome especially if the dispersion is due to factors which are outside the model.
To address this problem, the Negative Binomial model is used in its stead by adding
a parameter α that reflects unobserved heterogeneity among observations (Gardner
et al., 1995).
4.4.1.2 Negative Binomial Model
The Negative Binomial (NB) model helps to address the problem of over-dispersion
in the Poisson model, but the exact specification of the over-dispersion is usually
not known (Lawless, 1987). Two ways of specifying the NB model are shown in
Equations (4.4.7) and (4.4.8) below:
V ar(y|x) = λ+ αλ2 (4.4.7)
V ar(y|x) = λ+ αλ (4.4.8)
8That is observed differences among sample members.
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The mass probability function of the NB model is given as:
Pr[Y = y|λ, α] = Γ(α
−1 + y)
Γ(α−1)Γ(y + 1)
(
α−1
α−1 + λ
)α−1(
λ
λ+ α−1
)y
(4.4.9)
where: λ = E(yi|xi) is the mean and αλ or αλ2 is the variance.
It can be seen that both the Poisson and Negative Binomial models have the same
mean structure, E{yi|xi} = exp{xiβ}, so the expected rate for a given change in
the independent variables will be the same in both models. However, the standard
errors in the Poisson model would be biased downward if over-dispersion is present
(Cox, 1983). A simple way to detect over-dispersion is by testing H0 : α = 0.
The likelihood ratio (LR) test is used to test H0 and the test statistic is computed as
follows:
LR = 2∗(lnLNB − lnLP ) ∼ χ2(1) (4.4.10)
where lnLNB = log likelihood of the negative binomial regression model
lnLP = log likelihood of the Poisson regression model
χ2(1) = Chi-squared distribution with 1 degree of freedom
While acknowledging the value added by the NB model in capturing over-dispersion
in the data, it however, falls short in its prediction of the probability of having a zero
count especially when large number of zeroes are present in the count variable. To
address the issue of excess zeroes, one prescribed option is by changing the mean
structure to allow the zeroes to be generated by two distinct processes. The first pro-
cess relates to the decision to participate in a particular activity, while the second
process considers the level of consumption of the activity (Cameron and Trivedi,
2013; Lambert, 1992).
To illustrate this, consider an example wherein in the first stage private investors
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have to decide whether or not they find countries in Sub-Saharan African attractive
for PPPs. Those investors who do not find Sub-Saharan African countries attractive
are removed from the group (this process accounts for some of the zeroes). In
the second stage, those investors who remain and like to participate in PPPs in
Sub-Saharan African countries can only do so in discrete number, 0, 1, 2, 3 · · ·n.
The zeroes in this second stage represents inability to participate and not because
of the unattractiveness of Sub-Saharan African countries. This could happen in
circumstances where private investors are willing to participate in PPPs, but the
project could not reach financial closure or the investor’s bid to undertake the project
was unsuccessful. To handle the excess zero problem in count data, Lambert, (1992)
developed and popularize the use of Zero-Inflated models (see Figure 4.3 for an
illustration of the various count models).9
4.4.1.3 Zero Inflated Models
These models allow for the possibility of large number of zeroes in the data while
in the process increasing the conditional variance. The models assume that there
are two latent or unobserved groups. The first relates to individuals who are in
the ‘always zero’ group, and therefore have an outcome of 0 with a probability of
1. The second group are individuals who are in the ‘not always zero’ group and
thus there is a non-zero probability of having a positive count. If, for example, the
process of generating the zero is f1(·) and the process of generating the positive
responses is f2(·) then the zero inflated model is given as:
g(y) =
 f1(0) + (1− f1(0)f2(0)) if y = 0(1− f1(0))f2(y) if y ≥ 0
9Zero-inflated regression models are said to originate in the econometrics literature around 1986
(Mullahy, 1986), but their use became widespread since the publication of Lambert in 1992.
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Process 1 is chosen with probability ηi and Process 2 with probability 1−ηi. Process
1 generates only zero counts, whereas Process 2 generates counts from either a
Poisson or a Negative Binomial model.
The probability of Yi|xi is:
P (Yi = yi|xi, zi) = η(γ′zi) + (1− η(γ′zi))g(0|xi) if y = 0
or
P (Yi = yi|xi, zi) = (1− η(γ′zi))g(y|xi) if y ≥ 1
When the probability η depends on the characteristics of observation i, ηi is written
as a function of z′iγ, where z
′
i is the vector of zero inflated covariates and γ is the
vector of zero-inflated coefficients to be estimated. The function that relates the
product z′iγ (which is a scalar) to the probability ηi is called the zero-inflated link
function, and it can be specified as either the logistic function or the standard normal
cumulative distribution function (the probit function). The mean and variance of the
two zero inflated models are given below:
(i) Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP)
• Mean E(yi|xi, zi) = λi(1− ηi)
• Variance V (yi|xi, zi) = λi(1− ηi)(1 + λiηi)
(ii) Zero Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB):
• Mean E(yi|xi, zi) = λi(1− ηi)
• Variance V (yi|xi, zi) = λi(1− ηi)(1 + λi(ηi + α))
The econometric methodology involves a mix of a binary choice model (usually
a logit model) to estimate the factors affecting membership of the ‘always zero’
group and a Poisson or Negative Binomial model to estimate the factors affecting
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membership of the ‘not always zero’ group. As a result, two sets of coefficients are
produced for Zero-Inflated count models:
(i) the first set of coefficients from the binary choice model represent the odds in
favour of being a member of the ‘always zero’ group; and
(ii) the second set of coefficients represent the normal Poisson or Negative Bino-
mial interpretation.
The same LR test detailed above can be used to compare both models. Alternatively,
the ZIP model can be compared with its Poisson counterpart and similarly the ZINB
with its Negative Binomial counterpart. However, the LR test cannot be used in this
instance because the models are non-nested (we cannot get from one model to the
other by setting a parameter, or parameters, equal to zero). Instead Vuong’s test
for non-nested models is used (see Vuong, 1989). The test considers two models,
where P1{yi|xi} is the predicted probability of observing y in the first model and
P2{yi|xi} is the predicted probability of observing y in the second model. Defining,
mi = ln
(
P1{yi|xi}
P2{yi|xi}
)
(4.4.11)
Vuong‘s test statistic for testing the hypothesis that E{m} equals zero is:
V =
√
Nm
sm
(4.4.12)
Where m is the mean and sm is the standard deviation of mi. V has an asymptotic
distribution. If V > 1.96, the first model is favoured, where the first model will be
either the ZIP or ZINB models. However, as noted by Ridout et al., (2001), in the
event that there is over dispersion in the Poisson model, the ZINB model become
superior to the ZIP model.
The Poisson and Negative Binomial models are estimated in Section 4.5 alongside
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their counterparts to analyse the factors that leads to the attractiveness of countries
for PPP engagements.
4.4.2 Limited Dependent Variable Models
As mentioned above, as a way of providing alternative view of country attractive-
ness to enhance policymaking, two additional measures of country’s attractiveness
for PPPs were used. The first one is the number of projects, which is identified as
discrete count dependent variable and therefore, count variable techniques, such as
those outlined above, were utilized to analyse the data, resting again on the Zero-
Inflated Negative Binomial model. The second variable, US dollar investment, is
identified to be continuous but constrained. This is because a large number of obser-
vations for this variable are zeroes, while the rest constitutes positive but different
values as shown in Figure 4.2.
FIGURE 4.2: Regional Distribution of Annual US$ Investment
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The figure shows the annual distribution of PPP investments across the six regions.
The bar at the far left in each regional facet represents zeroes, which means that
the data are effectively censored from below at zero. The presence of these zeroes
in the dependent variable could pose difficulties when analysing the data. In the
case of this study, it will be misleading to just conclude that the zeroes represent
lack of attractiveness of a particular country for PPPs. As is the case with the zero
inflated models mentioned above, it could be that PPP project funds are disbursed
on a biennial granularity or some irregular pattern over several years and therefore,
one could observe zero investment in the years when disbursements are not made.
Another example is that the private investor (sponsor) could find the country attrac-
tive for PPPs, but has been unsuccessful in the bidding process or for her project
to reach financial closure due to failure in meeting some conditions precedent such
as adhering to, for example, social and environmental standards. In these examples
therefore, zero investments cannot be interpreted as a country’s lack of attractive-
ness.
The constrain posed by the concentration of observations for the dependent variable
at zero renders invalid the use of the ordinary least squares regression models as
such models would produce bias results of the parameter estimates because the
estimated regression line would not take into account the fact that the data is limited
at one end (Cragg, 1971; Heckman, 1976; Tobin, 1958). In this circumstance where
the dependent variable is incompletely observed, a different set of econometrics
models, known as censored or truncated models, are required (see Cragg, 1971;
Tobin, 1958).
According to Maddala, (1991, p. 794), a censored regression model arises where
the information on the dependent variable, but not the explanatory variables, are
unobserved, while for truncated regression model, neither the dependent nor the
explanatory variables are observed. There are several models dedicated to handle
limited dependent variables, prominent amongst them is the Tobit model, which
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was developed by Tobin in 1958 to analyse censored dependent variables.
This section presents the two main statistical techniques used in this study to analyse
the relationship between the limited dependent variable, US dollar investment, and
it substantive predictors.
4.4.2.1 The Tobit Model
The general Tobit model specification can be written as follows:
y∗i = β
′xi + εi εi ∼ IN(0, σ2) and i = 1 · · ·n, (4.4.13)
and yi is related to y∗i by the relation:
yi =
 y
∗
i if y
∗
i > 0
0 if y∗i ≤ 0
where y∗i is a latent endogenous variable representing the US dollar investment
amount in a particular PPP project, yi is the actual observed investment amount,
xi is the identified set of substantive predictors for country’s attractiveness for PPPs
and β is the corresponding vector of parameters to be estimated. The error term εi
is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and constant variance σ2.
This model implicitly assumes that some of the zero investments represent private
investors who find a country attractive for PPPs but due to some reasons are unable
to invest in the country. However, if the circumstance that prevents them from
investing changes, for example, the project happens to reach financial closure, then
the the zeroes will transform into positive investments.
The Tobit model could be regarded as a two part model as follows:
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(i) the first part constitutes a probit model for the discrete decision of whether or
not yi is zero or positive:
prob(yi > 0) = Φ(β
′x)
(ii) the second part constitutes a truncated regression model for the continuous
decision for the quantity of yi|y∗i > 0.
E(yi|y∗i > 0)) = β′x+ σ
φ(−β′x
σ
)
1− Φ(−β′x
σ
)
= β′x+ αλ(
β′x
σ
)
where φ(.) and Φ(.) are the density and the cumulative distribution functions
(pdf and cdf) respectively of the standard normal variable.
The parameters β and σ can be estimated by maximizing the likelihood function:10
LikTobit =
∏
yi>0
1
σ
φ
[
yi − β′xi
σ
]
×
∏
yi>0
Φ(zi) (4.4.14)
where zi = −β′xi/σ. The log likelihood function for equation 4.4.14 is given as:
LogLikTobit =
∑
0
ln
[
1− Φ
{
β′xi
σ
}]
+
∑
+
ln
[
1
σ
φ
{
yi − β′xi
σ
}]
(4.4.15)
where 0 indicates summation over the zero observations in the sample (yi = 0) and
+ indicates summation over positive observations (yi > 0).
As is the case with all limited dependent variable models, the maximum likelihood
estimates from the Tobit model cannot be interpreted in the same way as the OLS
10See Maddala, (1991)
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estimates. To interpret the relationship between the dependent and independent
variables in a limited dependent variable model, one needs to analyse their marginal
effects. There are basically three types of marginal effects that can be computed
depending on the interest of the researcher, including:
(i) The marginal effects for the latent variable - this is simply the marginal effect
on the desired level of investment by private investors and it is given by the
coefficient of the explanatory variables.
dE(y∗i )
dx
= β (4.4.16)
(ii) The Marginal effect for the censored sample (Tobit model) - this marginal
effect reflects both the zeroes and positive investment amounts, i.e., it attempts
to capture private investors who have the desire to invest, but unable to do so,
and those who actually invested. This form of marginal effect is given as the
product of the coefficient and a positive scale factor.
dE(yi)
dx
= βΦ
(
β′xi
σ
)
(4.4.17)
(iii) The marginal effect of the truncated sample – this marginal effect only reflects
positive investment amount, i.e., only private investors that actually invested
in a country’s PPP.
dE(yi|yi > 0)
dx
=
[
1− β
′xi
σ
λ
(
β′xi
σ
)
− λ
(
β′xi
σ
)2]
β (4.4.18)
There are a lot of examples of the empirical application of the Tobit model in vari-
ous areas of research including agricultural (see for example, Adesina and Zinnah,
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1993; Bellemare and Barrett, 2006), finance (Kinsey, 1981), and consumer expen-
diture (Melenberg and Van Soest, 1996). However, the model is said to have a fun-
damental restriction as it assumes that the same stochastic process determines both
the discrete (i.e. the censoring rule) and continuous decisions (see Cragg, 1971;
Lin and Schmidt, 1984). In other words, the exact same variables that affect the
probability of a non-zero observation determine the level of positive observations.
It is but reasonable for one to assume that the factors that determines whether or not
a private investor is willing to participate in a country’s PPP are somehow different
from those that determine the amount of investment she makes in a country where
she has never invested before than one where she has. Another shortcoming of the
Tobit model is that it links the shape of the distribution of the positive observations
and the probability of a positive observation (Lin and Schmidt, 1984, pp. 174-175).
For these reasons, several scholars, including Cragg, (1971) and Heckman, (1976),
have come up with variants of the Tobit model.11 However, because of it wider
application (see Blundell and Meghir, 1987; Jones, 1989) and relevance to this re-
search, the Cragg’s model is investigated.
4.4.2.2 The Cragg’s Double Hurdle Model
In 1971, Cragg developed his two hurdle model in an attempt to alleviate some of
the shortcomings of the Tobit model. His model has two basic assumptions (see Lin
and Schmidt, 1984):
(i) first, the probability of a limit observation (a zero) is given by a probit model
with parameter vector given by βi. That is,
prob(y∗i > 0) = Φ(γ
′zi) (4.4.19)
11See Amemiya, (1984) for more variants and empirical application of the Tobit model.
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(ii) second, it is assumed that the density of yi, conditional on being a non-limit
(positive), i.e. the truncated regression model for the continuous decision (un-
censored observations), is given as:
prob(y|y∗i > 0) = β′xi + σλ
[
β′xi
σ
]
(4.4.20)
In effect, in the Cragg’s Double Hurdle model, the coefficients γ and β as well as
the variables z and x in the probit and truncated regression models can be different.
The log likelihood function of the model is given as:12
LogLikCragg =
∑
0
ln
[
1− Φ(γ′zi)Φ
(
β′xi
σi
)]
+
∑
+
ln
[
Φ(γ′zi)
1
σi
φ
(
yi − β′xi
σi
)]
(4.4.21)
4.4.2.3 Test for the Tobit versus the Cragg’s Models
A log-likelihood ratio test is employed to check which of the two models, Tobit
single hurdle model and Cragg’s Double Hurdle model, is more suitable for the
analysis under consideration. The following steps help with the selection process:
• the Tobit model is selected if the restriction β/σ holds (same coefficients for
the discrete and continuous decisions) otherwise the Cragg’s model is selected
(different coefficients for the discrete and continuous decisions).
• to test this restriction, the following likelihood ratio statistic is used:13
η = 2× (LogLikProbit•Cragg + LogLikTrucate•Cragg − LogLikTobit) (4.4.22)
• the test statistic has a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal
to the number of independent variables (including the intercept). The Tobit
12See Lin and Schmidt, (1984) for a full derivation of the likelihood function of the Cragg’s model.
13A complete derivation of the log-likelihood ratio statistic can be found in Lin and Schmidt,
(1984).
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model is rejected in favour of the Cragg’s model if η exceeds the appropriate
chi-square critical value.
4.4.3 Robust Standard Error
It is typical for data described by econometric models to contain heteroskedas-
ticity and/or autocorrelation of some unknown form which could render the stan-
dard error of the model invalid for constructing confidence interval and t statistics
(Wooldridge, 2015). It is therefore, recommended that covariance matrix estimators
that can consistently estimate the covariance of the model parameters are used. To
this end, over the recent decades, econometric literature has given much attention
to the use of suitable heteroskedasticity consistent (HC) and heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimators (see for example, Andrews and Mona-
han, 1992; Newey and West, 1987, 1994; White, 1980).
To apply these estimators in practice, Zeileis, (2006) suggests that an implementa-
tion is needed that preferably translates the conceptual properties of the underlying
theoretical frameworks into computational tools, which he said can be achieved us-
ing the “sandwich package” in the R system for statistical computing. He noted
that the toolbox contained in sandwich is extremely flexible and comprehensive, in-
cluding specific functions for the most important HC and HAC estimators from the
econometric literature.
To compute the robust standard error (in our case accounting for potential het-
eroskedasticity), a choice has to be made among several recommended variants
of of HC estimators ΨˆHC which are constructed by plugging an estimate of type
Ωˆ = diag(ω1, · · · , ωn) into the following covariance matrix (see Zeileis, 2006)
Ψ = VAR[βˆ] = (XTX)−1XTΩX(XTX)−1 (4.4.23)
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The estimators ΨˆHC differ in their choice of the ωi. Some of the most important
variants of ωi are presented by Zeileis, (2006) as follows:
const : ωi = σˆ
2 (4.4.24)
HC0 : ωi = uˆ
2
i (4.4.25)
HC1 : ωi =
n
n− k uˆ
2
i (4.4.26)
HC2 : ωi =
uˆ2i
1− hi (4.4.27)
HC3 : ωi =
uˆ2i
(1− hi)2 (4.4.28)
HC4 : ωi =
uˆ2i
(1− hi)δi (4.4.29)
where hi = Hii are the diagonal elements of the hat matrix and δi = min(4, hi/h¯).
Equation 4.4.24 yields the standard estimator Ψconst for homoskedastic errors. The
estimator HC0 was introduced by White, (1980), building on earlier work by Eicker,
(1963). The estimators HC1, HC2 and HC3 were suggested by MacKinnon and
White, (1985) to improve the performance in small samples. According to Angrist
and Pischke, (2008), HC1 is a simple degrees of freedom correction, HC2 uses
the leverage to give an unbiased estimate of the variance of the ith residual when
the residuals are homoskedastic while HC3 approximates a jackknife estimator.14
Given that the sample size in this current study is relatively small, the HC3 estimator
is used consistent with the recommendation and finding of Long and Ervin, (2000)
that HC3 estimator provides the best performance in small samples as it gives less
weight to influential observations.
14The jackknife estimator gives useful nonparametric estimates of variance by systematically
omitting one observation at a time from a dataset to calculate the estimate and then finding the
average of these calculations.
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4.5 Empirical Results and Discussion
This section presents the regression results on the relationship between countries
attractiveness and the various channels through which this attractiveness is acquired.
Table 4.5 gives the main results in which the dependent variable is the number
of sponsors. The table shows the output from Negative Binomial (NB), Zero-
Inflated Poisson (ZIP), and the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) models,
all of which are benchmarked against the Poisson model. As noted in Section 4.4,
the selection of the appropriate model rests on various tests, including: the Disper-
sion Test, which checks for over-dispersion in the Poisson model; and the Vuong
Test, which helps to determine the appropriate non-nested model for interpreting
the results.
In terms of regional dummies, the SSA dummy is used as the benchmark for com-
paring the other regions. This is expected to reflect the challenges faced by the
region in attracting private investors in PPPs vis-a´-vis the other regions.
4.5.1 Results for Combined Sectors
Table 4.5 presents the results for the combined sectors’ scenario, i.e., looking at
countries’ attractiveness from an overall perspective without sectoral heterogeneity.
The table shows that the dispersion coefficient is significantly in excess of 1 (one),
which indicates over-dispersion of the Poisson regression, and significant z-statistic
of the Vuong test for the selection between the Poission and ZIP models, and in turn,
between the NB and ZINB models. The output indicates a preference for the ZIP
over the Poisson and, in turn, the ZINB over the ZIP. Therefore, the ZINB is used as
the main model for interpreting the relationship between countries’ attractiveness
and the various explanatory variables.
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The results provide strong evidence in support of Hypothesis 1, which argues that
macroeconomic and market channel is important for countries’ attractiveness for
PPPs, suggesting that stable macroeconomic condition coupled with the market
for PPP outputs incentivise private sector participation in PPPs. Consistent with
many studies, including Scaperlanda and Mauer, (1969), the results specifically
suggest that for those private investors who find a country attractive for PPPs the
main driver for such attraction is the the market for the PPP output both in terms of
size (population) and potential effective demand/purchasing power (GDP per capi-
tal) for which a unit increase in each of these variables could significantly increase
country’s attractiveness by a factor of exp(0.552) = 1.74 and exp(0.374) = 1.45
respectively.In terms of macroeconomic variables, Inflation is found to be highly
significant and has a reducing influence on countries’ attractiveness in line with a
priori expectation. Exchange rate on the other hand, does not appear to be signifi-
cant, albeit exhibits its expected negative relationship with countries’ attractiveness
for PPPs. However, the availability of foreign exchange (international reserves in
months of imports) is found to be significant and a percentage increase could lead
to 1.04 percent improvement in countries’ attractiveness.
With the exception of the solvency indicator, which was found to be slightly signifi-
cant, there is no evidence supporting the Hypothesis on ‘Fiscal Constraints’ channel
(Hypothesis 2). It could be suggested that because PPPs are usually long-term ar-
rangements between the public and private sectors, investors are concerned about
the long-term capacity of the public sector to meet obligations, particular in light of
possible termination of PPP arrangements. Experience has shown that irrespective
of the partner that is responsible for the termination of the PPP project (private or
public partner), the public sector is always saddled with several obligations. There-
fore, the ability of the public sector to meet these long-term obligations could be
important to private sector investors. As indicated, the rest of the variables under
the ‘Fiscal Constraints’ channel are of no significance to private investors. This
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could be the case that private investors are aware that governments with dire fiscal
condition are usually the ones that are desperate to engage in PPPs (Maskin and
Tirole, 2008). This desperation could present an opportunity for these investors to
secure greater profitability.
There is some evidence supporting Hypothesis 3, the ‘Regulatory and Governance’
channel as four out of the six variables are found to be significant in explaining
countries’ attractiveness for PPPs of which Rule of Law appears to be the most
significant variable. Government effectiveness, albeit significant, appears to have
the wrong sign, suggesting that as a government becomes more effective, the coun-
try’s attractiveness reduces. One plausible explanation for this negative relationship
could stem from one of the main justifications for PPPs, which is to tap into private
sector efficiency in the delivery of public infrastructure and related services. This
means that as governments become less effective, there is a clear and desperate need
for private sector engagement, which in turn may provide opportunity to private in-
vestors for greater profitability. This finding strengthen that on the fiscal constraint
channel.
The issue of corruption, which has commanded attention in the development litera-
ture, seems to be of no consequence to private investors when considering whether
or not to engage in PPPs. This finding is similar to that of Hammami et al., (2006)
who find corruption to be an insignificant determinant for PPPs. It has been sug-
gested that in a situation where corrupt practices such as “speed money” enables
public officials to avoid bureaucratic delays or allow them to work harder to ensure
the success of the partnership, private investors are not held back in their engage-
ment with the public sector (Mauro, 1995). On this same issue, the Sudanese-born
British billion philanthropist, Mo Ibrahim, who made his fortune in the telecommu-
nication industry, in an interview with Aljazeera, narrates that his company has been
able to avoid the issue of corruption by putting in place a board whose members are
of reputable standing and have great influence in the development process of the
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host countries, and by imposing a US$30,000 unapproved expenditure limit for his
chief executives in various countries.15 In so doing, it is difficult for any government
official to ask for bribes as it would require the approval of the board whose mem-
bers can influence decision-making in that country. In short, by internalising the
control of corruption through the company’s corporate governance structure, there
was no need for him to worry about corruption in host countries. Notwithstanding,
the sign of the coefficient for the corruption variable appears to be consistent with
a priori expectation, suggesting a reducing effect on countries’s attractiveness for
PPPs.
The hypothesis on countries’ experience in PPP transactions (Hypothesis 4) can-
not be rejected as it was found to be highly significant in determining countries’
attractiveness for PPPs. This may reflect the possibility that countries that have
implemented PPP projects have in place a cadre of local expert negotiators capa-
ble to avoid protracted negotiations, which may unnecessarily increase the cost of
projects, and hence lead to project failure.
As far as regional attractiveness is concerned, the results show significant differ-
ences between the benchmark region, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and Europe and
Central Asia (ECA) as well as Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), suggesting
that SSA is attracting about 31 and 22 percent less private sector investors into PPPs
than these two regions respectively.
4.5.2 Countries’ Attractiveness by Sector
This section presents the regression results for the four major infrastructure sectors
with the aim of investigating the sectoral heterogeneity in countries’ attractiveness
for PPPs.
15Some of the board members include big multinational institutions such as the IFC of the World
Bank, and big governmental institutions such as the CDC Group of the United Kingdom.
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4.5.2.1 PPP in the Telecommunication Sector
Table 4.6 presents the results for the telecom sector, which shows that only a few
factors are significant in explaining countries’ attractiveness for PPP engagements
in the sector, including: inflation, exchange rate and market size under the ‘Macroe-
conomic and Market’ channel; and regulatory quality under the ‘Regulatory and
Governance’ channel. Previous experience in executing PPP transactions appears
to be insignificant in determining countries’ attractiveness for PPPs in the sector,
so are all the variables under the ‘Fiscal Constraint’ channel.
The above findings seem to give credence to the way PPPs are structured in the
telecom sector, which are mostly on a build, own and operate (BOO) basis with less
reliance on public sector support, and where the private sector assumes nearly all of
the risks as well as associated rewards of the project (see Table 3.2 in Chapter 3).
Therefore, specific characteristics or changes in some of the conditions that affect
the public sector do not necessarily influence private sector interest and participation
in PPPs in this sector. The increased flow of PPP investments into the telecom sector
over the years as reflected in Table 4.4, buttresses this point and suggests that the
high profitability in the sector outweighs some of the policy-induced distortions or
other forms of risks (Hammami et al., 2006). Sirtaine and Foster, (2005) observe
that concessions in the telecom sector appear overall more profitable than the other
sectors.
The SSA region has significantly attracted more investors in telecom PPPs than both
the EAP and LAC regions. These findings are consistent with the relative success of
telecommunication PPP projects in developing countries, particularly in IDA-only
countries, most of which are in SSA (Kimura et al., 2010).
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4.5.2.2 PPP in the Energy Sector
Table 4.7 presents the results for the energy sector, which shows that only few vari-
ables are of significance to private investors, including: the market for the PPP
output, both in terms of size and purchasing power, and availability of foreign ex-
change, under the macroeconomic and Market channel; supplemental public sector
revenue under the Fiscal Constraints channel; Rule of Law under the Regulatory
and Governance channel and; experience of the government in implementing PPP
transactions.
Unlike the telecom sector, one of the variables that is significant in the energy sector
relates to the ‘Fiscal Constraint’ channel, which also has to do with the way PPPs
are structured in this sector. A majority of the PPP projects in the energy sector
are structured on a build, operate, and transfer basis (see Figure 3.9 in Chapter 3),
which, while conferring the residual facility of the project on the public sector, also
gives significant responsibility and requires huge support from the sector. As such,
investors are concerned about the buoyancy of the public sector as well as it experi-
ence in executing PPPs, which could assure them of the government propensity to
meet its commitments.
Most governments, particularly those in SSA, are allocating huge amount of re-
sources in the energy sector, yet experience suggests that they are unable to achieve
the desired result due mainly to inefficiencies. Therefore, the perception that the
sector is plagued mainly by inefficiencies and not resource inadequacy or market
for the PPP output, could be an enticing factor for private investors as it is their
expertise to eliminate inefficiencies and in the process achieve greater profitabil-
ity. This view is reaffirmed by the fact that a significant portion of the assets in
the sector is already available and owned by the public sector including, in some
cases, the transmission and distribution networks, which could be used as collateral
to raise debt financing for PPP projects (see Table 4.1). Furthermore, experience
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suggests that some governments are willing to take the risk of foreign exchange
availability in the event private investors are unable to secure foreign exchange in
the local economy for the repatriation of profit or foreign debt servicing, in addition
to providing other supports, such as political and partial risk guarantees. This could,
to some extent, explain why foreign exchange availability and government revenue
potential are very important to investors in this sector.
As indicated above, nearly all of the variables under the ‘Regulatory and Gover-
nance’ channel are found to be insignificant in explaining countries’ attractiveness
for PPPs. To corroborate this point, the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2015
indicates that notwithstanding the lack of infrastructure and volatile regulations,
FDI flows to least developed countries, the majority of which are located in Sub-
Saharan Africa, increased by 4 percent to US$23 billion.
From a regional perspective, the SSA region is trailing the other regions in attracting
private investors in the energy sector, except MENA.
4.5.2.3 PPP in the Transport Sector
Table 4.8 presents the results for the transport sector. This sector brings to the
fore the need for good regulation and governance. Apart from the significant need
for a large market and government experience in dealing with PPPs, the rest of
the variables that have significant influence on countries’ attractiveness for PPPs
in the transport sector come from the ‘Regulatory and Governance’ channel, in-
cluding Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality, Government Effectiveness and Control of
Corruption. There is a weak significance of government liquidity in terms of debt
service to budget revenue.
Since it is common for governments to issue out revenue guarantees under projects
in this sector in order to compensate for shortfall in, for example, traffic in a road
projects, it is possible that frequent disputes may arise in the reconciliation of
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records and payments of compensation. Therefore, it can be suggested that in-
vestors are concerned about the integrity of the government and legal system, and
more so, control of corruption, which may create unwarranted bottlenecks in the
entire process.
Comparatively, the SSA region has made significant progress in attracting more
private investors into transport PPPs than the EAP regions, albeit lagging behind
the LAC region.
4.5.2.4 PPP in the Water and Sewerage Sector
Table 4.9 shows the results for the determinants of countries attractiveness for PPPs
in the Water and Sewerage Sector. The results almost mimicked those of the trans-
port sector, although the regulatory and governance indicators are more significant
and there is the further requirement for foreign exchange availability as well as price
stability.
The Regional dummies indicate that the SSA region has faired significantly better
than the EAP and SA regions in attracting private investors in water and sewerage
PPPs.
4.5.3 Other Measures of Countries’ Attractiveness for PPPs
As mentioned earlier, the main variable used to capture countries’ attractiveness
for PPPs is the number of private sector investors in PPP projects. Nonetheless,
the research also used two other variables, which have been adopted before in other
empirical studies on PPPs, to measure countries’ attractiveness. These variables are
the number of PPP projects and the US dollar investment in PPP projects, expressed
as a percent of GDP. The aim here is to investigate how the outcomes of these
variables compared to that of the main dependent variable in order to broaden the
horizon for policymaking.
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4.5.3.1 Countries’ Attractiveness Measured by the Number of Projects
The number of PPP projects is a count variable and therefore, we used count vari-
ables models similar to those used for the number of investors for which the results
rest on the use of the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial model for interpretation.
Table 4.10 presents the results, which, to a large extent, is similar to the ones pre-
sented in Table 4.5 when countries’ attractiveness was measured by the number of
private investors. In both set of results, there is significant emphasis on the market,
both in term of size and potential effective demand; rule of law; political stability;
and the experience of the country in undertaking PPP transactions. The results from
Table 4.10 also emphasise the need for exchange rate stability.
Again, the two sets of results put very little significance on the ‘Government Con-
straint’ channel. However, while natural resource rent emerged as the only signifi-
cant variables in Table 4.10 under this channel, the solvency indicator, Debt Stock
to Export, emerged as the only significant variable under the same channel in Table
4.5.
Under the ‘Regulatory and Governance’ channel, Table 4.5 has two extra significant
variables, regulatory quality and government effectiveness, compared to Table 4.10.
With respect to regional attractiveness, the results are largely the same except for
the level of significance. The benchmark region, SSA, trails behind EAP, ECA and
LAC in attracting PPPs both in terms of the number of private investors as well as
number of projects.
4.5.3.2 Countries’ Attractiveness Measured by US Dollar Investment
As indicated in Section 4.4, the other variable used in this research to measure at-
tractiveness is the US dollar investment as a percent of GDP. It is noted that this
variable is a continuous variable but constrained due to the large number of zero
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observations. As a result, the research investigated two models, Tobit and Cragg’s
Double Hurdle models, which are known to handle such limitation in continuous
dependent variables. However, after comparing the result of the likelihood ratio test
(value = 4187) to the critical value for the Chi-square distribution with 21 degrees of
freedom (df) (value = 46.8), we reject the hypothesis that the Tobit model is the ap-
propriate model and hence, settle for the Cragg’s model to interpret the relationship
between countries’ attractiveness and the various explanatory variables.
The Cragg’s model has two parts, the probit part, which indicates the investor’s
decision to participate in a country’s PPP, and the truncated part, which indicates the
investor’s decision as to how much to invest in a country’s PPP. The results indicates
that investor’s Participation Decision rests mainly on the size of the market, public
sector solvency and the country’s income from natural resources as well as the its
experience in executing PPPs. Some of these findings relate well to the Sierra Leone
scenario. The country has huge fiscal challenges, but because of its discovery of
large deposit of iron ore (natural resources), it has been able to gain the attention
of many private investors who have shown interest to participate in the country’s
PPPs. In fact, there are talks of the Chinese wanting to use the proceeds from the
mining sector as collateral for the development of massive infrastructure projects in
the country.
The results also indicate that the Investment Decision emphasises the ‘Macroeco-
nomic and Market’ channel as the main source for countries’ attractiveness. Like
the other two measures of countries’ attractiveness (number of investors and num-
ber of PPP project), the ‘Government Constraint’ channel was not found to be sig-
nificant in explaining countries’ attractiveness for PPP investment, while rule of
law under the ‘Regulatory and Governance’ channel is highly significant.
Again, SSA is trailing behind ECA, but has attracted significantly more PPP invest-
ment than MENA.
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4.6 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
This section concludes the chapter and highlights the policy recommendations em-
anating thereof.
4.6.1 Conclusions
This chapter investigates the attractiveness of 101 countries across the six regions
of the world for the period 1995 - 2014 using the World Bank’s Private Participation
in Infrastructure (PPI) dataset for the year ending 2014. The main variable used to
measure countries’ attractiveness for PPPs is the number of private investors (re-
ferred to as Sponsors) engaged in PPPs. However, two other measures, the number
of projects and the US dollar investment, were also used to measure countries’ at-
tractiveness in an attempt to provide policymakers additional options when making
decisions on the prioritisation of reform programmes geared towards the accelera-
tion of infrastructure development. These variables were then tested against several
substantive predictors which were grouped into four major channels: Macroeco-
nomic and Market; Fiscal Constraints; Regulatory and Governance; and Experience
in PPPs (see Table 4.14).
4.6.1.1 Number of Sponsors as Dependent Variable
As noted above, because the number of sponsors constitutes count data, count vari-
able models were utilised resting on the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model.
The analysis relating to this variable was done in two parts. The first part considers
the total number of private investors participating in PPP projects irrespective of the
sector in which the project is implemented (combined sector), while the second part
takes into consideration sectoral heterogeneity by investigating each sector in turn.
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Under the combined sector, the Macroeconomic and Market channel emerged as
most important channel in determining countries’ attractiveness for PPPs. In par-
ticular, the market, both in terms of size and effective demand, as well as overall
price stability were found to be highly significant. Evidence suggests that countries
with high population are more attractive for PPPs (see Asiedu, 2006) and as noted
by Hammami et al., (2006, p. 20), countries need large markets to attract private
investment in infrastructure and to promote real growth and income per capita.
Since PPPs are usually long-term arrangements, investors are particularly interested
in knowing that the government is capable of meeting its long-term commitments
under PPPs, which makes the solvency indicator under the Fiscal Constraints chan-
nel very significant as it portrays the sustainability of the long-term cash flow of the
public sector. Evidence also suggests that countries with better rule of law attract
more private investors into PPPs, so also are countries with wealth of experience
in executing PPP transactions. It is noted that countries that amass qualified pub-
lic officials capable of negotiating and implementing PPPs have higher possibility
of reducing project costs and increasing affordability, thus attracting more private
investors.
Finally, under the Combined Sector analysis, evidence suggests that the SSA region
is attracting approximately 30 percent less private investors into PPPs for infras-
tructure development and related services than both the ECA and LAC regions.
At the sectoral level, only four factors were found to be significant in the telecom
sector. Three of these factors; inflation, exchange rate stability and market size, are
under the Macroeconomic and Market channel, and one, regulatory quality, which
captures the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies
and regulations that permit and promote private sector development, is under the
Regulatory and Governance channel. The rest of the factors, including control of
corruption and experience in PPPs, were found to be insignificant in explaining
countries attractive for PPPs in the telecom sector. As suggested, the potential for
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huge profitability in the sector outweighs investors’ perception of the risk in the
sector (Hammami et al., 2006; Sirtaine and Foster, 2005).
A common attribute amongst the energy, transport and water and sewerage sectors
is that they are normally heavily supported by governments. For example, gov-
ernments sometimes provide revenue guarantees in toll road projects or guarantee
the capacity and output charges in a ‘take-or-pay’ or ‘take-and-pay’ energy con-
tract.16 This has the effect of shifting a majority of the risks to the public sector,
including foreign exchange risk, both in terms of availability and upside volatility,
which makes these variables very significant for countries’ attractiveness for PPPs
in these three sectors. In addition, and especially in the energy and water and sew-
erage sectors, proceeds from natural resources are very important as they can be
used leverage against private sector investments. This is especially true for Chinese
investments in developing countries which have huge natural resources (see Cassel
et al., 2010).
4.6.1.2 The other Dependent Variables
As indicated earlier, the study used two other variables to measure countries’ at-
tractiveness for PPPs in an attempt to enhance the policymaking decision when
sequencing activities for the acceleration of countries’ infrastructure development
programmes through the use of the PPP framework.
The first variable, number of projects, is a count variable, and like the number of
sponsors, count variable techniques were utilised to analyse the data, resting on the
Zero-inflated Negative Binomial model. The second variable, US dollar investment
as a percent of GDP, is a continuous dependent variable but limited at one end,
and therefore, several variants of the Tobit model, which deal with such limitation
16A take or pay agreement is a buyer-seller agreement where the buyer’s obligation to pay is not
unconditional, but is contingent either upon the delivery of purchased goods or services or upon the
buyer’s consent to take the delivery (see the Oxford Business Dictionary)
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were investigated for which the Cragg’s Double Hurdle model emerged as the most
appropriate model.
The results from these two variables are similar to those of the main dependent
variable (the number of sponsors in PPP projects), except that they were able to
highlight the importance of the availability of foreign exchange, which practitioners
have identified as key especially for PPPs in the energy sector. Many countries,
including Iraq (see Iraqi Draft Law on Public Private Partnership), have legislated
that the risk of foreign exchange availability under PPPs should be allocated to
public authorities. A way of knowing whether the public sector can make true to its
promise on foreign exchange availability is by looking at the country’s international
reserve, which was found to be highly significant.
4.6.2 Policy Recommendations
To reiterate, the main purpose of this chapter is to help identify the crucial factors
that enhance countries’ attractiveness for PPPs for infrastructure development and
to guide policymakers in the process of sequencing reforms that are geared towards
this end, particularly for Sub-Saharan African countries. While Section 4.5 was
able to identify the relevant factors, this section articulates some the policy recom-
mendations that will guide countries in their quest for PPPs as a way of accelerating
the delivery of public infrastructure and related services. Some of the policy rec-
ommendations include:
(1) Governments should prioritise macroeconomic and market factors. They should
find ways of guaranteeing the market for PPP outputs as well as maintaining
price and exchange rate stability, which can easily be translated into PPP output
tariff and hence, affect output affordability. One of the main channels through
which countries gain their attractiveness for PPPs is the Macroeconomic and
Market Channel, which requires governments’ ability to stabilize inflation and
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exchange rate as well as demonstrate a clear market for the PPP output. With
reference to the latter, a large number of PPPs are now requiring the public
sector to assume the market risk. For example, most energy PPP agreements
are structured as off-take/power purchase agreements (PPA), which are usually
in the form of a take-or-pay under which the public sector is required to pay for
a contractually specified minimum quantity of the PPP output whether or not
delivery is taken (Masten and Crocker, 1985, p. 1083).17
(2) There is the need for governments to act as providers of last resort for foreign
currency should the local financial markets fail to provide the required foreign
currency for the repatriation of profit and servicing of foreign debt. Matsukawa
et al., (2003, pp. 3-4) put forward several reasons why private investors believe
that the government should take up foreign exchange risk, both in terms of
availability and upside volatility, including:
• the government has an informational advantage due to knowledge of its
own future policy intentions and its ability to use policy instruments to
influence the exchange rate and;
• the government is able to spread the risk thinly over its numerous and
diversified taxpayers with none suffering significantly from the effect.
(3) There is the need for public sector solvency, which thus calls for prudent public
debt management as well as enhanced access to both local and international
capital markets for ease of capital mobilization in the event of crystallisation of
obligations assumed under PPPs. The importance of this is brought out clearly
in most of the results, which indicates that public sector solvency is a highly
significant variable under the Fiscal Constraint channel for attracting private
investors into PPPs.
17See the Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co.’s Power Purchase Agreements for exam-
ple of off-take agreement.
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(4) Amongst the variables under the Regulatory and Governance channel, there is
the need for urgent strengthening of the rule of law, which relates to investors’
perception of the extent to which economic agents have confidence in and abide
by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
property rights, and the court. As noted in Section 4.5, PPPs are mostly struc-
tured in a way that at one point during the course of the partnership, ownership
of residual rights or facility is conferred on the private sector and therefore, the
sector requires certainty on the protection of these rights. In addition, because
PPPs are usually long-term engagements, there is the need for assurance that in
the event of future renegotiations, which may lead to the ‘hold-up problem’ (see
Hart et al., 1996), private sector investors will not be unduly disadvantaged.
(5) There is need for experience in executing PPP projects. The results placed
significant emphasis on experience in PPPs as a means of gaining attractiveness.
The successful implementation of PPPs provides knowledge accumulation for
public officials and enhances there capacity to speedily conclude negotiations
and provide the right kind of supports for the success of projects. It is true that in
most cases gaining experience means a great deal of sacrifice, particularly when
the government is in desperate need of private resources for its infrastructure
programme. Most often than none, the government has to assume risks that are
sometimes over and above its fair share just in an effort to close PPP deals. This
is particularly the case for PPP projects in the energy, transport and water and
sewerage sectors, which require huge upfront government commitments and
support.
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TABLE 4.5: Coutries’ Attractiveness Measured by the Number of Sponsors
Poission Negative Binomial (NB) Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) Zero Inflated NB (ZINB)
Variables Abbreviation Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant Const. 1.806*** 0.082 2.358*** 0.19 1.405*** 0.004 2.205*** 0.008
Macroeconomic and Market Channel
Inflation Infl 0.002 0.003 -0.01. 0.005 0.004 0.003 -0.014* 0.006
Exchange Rate (Stability) SDExRate -1.244*** 0.187 -0.716* 0.354 -1.242*** 0.195 -0.904* 0.374
International Reserve in Months of Imports (log) LTRiMoI 0.149*** 0.033 0.031 0.069 0.24*** 0.037 0.008* 0.068
Population (log) LPOP 0.51*** 0.021 0.473*** 0.040 0.411*** 0.023 0.552*** 0.041
GDP Per Capita (log) LGDPPC 0.291*** 0.027 0.241*** 0.062 0.238*** 0.029 0.374*** 0.066
Governement Constraint Channel
Debt Stock to Exports (log) LDODExport 0.067. 0.036 0.141. 0.076 -0.093* 0.040 -0.156. 0.080
Debt Service to Exports (log) LTDSXGS 0.01 0.039 0.037 0.083 -0.004 0.041 -0.061 0.084
Debt Service to Budget Revenue (log) LTDSDBR -0.115** 0.039 -0.114 0.080 -0.051 0.043 -0.056 0.083
Natural Resource Rent to GDP (log) LTNRRGDP -0.105*** 0.016 -0.035 0.032 -0.116*** 0.018 0.015 0.034
Regulatory and Governance Channel
Rule of Law (index) RoL 0.018*** 0.002 0.014** 0.005 0.015*** 0.002 0.024*** 0.005
Regulatory Quality (index) RQ 0.011*** 0.002 0.007. 0.004 0.008*** 0.002 0.009* 0.004
Total Time to Effect Contract (log) LTRtEC 0.216*** 0.049 0.098 0.107 0.175*** 0.051 0.092 0.106
Government Effectiveness (index) GoE -0.016*** 0.002 -0.007 0.005 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.014** 0.005
Control of Corruption (index) CoC -0.004. 0.002 -0.004 0.004 -0.006** 0.002 -0.005 0.004
Political Stability Channel
Political Stability (index) PSaV 0.006*** 0.001 0.006. 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.007** 0.003
Experience Channel
Experience (log) LExpe 0.518*** 0.026 0.52*** 0.046 0.423*** 0.024 0.361*** 0.045
Regional Dummies (Benchmark - Sub-Saharan Africa)
East Asia and Pacific EAP -0.183** 0.065 0.053 0.137 -0.322*** 0.067 0.117 0.134
Europe and Central Asia ECA 0.181* 0.079 0.197 0.142 0.047 0.085 0.308* 0.142
Latin America and the Caribbean LAC 0.222** 0.072 0.138 0.131 0.163* 0.076 0.221. 0.129
Middle East and North Africa MENA -0.299** 0.092 -0.115 0.159 -0.218* 0.103 -0.104 0.164
South Asia SA -0.094 0.078 0.161 0.165 -0.038 0.083 0.154 0.165
Dispersion Test [H1(True dispersion) > 1] 3.339***
No. of Projects 5270 5270 5270 5270
Vuong Test: Poission vs ZIP (z-statistic) -7.794***
Vuong Test: ZIP vs ZINB (z-statistic) -7.452***
Notes:
1) ’***’, ’**’, ’*’ and ’.’ denote significant estimate at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
2) Several tests were conducted to select the superior model. A dispersion test shows that the Poisson model was overdispersed and the Vuong non-nested test
shows that the Zero Inflated Negative Binomial model, which corrects for both overdispersion and excess zero in the data, was found to be the superior model.
3) The standard errors are robust and are computed using the Sandwich Package in R Programming as explained in Section 4.4.3
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TABLE 4.6: Telecommunication Sector (Dependent Variable: Number of Sponsors)
Poission Negative Binomial (NB) Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) Zero Inflated NB (ZINB)
Variables Abbreviation Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant Const. 3.854*** 0.266 3.912*** 0.371 3.384*** 0.012 3.848*** 0.014
Macroeconomic and Market Channel
Inflation Infl -0.004 0.006 -0.005 0.009 -0.032*** 0.008 -0.023* 0.010
Exchange Rate (Stability) SDExRate -0.218 0.341 -0.116 0.467 -0.931* 0.446 -0.283* 0.540
International Reserve in Months of Imports (log) LTRiMoI -0.024 0.089 -0.037 0.123 -0.304* 0.121 -0.205 0.136
Population (log) LPOP 0.213*** 0.050 0.154* 0.069 0.271*** 0.075 0.152* 0.077
GDP Per Capita (log) LGDPPC 0.097 0.079 0.089 0.112 0.235* 0.116 0.317** 0.122
Government Constraint Channels
Debt Stock to Exports (log) LDODExport 0.020 0.096 0.073 0.133 -0.357** 0.138 -0.087 0.154
Debt Service to Exports (log) LTDSXGS -0.044 0.100 -0.104 0.142 0.322* 0.138 0.16 0.162
Debt Service to Budget Revenue (log) LTDSDBR 0.027 0.094 -0.01 0.138 -0.139 0.124 -0.196 0.160
Natural Resource Rent to GDP (log) LTNRRGDP 0.062 0.043 0.059 0.059 0.077 0.059 0.077 0.067
Regulatory and Governance Channel
Rule of Law (index) RoL 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.009 -0.004 0.007 -0.001 0.010
Regulatory Quality (index) RQ 0.014** 0.005 0.01 0.007 0.031*** 0.006 0.019* 0.008
Total Time to Effect Contract (log) LTRtEC -0.111 0.133 -0.153 0.187 0.176 0.175 0.034 0.213
Government Effectiveness (index) GoE -0.014* 0.006 -0.007 0.009 -0.02* 0.008 -0.015 0.011
Control of Corruption (index) CoC 0.001 0.005 -0.005 0.007 0.012. 0.007 0.006 0.009
Political Stability Channel
Political Stability (index) PSaV 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.005 -0.009. 0.004 0.001 0.006
Experience Channel
Experience (log) LExpe 0.369* 0.052 0.426* 0.072 0.181 0.085 0.527 0.069
Regional Dummies (Benchmark - Sub-Saharan Africa)
East Asia and Pacific EAP -1.165*** 0.199 -1.092*** 0.273 -0.891*** 0.210 -0.958*** 0.268
Europe and Central Asia ECA 0.022 0.174 0.054 0.243 -0.099 0.195 0.04 0.237
Latin America and the Caribbean LAC -0.397* 0.174 -0.568* 0.242 -0.385* 0.193 -0.553* 0.230
Middle East and North Africa MENA -0.008 0.211 0.018 0.290 -0.032 0.240 -0.098 0.280
South Asia SA -0.005 0.194 0.079 0.287 0.105 0.234 0.054 0.295
Dispersion Test [H1(True dispersion) > 1] 1.692***
No. of Projects 5270 5270 5270 5270
Vuong Test: Poission vs ZIP (z-statistic) -5.092***
Vuong Test: ZIP vs ZINB (z-statistic) -2.186*
Notes:
1) ’***’, ’**’, ’*’ and ’.’ denote significant estimate at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
2) Several tests were conducted to select the superior model. A dispersion test shows that the Poisson model was overdispersed and the Vuong non-nested test
shows that the Zero Inflated Negative Binomial model, which corrects for both overdispersion and excess zero in the data, was found to be the superior model.
3) The standard errors are robust and are computed using the Sandwich Package in R Programming as explained in Section 4.4.3
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TABLE 4.7: Energy Sector (Dependent Variable: Number of Sponsors)
Poission Negative Binomial (NB) Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) Zero Inflated NB (ZINB)
Variables Abbreviation Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant Const. 0.883*** 0.115 1.462*** 0.269 0.284*** 0.006 0.917*** 0.014
Macroeconomic and Market Channel
Inflation Infl 0.014*** 0.004 -0.002 0.008 0.015*** 0.004 0.017 0.011
Exchange Rate (Stability) SDExRate -1.561*** 0.279 -1.581** 0.609 -1.029*** 0.298 -1.731* 0.829
International Reserve in Months of Imports (log) LTRiMoI -0.032 0.047 -0.117 0.101 0.114* 0.053 0.308* 0.120
Population (log) LPOP 0.451*** 0.030 0.503*** 0.059 0.232*** 0.033 0.275*** 0.076
GDP Per Capita (log) LGDPPC 0.31*** 0.038 0.331*** 0.091 0.129** 0.041 0.494*** 0.108
Governement Constraint Channel
Debt Stock to Exports (log) LDODExport 0.082 0.053 0.077 0.112 -0.114. 0.062 0.115 0.160
Debt Service to Exports (log) LTDSXGS 0.017 0.059 0.01 0.122 -0.002 0.060 0.031 0.147
Debt Service to Budget Revenue (log) LTDSDBR 0.025 0.058 0.079 0.117 0.075 0.064 -0.057 0.141
Natural Resource Rent to GDP (log) LTNRRGDP 0.188*** 0.022 0.049 0.047 0.204*** 0.028 0.153* 0.066
Regulatory and Governance Channel
Rule of Law (index) RoL 0.025*** 0.003 0.025*** 0.007 0.019*** 0.003 0.021* 0.009
Regulatory Quality (index) RQ 0.01*** 0.002 0.013* 0.005 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.006
Total Time to Effect Contract (log) LTRtEC -0.005 0.071 0.052 0.156 -0.073 0.077 -0.124 0.171
Government Effectiveness (index) GoE -0.028*** 0.003 -0.018** 0.007 -0.015*** 0.003 -0.006 0.009
Control of Corruption (index) CoC 0.003 0.003 -0.008 0.006 0.002 0.003 -0.013. 0.008
Political Stability Channel
Political Stability (index) PSaV -0.005** 0.002 -0.006 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004
Experience Channel
Experience (log) LExpe 0.566*** 0.038 0.471*** 0.069 0.437*** 0.035 0.323*** 0.076
Regional Dummies (Benchmark - Sub-Saharan Africa)
East Asia and Pacific EAP 0.356*** 0.094 0.698*** 0.194 -0.156 0.101 0.44* 0.184
Europe and Central Asia ECA 0.323** 0.113 0.383. 0.207 -0.084 0.127 0.177 0.221
Latin America and the Caribbean LAC 0.206. 0.106 0.297 0.193 -0.021 0.113 0.243 0.199
Middle East and North Africa MENA -0.299* 0.142 -0.055 0.238 -0.137 0.165 -0.245 0.247
South Asia SA 0.192. 0.111 0.568* 0.235 -0.14 0.123 0.787*** 0.228
Dispersion Test [H1(True dispersion) > 1] 3.465***
No. of Projects 5270 5270 5270 5270
Vuong Test: Poission vs ZIP (z-statistic) -8.415***
Vuong Test: ZIP vs ZINB (z-statistic) -3.833***
Notes:
1) ’***’, ’**’, ’*’ and ’.’ denote significant estimate at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
2) Several tests were conducted to select the superior model. A dispersion test shows that the Poisson model was overdispersed and the Vuong non-nested test
shows that the Zero Inflated Negative Binomial model, which corrects for both overdispersion and excess zero in the data, was found to be the superior model.
3) The standard errors are robust and are computed using the Sandwich Package in R Programming as explained in Section 4.4.3
C
hapter4.
C
ountries’
A
ttractiveness
forPPP
143
TABLE 4.8: Transportation Sector (Dependent Variable: Number of Sponsors)
Poission Negative Binomial (NB) Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) Zero Inflated NB (ZINB)
Variables Abbreviation Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant Const. 3.092*** 0.172 3.429*** 0.358 2.092*** 0.009 3.148*** 0.018
Macroeconomic and Market Channel
Inflation Infl -0.014* 0.005 -0.024* 0.011 -0.003 0.006 -0.017 0.014
Exchange Rate (Stability) SDExRate -2.434*** 0.437 -1.278. 0.744 -2.457*** 0.493 -2.754** 0.848
International Reserve in Months of Imports (log) LTRiMoI 0.078 0.069 -0.018 0.129 0.139. 0.083 -0.09 0.184
Population (log) LPOP 0.573*** 0.045 0.57*** 0.082 0.379*** 0.053 0.343*** 0.098
GDP Per Capita (log) LGDPPC 0.432*** 0.056 0.233* 0.114 0.248*** 0.069 0.078* 0.156
Government Constraint Channels
Debt Stock to Exports (log) LDODExport 0.03 0.074 0.08 0.142 0.033 0.090 -0.081 0.193
Debt Service to Exports (log) LTDSXGS 0.138. 0.081 0.238 0.157 0.024 0.091 0.156 0.222
Debt Service to Budget Revenue (log) LTDSDBR -0.378*** 0.081 -0.449** 0.150 -0.282** 0.100 -0.353 0.227
Natural Resource Rent to GDP (log) LTNRRGDP -0.036 0.035 -0.109. 0.060 -0.023 0.042 -0.001 0.074
Regulatory and Governance Channel
Rule of Law (index) RoL 0.016*** 0.004 0.002 0.009 0.026*** 0.004 0.035*** 0.010
Regulatory Quality (index) RQ 0.015*** 0.003 0.017* 0.007 0.016*** 0.004 0.014* 0.007
Total Time to Effect Contract (log) LTRtEC 0.697*** 0.095 0.545** 0.199 0.391*** 0.100 0.217 0.208
Government Effectiveness (index) GoE -0.01* 0.004 -0.004 0.009 -0.017*** 0.004 -0.016* 0.009
Control of Corruption (index) CoC 0.011** 0.004 0.01 0.008 0.014*** 0.004 0.018* 0.008
Political Stability Channel
Political Stability (index) PSaV -0.011*** 0.002 0.005 0.005 -0.008** 0.003 -0.008 0.006
Experience Channel
Experience (log) LExpe 0.664*** 0.055 0.794*** 0.102 0.424*** 0.053 0.697*** 0.112
Regional Dummies (Benchmark - Sub-Saharan Africa)
East Asia and Pacific EAP -0.871*** 0.142 -0.725** 0.257 -0.969*** 0.159 -0.992*** 0.251
Europe and Central Asia ECA -0.177 0.181 -0.283 0.283 -0.474* 0.232 -0.155 0.335
Latin America and the Caribbean LAC 0.269. 0.148 0.301 0.238 0.107 0.169 0.468. 0.261
Middle East and North Africa MENA -0.301 0.195 0.038 0.294 -0.608* 0.238 -0.265 0.328
South Asia SA 0.003 0.163 -0.428 0.310 -0.051 0.190 -0.497 0.337
Dispersion Test [H1(True dispersion) > 1] 6.51***
No. of Projects 5270 5270 5270 5270
Vuong Test: Poission vs ZIP (z-statistic) -5.275***
Vuong Test: ZIP vs ZINB (z-statistic) -4.779***
Notes:
1) ’***’, ’**’, ’*’ and ’.’ denote significant estimate at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
2) Several tests were conducted to select the superior model. A dispersion test shows that the Poisson model was overdispersed and the Vuong non-nested test
shows that the Zero Inflated Negative Binomial model, which corrects for both overdispersion and excess zero in the data, was found to be the superior model.
3) The standard errors are robust and are computed using the Sandwich Package in R Programming as explained in Section 4.4.3
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TABLE 4.9: Water and Sewerage Sector (Dependent Variable: Number of Sponsors)
Poission Negative Binomial (NB) Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) Zero Inflated NB (ZINB)
Variables Abbreviation Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant Const. 4.193*** 0.274 4.287*** 0.500 3.015*** 0.016 3.984*** 0.027
Macroeconomic and Market Channel
Inflation Infl -0.021* 0.008 -0.037* 0.014 -0.036*** 0.010 -0.046** 0.017
Exchange Rate (Stability) SDExRate 0.076 0.428 -0.332 0.767 0.788. 0.445 0.468 0.785
International Reserve in Months of Imports (log) LTRiMoI 0.768*** 0.104 0.589*** 0.173 0.736*** 0.132 0.513* 0.214
Population (log) LPOP 0.671*** 0.071 0.468*** 0.111 0.788*** 0.100 0.772*** 0.141
GDP Per Capita (log) LGDPPC 0.252** 0.081 -0.046 0.154 0.031 0.101 -0.14 0.180
Governement Constraint Channel
Debt Stock to Exports (log) LDODExport -0.318** 0.110 -0.262 0.188 -0.155 0.143 -0.073 0.264
Debt Service to Exports (log) LTDSXGS 0.099 0.121 0.007 0.204 0.318. 0.176 -0.253 0.326
Debt Service to Budget Revenue (log) LTDSDBR -0.381** 0.123 -0.09 0.202 -0.798*** 0.168 -0.467 0.295
Natural Resource Rent to GDP (log) LTNRRGDP -0.002 0.056 0.068 0.084 -0.174* 0.079 0.069 0.119
Regulatory and Governance Channel
Rule of Law (index) RoL 0.006 0.007 0.019 0.013 0.029*** 0.008 0.039** 0.014
Regulatory Quality (index) RQ 0.021*** 0.005 -0.002 0.009 0.035*** 0.006 0.052*** 0.011
Total Time to Effect Contract (log) LTRtEC 0.996*** 0.148 0.325 0.263 1.309*** 0.175 1.388*** 0.298
Government Effectiveness (index) GoE 0.01. 0.005 0.002 0.011 -0.01 0.006 -0.046*** 0.014
Control of Corruption (index) CoC 0.028*** 0.005 0.002 0.011 0.038*** 0.006 0.035* 0.014
Political Stability Channel
Political Stability (index) PSaV -0.01* 0.004 -0.017* 0.007 -0.01 0.006 -0.002 0.009
Experience Channel
Experience (log) LExpe 0.744*** 0.082 0.827*** 0.135 0.27** 0.090 0.459** 0.147
Regional Dummies (Benchmark - Sub-Saharan Africa)
East Asia and Pacific EAP -0.679** 0.236 -0.404 0.345 -1.378*** 0.280 -0.953* 0.372
Europe and Central Asia ECA 0.22 0.301 0.38 0.393 -0.052 0.419 0.464 0.459
Latin America and the Caribbean LAC 0.605* 0.266 0.459 0.356 0.382 0.319 0.685. 0.390
Middle East and North Africa MENA 0.664* 0.274 0.614 0.377 0.012 0.363 0.496 0.476
South Asia SA -2.925*** 0.357 -2.843*** 0.557 -3.964*** 0.418 -3.909*** 0.588
Dispersion Tes [H1(True dispersion) > 1] 2.419***
No. of Projects 5270 5270 5270 5270
Vuong Test: Poission vs ZIP (z-statistic) -4.612***
Vuong Test: ZIP vs ZINB (z-statistic) -3.471***
Notes:
1) ’***’, ’**’, ’*’ and ’.’ denote significant estimate at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
2) Several tests were conducted to select the superior model. A dispersion test shows that the Poisson model was overdispersed and the Vuong non-nested test
shows that the Zero Inflated Negative Binomial model, which corrects for both overdispersion and excess zero in the data, was found to be the superior model.
3) The standard errors are robust and are computed using the Sandwich Package in R Programming as explained in Section 4.4.3
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TABLE 4.10: Countries’ Attractiveness Measured by Number of Projects)
Poission Negative Binomial (NB) Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) Zero Inflated NB (ZINB)
Variables Abbreviation Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant Const. -4.073*** 0.451 -4.06*** 0.760 -2.711*** 0.510 -4.039*** 0.760
Macroeconomic and Market Channel
Inflation Infl 0.007* 0.003 -0.001 0.005 0.013*** 0.003 -0.009 0.006
Exchange Rate (Stability) SDExRate -0.919*** 0.213 -0.713* 0.346 -0.961*** 0.227 -0.594** 0.390
International Reserve in Months of Imports (log) LTRiMoI 0.257*** 0.037 0.206** 0.066 0.309*** 0.045 0.315*** 0.068
Population (log) LPOP 0.669*** 0.023 0.577*** 0.037 0.513*** 0.027 0.547*** 0.037
GDP Per Capita (log) LGDPPC 0.028 0.030 0.072 0.059 -0.022 0.035 0.151* 0.061
Government Constraint Channels
Debt Stock to Exports (log) LDODExport -0.012 0.043 0.071 0.075 -0.221*** 0.048 0.053 0.077
Debt Service to Exports (log) LTDSXGS 0.172*** 0.046 0.14. 0.079 0.123* 0.050 0.119 0.080
Debt Service to Budget Revenue (log) LTDSDBR -0.155*** 0.047 -0.086 0.078 -0.065 0.052 -0.071 0.079
Natural Resource Rent to GDP (log) LTNRRGDP -0.222*** 0.019 0.165*** 0.031 0.217*** 0.023 0.153*** 0.033
Regulatory and Governance Channel
Rule of Law (index) RoL 0.012*** 0.002 0.009. 0.005 0.009** 0.003 0.004** 0.005
Regulatory Quality (index) RQ 0.006** 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.005* 0.002 -0.001 0.004
Total Time to Effect Contract (log) LTRtEC 0.104. 0.058 0.13 0.102 0.053 0.062 0.043 0.101
Government Effectiveness (index) GoE -0.013*** 0.002 -0.006 0.004 -0.01*** 0.002 -0.001 0.005
Control of Corruption (index) CoC -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.004 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.004
Political Stability Channel
Political Stability (index) PSaV -0.002 0.001 -0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.003
Experience Channel
Experience (log) LExpe 0.269*** 0.024 0.249*** 0.035 0.289*** 0.027 0.237*** 0.039
Regional Dummies (Benchmark - Sub-Saharan Africa)
East Asia and Pacific EAP 0.148. 0.077 0.448*** 0.128 0.068 0.083 0.363** 0.126
Europe and Central Asia ECA 0.398*** 0.096 0.457** 0.141 0.382*** 0.105 0.451** 0.138
Latin America and the Caribbean LAC 0.797*** 0.084 0.616*** 0.127 0.741*** 0.093 0.577*** 0.127
Middle East and North Africa MENA -0.341** 0.114 -0.286. 0.159 -0.267* 0.130 -0.233 0.159
South Asia SA 0.024 0.092 0.127 0.157 0.183. 0.102 0.265. 0.156
Dispersion Tes [H1(True dispersion) > 1] 2.40***
No. of Projects 5270 5270 5270 5270
Vuong Test: Poission vs ZIP (z-statistic) - 5.822***
Vuong Test: ZIP vs ZINB (z-statistic) -6.760***
Notes:
1) ’***’, ’**’, ’*’ and ’.’ denote significant estimate at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
2) Several tests were conducted to select the superior model. A dispersion test shows that the Poisson model was overdispersed and the Vuong non-nested test
shows that the Zero Inflated Negative Binomial model, which corrects for both overdispersion and excess zero in the data, was found to be the superior model.
3) The standard errors are robust and are computed using the Sandwich Package in R Programming as explained in Section 4.4.3
C
hapter4.
C
ountries’
A
ttractiveness
forPPP
146
TABLE 4.11: Countries’ Attractiveness Measured by US Dollar Investment as a Ratio of GDP
Cragg’s Model
Tobit Model Participation Decision Investment Decision
Variables Abbreviation Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant Const. -4.642. 2.586 -1.936** 0.659 0.844*** 0.198
Macroeconomic and Market Channel
Inflation Infl -0.005 0.019 -0.001 0.005 -0.004** 0.001
Exchange Rate (Stability) SDExRate 0.386 1.004 -0.204 0.274 -0.207* 0.083
International Reserve in Months of Imports (log) LTRiMoI -0.189 0.240 0.016 0.061 0.149*** 0.018
Population (log) LPOP 0.53*** 0.129 0.349*** 0.033 0.169*** 0.024
GDP Per Capita (log) LGDPPC 0.308 0.216 0.021 0.056 0.013* 0.018
Government Constraint Channel
Debt Stock to Exports (log) LDODExport 0.833** 0.260 0.153* 0.066 0.03 0.019
Debt Service to Exports (log) LTDSXGS 0.03 0.279 0.109 0.071 -0.014 0.019
Debt Service to Budget Revenue (log) LTDSDBR -0.216 0.277 -0.118. 0.069 0.011 0.009
Natural Resource Rent to GDP (log) LTNRRGDP -0.306** 0.110 -0.126*** 0.028 0.054** 0.019
Regulatory and Governance Channel
Rule of Law (index) RoL 0.002 0.018 0.007 0.005 0.006*** 0.002
Regulatory Quality (index) RQ 0.002 0.014 -0.001 0.003 0.003* 0.001
Total Time to Effect Contract (log) LTRtEC 0.526 0.354 0.093 0.092 0.079** 0.024
Government Effectiveness (index) GoE 0.018 0.017 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.001
Control of Corruption (index) CoC -0.022 0.014 -0.004 0.004 -0.001 0.001
Political Stability Channel
Political Stability (index) PSaV 0.01 0.010 0.004 0.002 0.001. 0.001
Experience Channel
Experience (log) LExpe 0.323** 0.114 0.159*** 0.028 0.114*** 0.014
Regional Dummies (Benchmark - Sub-Saharan Africa)
East Asia and Pacific EAP 0.477 0.473 0.425*** 0.125 -0.042 0.059
Europe and Central Asia ECA 1.042* 0.486 0.174 0.121 0.097** 0.035
Latin America and the Caribbean LAC 0.554 0.447 0.304** 0.112 -0.013 0.037
Middle East and North Africa MENA -0.369 0.564 -0.146 0.141 -0.340*** 0.089
South Asia SA -0.799 0.582 0.107 0.161 -0.056 0.080
Likelihood Ratio Test (df=21) 4187***
Number of Projects 5270 5270 5270
Notes:
1) ’***’, ’**’, ’*’ and ’.’ denote significant estimate at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
2) The significance of the Likelihood Ratio test indicates that the Cragg’s Double Hurdle model is superior to the Tobit model.
3) The Participation Decision is measured by the probit part of the Cragg’s model and it indicates whether or not an investor
wants to participate in a country’s PPP. The Investment Decision is measured by the truncated part of the Cragg’s model,
which shows the positive amount invested in the PPP by the private investor (see Section – for further explanation)
4) The standard errors are robust and are computed using the Sandwich Package in R Programming as explained in Section 4.4.3
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FIGURE 4.3: Count Variable Models
Source: Erdman et al., (2008)
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TABLE 4.12: Distribution of PPPs by Countries (1995 - 2014)
Total Number of Total Value of
Region Country Projects Sponsors Investments (US$’mn)
EAP Cambodia 28 37 73,684
EAP China 1147 1268 2,184,742
EAP Fiji 2 2 3,856
EAP Indonesia 90 140 300,536
EAP Lao PDR 17 26 53,368
EAP Malaysia 74 106 133,956
EAP Papua New Guinea 3 6 7,451
EAP Philippines 94 140 205,405
EAP Thailand 111 165 228,809
EAP Vanuatu 2 2 4,958
EAP Vietnam 83 108 156,990
ECA Albania 25 32 76,932
ECA Armenia 14 18 76,880
ECA Azerbaijan 7 9 57,586
ECA Belarus 6 7 92,222
ECA Bosnia and Herzegovina 4 4 28,773
ECA Bulgaria 54 63 169,674
ECA Georgia 31 36 105,393
ECA Kazakhstan 25 30 112,144
ECA Kyrgyz Republic 9 11 35,897
ECA Macedonia, FYR 6 8 67,602
ECA Moldova 7 8 52,956
ECA Montenegro 6 7 48,464
ECA Romania 50 57 211,313
ECA Serbia 7 7 73,901
ECA Tajikistan 8 10 39,096
ECA Turkey 170 237 389,203
ECA Ukraine 56 61 155,917
LAC Argentina 121 229 358,495
LAC Bolivia 24 41 124,511
LAC Brazil 733 1130 3,045,023
LAC Colombia 135 228 322,881
LAC Costa Rica 31 52 64,875
LAC Dominica 3 3 7,227
LAC Dominican Republic 27 41 77,659
LAC El Salvador 15 21 101,481
LAC Grenada 1 1 88
LAC Guatemala 33 44 119,415
LAC Guyana, CR 3 3 5,060
LAC Honduras 21 30 99,811
LAC Jamaica 9 12 36,086
LAC Mexico 196 285 634,173
LAC Nicaragua 16 19 60,431
LAC Panama 27 37 138,988
LAC Paraguay 4 8 60,450
LAC Peru 107 172 379,331
LAC St. Lucia 1 1 1,464
LAC St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1 1 2,888
LAC Venezuela, RB 15 20 40,407
continue on next page. . . .
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TABLE 4.13: Country Distribution of PPPs (1995 - 2014)
Total Number of Total Value of
Region Country Project Sponsors Investment (US$’mn)
MENA Algeria 27 40 76,694
MENA Djibouti 4 4 5,693
MENA Egypt, Arab Rep. 24 35 142,507
MENA Jordan 31 57 94,647
MENA Lebanon 6 7 2,673
MENA Morocco 18 31 79,527
MENA Tunisia 8 14 47,558
MENA Yemen, Rep. 9 10 50,412
SA Bangladesh 64 86 182,947
SA Bhutan 2 2 2,222
SA India 838 1070 2,046,107
SA Maldives 2 3 13,068
SA Nepal 24 40 53,058
SA Pakistan 76 106 179,322
SA Sri Lanka 70 101 177,846
SSA Angola 9 14 33,207
SSA Benin 6 7 71,885
SSA Botswana 3 5 33,135
SSA Burkina Faso 4 7 50,685
SSA Burundi 3 3 12,390
SSA Cabo Verde 0 0 -
SSA Cameroon 9 12 77,973
SSA Comoros 2 2 25
SSA Congo, Republic 11 13 54,570
SSA Côte d’Ivoire 16 25 92,423
SSA Ethiopia 3 3 2,416
SSA Gabon 11 14 57,647
SSA Gambia, The 4 4 5,324
SSA Ghana 20 26 66,634
SSA Guinea 8 10 57,127
SSA Guinea-Bissau 2 2 33,954
SSA Kenya 24 38 123,727
SSA Lesotho 3 4 25,406
SSA Liberia 8 9 31,523
SSA Madagascar 9 12 47,940
SSA Mali 3 4 34,873
SSA Mauritania 3 5 20,050
SSA Mauritius 13 22 20,435
SSA Mozambique 15 30 57,840
SSA Niger 5 7 59,390
SSA Nigeria 53 63 215,900
SSA Rwanda 10 13 45,630
SSA São Tomé and Principe 1 1 2,806
SSA Senegal 16 21 79,012
SSA Seychelles 3 4 28,580
SSA Sierra Leone 8 8 47,488
SSA South Africa 55 111 142,108
SSA Swaziland 1 1 22,885
SSA Tanzania 25 37 96,552
SSA Togo 7 11 22,351
SSA Uganda 26 31 80,939
SSA Zambia 9 16 66,568
Total 5,270 7,184 15,904,131
Source: World Bank’s PPI Dataset
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TABLE 4.14: Description and Sources of Explanatory Variables
Sources of Attractiveness Explanatory Variable Reason for Inclusion Expected Sign Data Source
Macroeconomic & Market Inflation This is the annual change in consumer price index (CPI). It helps to predict negative WEO
Channel potential fluctuation in output tariff and investors’ profitability as well as
government policy effectiveness
Exchange Rate (Volatility) The exchange rate is the rate at which a country’s currency is exchange for negative WEO
one unit of US dollar. The volatility in the exchange rate, which is measured in
by the standard deviation, affects the certainty of foreign investors long-term
profitability.
International Reserves An indication of the ability to access foreign exchange to externalise profits positive WDI
in months of imports (log) and make debt service payments to foreign sponsors and debtors
respectively
Population (log) An indication of the market for the PPP output positive WDI
Real GDP per Capita (log) An indication of the potential effective demand for the PPP output Positive WEO
Fiscal Constraint External Debt Stock An indication of solvency of the public sector in terms of meeting long-term negattive WDI
Channel as percent of Exports (log) debt obligations
External Debt Service An indication of public sector liquidity in terms of raising the necessary foreign negative WDI
as percent of Exports (log) exchange to meet its short term debt liability
Domestic Budget Revenue An indication of public sector liquidity in terms of raising revenue to meet its negative WDI
as percent of Exports (log) short time debt obligations
Government Revenue as This consists of taxes, social contributions, grants receivable, and other positive WEO
percent of GDP (log) revenue. It is an indication of the ability of the public sector to generate
revenue from its normal sources. Revenue increases government’s net worth
( see Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM) 2001, paragraph 4.20)
Total Natural Resource An indication of the ability of the public sector to raise revenue from positive WDI
Rent (log) non-formal sources .
continue on next page. . .
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TABLE 4.15: Description and Sources of Explanatory Variables (cont...)
Sources of Attractiveness Explanatory Variable Reason for Inclusion Expected Sign Data Source
Regulatory and Government Effectiveness This index ranks countries on a scale of 100 to capture the quality of public positive WGI
Governance Channel (index) services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation,
and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies .
Control of Corruption This Index captures perception of the extent to which public power is positive WGI
(index) exercised for private gain, as well as capture of the state by elites and private
interests.
Political Stability and This Index captures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be positive WGI
Absence of Violence destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including
and Terrorism (index) politically motivated violence and terrorism.
Legal and Regulatory This Index captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate positive WGI
Quality (index) and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private
sector development.
Time Required to enforce Capturing time to implement sound policies and regulations that permit and negative WDI
Contracts (in days (log)) promote private sector development
Rule of Law (index) This Index captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have positive WGI
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of
contract enforcement, property rights, and the courts
Experience Channel Experience with PPPs (log) This variable is measure by the cummulative number of PPP project. positive By Author
It provides an indication of the government ability to execute PPP projects.
Note: WEO - World Economic Outlook, WDI - World Development Indicator, WGI - World Governance Indicator
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TABLE 4.16: Correlations among the Variables
Variable Acronym Infl SDExRate LGDPPC LPOP LDODExport LTDSDBR LTDSXGS LTNRRGDP LTRiMoI RoL RQ GoE CoC PSaV
Inflation Infl 1.000
Exchange Rate SDExRate 0.345 1.000
GDP per Capita LGDPPC -0.165 -0.105 1.000
Population LPOP 0.143 0.077 -0.159 1.000
Debt Stock to Exports LDODExport 0.093 0.064 -0.615 -0.127 1.000
Debt Service to Budget Revenue LTDSDBR 0.104 -0.002 -0.208 0.317 0.558 1.000
Debt Service to Exports LTDSXGS 0.133 0.030 0.089 0.152 0.333 0.515 1.000
Natural Resource Rent to GDP LTNRRGDP 0.154 0.143 -0.390 0.435 0.089 -0.019 -0.129 1.000
International Reserves in Month of Imports LTRiMoI -0.103 -0.050 0.102 0.292 -0.068 0.123 0.116 0.153 1.000
Rule of Law RoL -0.230 -0.139 0.442 -0.162 -0.277 -0.176 -0.056 -0.346 0.060 1.000
Regulatory Quality RQ -0.222 -0.137 0.484 -0.014 -0.304 -0.067 0.047 -0.298 0.073 0.536 1.000
Government Effectiveness GoE -0.200 -0.124 0.511 -0.031 -0.304 -0.099 0.039 -0.299 0.105 0.596 0.588 1.000
Control of Corruption CoC -0.215 -0.121 0.434 -0.204 -0.233 -0.163 -0.051 -0.312 0.055 0.598 0.499 0.576 1.000
Political Stability PSaV -0.180 -0.088 0.374 -0.414 -0.241 -0.296 -0.153 -0.274 -0.073 0.469 0.609 0.460 0.448 1.000
Note: The ’L’ in front of the acronyms means ’log’
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TABLE 4.17: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables
Statistic nbr.val min max range median mean std.dev
Inflation (% change in CPI) 2100 -5.00 30.00 35.00 5.60 7.54 7.57
LExRate 2100 0.00 2.22 2.22 0.04 0.08 0.13
Population (log) 2100 -2.60 7.20 9.80 2.10 1.99 1.96
GDP per Capita (log) 2100 4.17 9.72 5.55 7.28 7.27 1.13
Debt Stock to Exports (log) 2100 -2.30 3.79 6.10 0.10 0.12 0.97
Debt Service to Exports (log) 2100 -1.20 4.90 6.11 2.26 2.19 0.94
Debt Service to Budget Revenue (log) 2100 -2.07 4.76 6.82 0.34 0.37 1.17
Natural Resource Rent to GDP (log) 2100 -2.30 4.40 6.70 1.61 1.43 1.59
Total Reserve in Months of Imports (log) 2100 -1.61 3.61 5.22 1.44 1.46 0.63
Rule of Law (index) 2100 0.00 83.30 83.30 27.95 28.51 21.97
Regulatory Quality (index) 2100 0.00 84.80 84.80 31.90 31.13 22.83
Total Time to Effect Contract (log) 2100 5.42 7.45 2.03 6.38 6.42 0.42
Government Effectiveness (index) 2100 0.00 86.90 86.90 29.10 30.30 23.34
Control of Corruption (index) 2100 0.00 88.50 88.50 28.20 29.57 23.38
Political Stability (index) 2100 0.00 98.60 98.60 26.90 29.09 24.43
Experience (log) 2100 -2.30 7.53 9.83 3.05 2.77 1.85
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Chapter 5
Residual Ownership and the Risk of
Failure of Public Private Partnership
Projects
5.1 Introduction
An emerging literature, building on the seminal work of Grout, (2003), Hart, (2003),
and Maskin and Tirole, (2008), compares efficiency gains associated with Public
Private Partnership (PPP) mode of procurement of public infrastructure relative to
the traditional method (see, e.g., Buso et al., 2016; Byoun et al., 2013; Hoppe and
Schmitz, 2013).1 Some authors argue that the efficiency gains, which justify the use
of PPP are a mere illusion as the benefits emanating from the participation of the
private sector in the provision of public infrastructure is been overshadowed by the
ensuing costs, thus impacting negatively on project affordability and hence, project
survival (see Bennett and Iossa, 2006; Bloomgarden and Blumenfeld, 2013; Buso
et al., 2016; Hodge and Greve, 2007).
Information gathered from this current research highlight that in a sample of 2721
PPP projects implemented over the period 1986 - 2015, the value (number) of
projects that failed is around $78 billion (253), while the value (number) of success-
fully completed projects is around $60 billion (181).2 Such large-scale failures in
1In the traditional method of procurement, the government contracts the private sector for the
delivery of public services through competitive tendering under several contracts including, design,
construction and operation contracts. On the other hand, PPP bundles investment, construction and
service provision in a single long-term contract, thus bringing greater efficiency in the process (see
Engel et al., 2013).
2The definition of project failure is articulated in Section 5.4.
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PPP projects impair governments’ ability to provide socio-economic infrastructure
that is vital not only for economic growth (Munnell, 1992; Röller and Waverman,
2001) and poverty reduction, but also for the prevention of conflicts (Beall et al.,
2013). Furthermore, the anticipation of failure, given such history, could intimidate
private investors away from PPPs or instigate the requirement for excessive premi-
ums, which in either case affects countries that are badly in need of PPPs. Within
this context, the research seeks to address the following question: How should PPP
projects be structured so as to mitigate the risk of failure? To this end, the research
builds upon the theoretical hypothesis of incomplete contracting, which links the
risk of PPP project failure to the ownership of residual facilities, and then test this
hypothesis using a comprehensive sample of 2721 PPP projects from 114 low and
middle income countries across the six regions of the world.3
While the PPP framework might not have fully met its a priori expectation, there
is sufficient evidence supporting its relevance in infrastructure development and
related services delivery, particularly in developing countries where there is huge
infrastructure deficit. Therefore, the aim of this chapter’s research is not to levy fur-
ther criticism on the framework, but rather to find ways and means of making it work
by providing evidence that the survival of PPP projects can be greatly enhanced if
they are structured to confer residual facility ownership on the public rather than the
private sector.
The ownership of residual facilities has long been recognised as a crucial part in
the structuring of PPP projects, albeit there is to the best of our knowledge, no
empirical study relating to how such ownership can have an impact on the risk of
project failure. In the United Kingdom (UK), it is stipulated that ownership of
residual facilities goes to the public sector if the long-term public sector demand
for the project output is clear or the project has high asset specificity (no practical
3Except otherwise qualified, any mentioning of residual ownership or residual facility owner is
simply referring to the ownership of the residual facility of the PPP project at the expiry of the
contract as indicated in Figure 5.1.
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alternative use for the residual asset of the project, example, schools, hospitals and
prisons), otherwise ownership is retained by the private sector (for example, office
or housing accommodation in areas where there is demand from other users).4 The
raison d’être for such allocation is to encourage the partner upon whom residual
ownership is conferred to invest more in order to ensure the success of the project or
maximise the partnership joint surplus (Bennett and Iossa, 2006; Grout, 2003; Hart,
2003; Maskin and Tirole, 2008). However, residual facilities can only incentivise
the owner if the expected residual value is positive (see Aghion and Holden, 2011),
otherwise, depending on who the owner is, the “residual value risk” could be costed
and incorporated ex-ante into the overall project cost, which could bear negatively
on project affordability and hence, project survival.5
Noting that PPP project arrangements are often long-termed with average duration
of around 30 years, one cannot determine ex-ante with all certainty whether or not
the residual facilities at the expiry of the partnership agreement will have positive
or negative value.6 This means that the owner of the facility is faced with residual
value risk. In the case where the partners’ investments are unverifiable as assumed
by Hart, (2003), which leads to no bargaining power over the implementation of
innovation, the private partner can only be motivated by concern for her own profit.
Therefore, the transfer of residual ownership to this partner in the presence of possi-
ble downside risk could, all else being equal, lead to an increase in the required risk
premium and hence, the cost of the project. This increase in the cost could affect
output affordability, which has been referenced as a catalyst for the failure of many
PPP projects because the scope of long term charges must be within the end-users’
income and/or the fiscus, otherwise strong public opposition may ruin the project
(Davis, 1996; Zhang, 2005). On the other hand, this increased cost emanating from
4see HM Treasury’s document on the standardisation of PFI contracts Version 4
5According to HM Treasury, “Residual Value Risk”refers to the uncertainty as to what the resid-
ual value will prove to be at the expiry of the PPP project
6Iossa and Martimort, (2015) and Ng et al., (2007) indicate that the average duration of PPP
projects is around 30 years
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residual value risk could be mitigated if ownership is conferred on the public sec-
tor, whose objectives lean heavily towards welfare, rather than profit maximisation.
This could be one possible reason that although the UK Government specified the
conditions for residual ownership allocation, its preferred option, however, is an
automatic transfer of the residual facilities to the public sector at the end of the
contract (see Bennett and Iossa, 2006).
This research therefore, hypothesizes that, ceteris paribus, the risk of failure of PPP
projects is mitigated if ownership of the residual facilities is conferred ex-ante on
the public rather than the private sector. To test this hypothesis, an econometric
duration model, in particular, a discrete-time hazard model was applied to a set of
data extracted from the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI)
database. This model was specifically selected because it corrects for right censor-
ing, which characterised the dataset and has the potential effect of creating bias in
the estimation of the parameters (Cox and Oakes, 1984; Shumway, 2001). Further-
more, by taking the duration of projects into consideration, it will not only provide
information on whether but also on when a PPP project is most likely to experience
the event of failure (Singer and Willett, 2003).
As a preview, the result from this research suggests that it is better for residual
ownership to be granted to the public sector because the odds of experiencing the
event of failure when such ownership is given to the public sector is half the odds
when private sector retains ownership. The size of the project is also found to be
a crucial ingredient for project longevity with small size projects having lower risk
of failure compared to medium and large size projects. In addition, PPP projects
implemented in the Middle East and North African region, where until recently
most of the countries did not have political term limit, have lower risk of PPP project
failure than Latin America and the Caribbean region, where most countries have a
maximum of two-term political term limit with each term ranging between four to
six years, a finding that may suggest the significance of the role and continuity of
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government’s policies.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: the section immediately following,
Section 5.2, reflects the motivation inspiring the research and the expected contri-
bution to PPP framework; Section 5.3 contextualises the study by highlighting the
testable hypotheses that seek to establish the relationship between the selected co-
variates and the risk of failure of PPP projects; Section 5.4 presents the data and
methodology used in the study; Section 5.5 presents the empirical results, while
Section 5.6 discusses the results; and finally, Section 5.7 presents the conclusions
and policy recommendations.
5.2 Motivation and Contributions
Notwithstanding its numerous challenges, experience suggests that PPP is consid-
ered by many governments, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa, as perhaps the
only feasible option to accelerate the delivery of infrastructure and related services.
As a result, the concern for many practitioners, researchers and policy makers alike,
which partly motivates this research, is to identify appropriate actions that could
lead to a successful implementation of the framework. To this end, this research
contributes to the evidence that the survival of PPP projects can be greatly enhanced
if the project is structured in a way that confers residual facilities ownership on the
public rather than the private sector.
Another motivation stems from the need to connect theories on residual ownership
in PPP project arrangements with empirical outcomes. Several recent contributions
have referenced the theory of Incomplete Contracting to determine the optimal allo-
cation of residual rights between contracting parties.7 The aim is to allocate residual
7The theory of incomplete contracting was pioneered by Sanford J. Grossman, Oliver D. Hart,
and John H. Moore (see Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995; Hart and Moore, 1988). The theory
tries to explain the so called hold-up problem emanating from the opportunistic behaviour of either
of the contracting party during ex-post renegotiation due to the inability of the parties to write a
complete contract ex-ante that will capture all possible contingencies.
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ownership to the party that values the partnership the most, thus incentivising this
party’s optimal ex-ante investment and hence, the maximisation of the partners’
joint surplus (see Besley and Ghatak, 2001). Relatedly, this research contributes
to the empirical confirmation that indeed residual ownership matters when dealing
with the survival of PPP projects. However, unlike Bennett and Iossa, (2006), this
research advocates an automatic conferment of residual ownership on the public
sector, consistent with the preferred option of the UK Government when entering
into private finance initiative (PFI) contracts.8
The research also contributes in the area of methodology, noting that duration analy-
sis (survival analysis) has been extensively applied in other areas, including medicine
(see Alabas et al., 2014; Kumar, 2015; Savage et al., 2006), labour economics and
international relations (Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2003; Carrasco, 1999; Gokovali
et al., 2007; Golub, 2007; Martinez-Garcia and Raya, 2008; Reisine et al., 2004),
but its application in the field of project finance, particularly PPPs, is still a novelty.
This research applied duration analysis to data extracted from the World Bank’s PPI
database, which to the best of our knowledge has never been done before.
Finally, the empirical literature on PPPs can benefit from the insight provided by
this research about the relationship between critical project and country character-
istics on the risk of failure of PPP projects. For example, while the effect of project
size and the participation of multilateral institutions as well as local sponsors in
PPP project arrangements have been widely acknowledged by practitioners, there
is hardly any empirical work that attempts to underscore the effects of these vari-
ables on the risk of project failure. In addition, albeit not explicitly investigated,
this research contributes to the literature by provoking discussion on the impact of
political term time on the survival of PPP projects, an issue that is of particular
relevance to private investors who are worried about the tendency of succeeding
8PFI is another name for PPP in the UK.
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governments reneging on obligations under PPP contracts entered into by their pre-
decessors, which may put them at a disadvantage in the event of ex-post renegotia-
tions.
5.3 Related Literature and Testable Hypotheses
In this section, we first develop the main hypothesis of the study, which reflects
the relationship between residual facilities ownership and the risk of PPP project
failure. Thereafter, the hypotheses on the control variables are formulated. These
variables are related mainly to project and country characteristics, including, the
size of the project, the participation of multilateral institutions and local sponsors in
the project arrangement, the inflation and exchange rates of the country where the
project is implemented, etc.
5.3.1 Residual Ownership and the Risk of PPP Failure
The role of residual ownership on the outcomes of relationship-specific investments,
such as PPPs, has garnered tremendous interest in recent years, more so after the
seminal work of Grossman and Hart, (1986) and Hart and Moore, (1988) (hence-
forth referenced as GHM) on the theory of incomplete contracting, albeit some
authors believe the theory originated from the work of Williamson, (1975) who em-
phasises that market relations are problematic when they require relation-specific
investments in a complex and uncertain environment (see Aghion and Holden,
2011).
As noted in Chapter 2, the basic tenet of incomplete contracting theory is that eco-
nomic agents are boundedly rational and cannot anticipate ex-ante all possible con-
tingencies in a relationship, and therefore, they may end up writing contracts that
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specify only the possible known contingencies and later on when the state of na-
ture is realised, they can fill in the additional details through a process of renego-
tiations. But the main problem with this gap filling solution relates to incentive-
compatibility, i.e., whether or not the economic agents have the propensity to be
truthful in their dealings during ex-post renegotiations (Dewatripont and Legros,
2005). In other words, incomplete contracts typically fail to fully protect economic
agents against opportunistic behaviour when it is difficult for third parties to distin-
guish good-faith renegotiation demands, (e.g., when exogenous market conditions
have changed) from bad-faith ones (those specifically triggered to take advantage
of higher investment by the other party) (Dewatripont and Legros, 2005, p. 123).
To ameliorate the possible hold-up problem associated with incentive-compatibility,
GHM elucidate that when economic agents enter into a relationship in which the
asset will be used to generate income, the agents can, in principle, contractually
specify exactly who will have control over the asset during the contract period.9
To explain this concept, GHM focused on the ownership of residual rights (or the
residual facilities) during the contract period in a two-period model of integration
of two parties (see Figure 5.1) where the product emanating from the relationship
is a private good. In time 1, the two parties form a contract that allocates control
rights and allows each party to make relationship-specific investment. In time 2,
each party makes production decisions based on the control rights designated in
time 1. Based on these assumptions, they conclude that if the time 1 investment of
one party has a larger effect on the relationship’s value than that of the other party,
the contract should assign the party with the more valuable investment full control
rights over decision making in time 2 (in the event of renegotiations), giving this
9The hold-up problem is a situation where economic agents have the possibility of working
together in order to increase their joint output but refrain from doing so because of fear that they
may be giving the other agent increased bargaining power, which could culminate in a reduction of
the partners’ joint surplus. “A hold-up problem occurs when two factors are present. First, parties
to a future transaction must make non-contractible specific investments prior to the transaction in
order to prepare for it. Second, the exact form of the optimal transaction (e.g. how many units if
any, what quality level, the time of delivery) cannot be specified with certainty ex ante” (Rogerson,
1992, p. 777)
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party an incentive to invest optimally in time 1, thus maximizing the parties’ joint
surplus. In short, in the case of jointly produced private good, assignment of control
rights or residual facilities to parties based on the value generated by investments
can help prevent under-investment.
FIGURE 5.1: Conceptual Diagram
Produced by Author
Besley and Ghatak, (2001) extended the model to evaluate the public private part-
nership framework for the production of public good (i.e., products whose con-
sumption are non-rivalry and non-excludable). They argue that if the value created
by the investment of the partners constitutes a public good then the partner with
the highest valuation should be the owner of the residual facilities or has the con-
trol rights during the contract period irrespective of the relative importance of their
investments or other aspects of the production technology (p. 1344).
Francesconi and Muthoo, (2006) took the model a bit further by looking at public
good in terms of it level of impurity. They elucidate that: (i) when the level of impu-
rity in public good is small (i.e., the partnership product is primarily a public good),
control right should go to the partner that values the results of the partnership the
most, consistent with Besley and Ghatak; (ii) when the degree of impurity is large
(i.e., the partnership product is primarily a private good), control right should be al-
located to the partner with the largest investment, consistent with GHM; (iii) when
the degree of impurity is large and investments are roughly equal, it is optimal for
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control rights to be shared, with relatively greater share going to the low-valuation
partner: and (iv) when the degree of impurity is neither small (i.e., public good) nor
large (i.e., private good) and the investment are of similar importance, it is optimal
to allocate control rights to the low-valuation partner. It follows from this theory
that efficient assignment of rights, including risks, depends on the type of good or
value generated as well as the choice or attributes of the parties entering into the
partnership.
All of the models presented above are two periods models, which focus mainly
on the ownership of residual facilities or control rights during the tenure of the
partnership and not at the expiry of the partnership (i.e., between points A and C
and not at point C and beyond in Figure 5.1).10 The question is, what is the impact
of the ownership of residual facilities at the expiry of the contract (ownership at
point C) for a long term arrangement such as PPP?
To prepare the stage for an answer to the above question, Hart, (2003, p. 75) hints
that the GHM model can be usefully extended in this area because as is, the GHM
model takes the length of contract as given, which implicitly assumes that the world
ends at point C, thus making ownership of the residual facilities irrelevant for in-
centivising partners’ ex-ante investments. But he notes that, if more periods are
considered, both contract length and who owns the residual facilities become inter-
esting choice for investigation. Subsequently, Bennett and Iossa, (2006) developed
a three period model (see also Figure 5.1) in an attempt to capture the role of resid-
ual facilities ownership at the expiry of the contract period (point C) and beyond.
As a first step in developing their model, Bennett and Iossa assume that investment
is verifiable, contrary to the GHM model, and that the residual value of the facilities
depends on whether in period 3 (shown by the broken line in Figure 5.1) the use of
the facilities is public or private. They explore this issue by further assuming that
10The distance from point A to Cin a typical PPP arrangement is referred to as the concession
period, a period during which the public sector partner has a binding commitment to allow the
private sector partner to recoup her investment from the project proceeds.
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when the initial contract is agreed upon, there is uncertainty regarding the relative
sizes of the ‘public residual value’ (the residual value if the facility is used in the
public sector when the contract ends) and the ‘private residual value’ (the facility
is used in the private sector) [p. 6]. Based on these assumptions, they conclude
that ownership of the facility when the contract has expired has an important role
to play in incentivising partners’ ex-ante investments for the maximisation of their
joint surplus. More so, if it is assumed that the project generates positive externality,
it is optimal to specify ex-ante that the private sector partner will keep ownership of
the facilities at the end of the contract and that an option to negotiate a mutually ben-
eficial transfer of ownership to the public sector partner strengthens the investment
incentive of the private sector partner.
Bennett and Iossa indicate further that the argument in favour of residual ownership
by the private sector partner is strengthened when it is assumed that the partners’
investments are unverifiable, consistent with the GHM model, in which case there
can be no bargaining over the implementation of innovation, and thus the private
sector partner is only motivated by concern for her own profit. The intuition here is
that because investment is unverifiable, the only way to incentivise optimal ex-ante
investment by the private sector partner in the presence of positive externalities, is
a promise of ownership of the residual facility.
Given the large number of PPP project failures, one question that is very pertinent
to practitioners and policy makers and thus forms the crux of this study, is, how
does residual facility ownership affect the risk of failure of PPP projects, or rather,
enhance the survival of PPP projects? While the literature presented above focuses
mainly on how residual ownership stimulates partners’ ex-ante investments for the
maximisation of the partnership joint surplus, the logic can be applied to provide an
answer to the above question.
To begin with, this research proposes that the survival of PPP projects is influenced
by the cost associated with the ownership of the residual facilities. Because PPP
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projects are long term projects with duration averaging around 30 years, it is not
possible for the partners to determine ex-ante whether or not the residual value of
the facility will be positive or negative at the end of the contract period. As such,
the partner upon whom residual ownership is conferred is faced with “residual value
risk”.11 In such circumstances therefore, if the residual facility ownership is con-
ferred ex-ante on the private sector partner, given that this partner is motivated by
concern for her own profit (under the assumption of unverifiable investment), a pre-
mium will be charged by this partner for the associated residual value risk and such a
cost will be incorporated ex-ante into the overall project cost. The ensuing increase
in the overall project cost reduces the potential for affordability of the project out-
put by the end-users (if the project output is sold directly to the end-users) and/or
the fiscus (if the government is paying for the project output). On the other hand,
if residual facilities ownership is conferred on the public sector partner, given the
welfare maximisation objective of this partner, it is possible that the cost associated
with the residual value risk will not be translated ex-ante into the overall project
cost, thus reducing the present value of the tariff burden on the end-users and/or the
fiscus.
A good number of studies, including that of Byoun et al., (2013), Davis, (1996), and
Osei-Kyei and Chan, (2015), have suggested that output affordability is very crucial
for the survival of PPP projects as the scope of long term charges must be within
the end-users’ income and/or the fiscus, “otherwise, strong public opposition may
ruin the project” (Zhang, 2005, p. 7). It may be because of this reason that although
the UK government prescribed conditions under which residual facilities can be
allocated under PFIs, its preferred option, however, is an automatic transfer of the
facility at the expiry of the contract to the public sector, contrary to the suggestion
of Bennett and Iossa. On this note therefore, the following is hypothesised:
11See Section 5.1 for the definition of Residual Value Risk
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Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, PPP projects that confer residual facility own-
ership to the public sector are likely to have lower risk of failure than those
for which such ownership is conferred on the private sector.
The variable used to measure residual facilities ownership in this study relates to the
two main sub-classification of PPPs: (i) build, operate and transfer (BOT), where
residual facility ownership is conferred on the public sector; and (ii) build, own and
operate (BOO), where the residual facility is retained by the private sector.
To account for possible endogeneity in the relationship between residual facilities
ownership and the risk of PPP projects failure, and to understand how the survival
of PPP projects relates to other substantive predictors commonly used in the lit-
erature of PPP (see Buso et al., 2016; De Vries and Yehoue, 2013), the research
incorporated some control variables in the empirical model.
The first set of control variables reflects the specific characteristics of PPP projects
as contained in the PPI dataset, which includes: the size of the project; the partici-
pation of multilateral institution(s) and local sponsor(s) in the project arrangement,
etc. The second set of control variables relates to the fiscal, macroeconomic and
political environment of the country where the project is implemented. These vari-
ables are selected because of their potential to inhibit the ability of the public sector
and/or the end-users to meet obligations under PPP arrangements or afford the PPP
project output, which may culminate in early project failure.
The sections below constitutes the hypotheses establishing the relationship between
the control variables and the risk of PPP project failure.
5.3.2 Project Characteristics and the Risk of PPP failure
This section highlights the hypotheses that relate the characteristics of PPP projects
to the risk of project failure. These characteristics include: (i) the size of the project;
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(ii) the participation of multilateral institution(s) in the project arrangement; and (iii)
the participation of local sponsor(s) in the project arrangement.
5.3.2.1 The Size of the PPP Project
The size of a PPP project is considered an important factor in explaining whether
or not the project would fail prior to the duration specified in the partnership agree-
ment. The reason being, larger projects are normally more expensive than smaller
ones and this high cost is translated into the project output tariff, thereby reducing
the potential for affordability by the end-users and/or the fiscus. It is intimated by
Davis, (1996, pp. xi & 79) that aside from the ability to pay for the project output,
the willingness by the state and/or end-users to pay because of unreasonably high
tariff, could affect the survival of the project. He gave a classic example of the Dab-
hol Power project in the state of Maharastra in India where both the off-taker (the
Maharastra State Electricity Board (MSEB)) and the Federal Government of India
“wilfully” defaulted on their guarantees under the project due to high output tariff
in the midst of output glut, resulting from an oversized project. The Dabhol power
project was considered the largest energy infrastructure project and represented the
largest foreign investment in the country during that period.
In some cases, governments try to alleviate the issue of higher tariff emanating from
large projects by compensating with long concession periods.12 The World Bank’s
PPI dataset shows some concession periods spanning up to 40 years and beyond.
However, as this period is extended, the inter-generational obligations resulting
thereof could lead to project failure because of the restrictions that these obliga-
tions could place on future governments’ policy choices and/or end-users’ demand
for cheaper alternatives in midst of technological advancement (Greve, 2003). This
point is also expounded by Byoun et al., (2013), who note that “the size can also
12The concession period is the period over which the public sector partner has a binding commit-
ment to allow the private sector partner to recoup her investment
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increase project risk if the high-profile nature of a large project draws more atten-
tion from the local government, which might in turn increase the probability of the
local government taking an adverse action” (p. 559). Based on this argument, the
following hypothesis can be formulated to establish the relationship between the
size of PPP projects and the risk of failure:
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, small size PPP projects are likely to have
lower risk of failure than large size PPP projects.
5.3.2.2 Participation of Multilateral Institutions in PPP Framework
Multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank (WB), the International Finance
Corporation (IFC), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Asian De-
velopment Bank (AsDB), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), etc., have been playing signif-
icant role in the implementation of PPPs across the world. As elucidated by Byoun
et al., (2013), the participation of these institutions in PPP arrangements can miti-
gate the effects of adverse government actions and provide political risk insurance
to protect or project sponsors (equity holders) against the risks of capital controls,
expropriation, or other adverse and unexpected political events. In short, the partic-
ipation of these institutions, particularly in the provision of guarantees, could have a
cost reducing effect as well as enhances the smooth implementation of PPP projects
(Hawkins and Mann, 2007; Irwin, 2007).
In general, these institutions can participate at several levels of the project cycle,
including:
(i) Financial
• provision of loans to the project - Some of these institutions provide
very competitive market rate loans to its members (e.g., IBRD loans).
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For countries labelled as IDA-only countries, they receive below market
rate loans for PPP projects.13’14
• take direct equity interest in the project - Institutions such as the IFC
are known to take equity interest in PPP projects. Sometimes finding
a willing private partner for PPP arrangements can be a daunting, time
consuming and costly endeavour, particularly for countries with little or
no experience in PPPs. Therefore, the direct involvement of these insti-
tutions in the arrangement could give confidence to private investors to
participate without asking for excessive premium, thus enhancing project
affordability and hence success.
(ii) Provision of Guarantees15
• partial risk guarantee - this type of guarantee is normally aimed at bridg-
ing temporal cash flow hiccups, which if not available, may culminate to
an outright termination of the project. Therefore, the provision of such
contingent payment gap filling mechanism could help elongate the life
of the project.
• political risk guarantees - This guarantee prevent the collapse of the
project during temporal political shocks.
(iii) Risk Management Support
Some multilateral institutions provide currency hedging as well as interest rate
risk management facilities for PPP projects. Again, these facilities help to pre-
vent early termination of the project because currency risk, for example,was
13IDA only countries are countries that can access the concessional window of the World Bank
referred to as the International Development Association. Countries are eligible to secure IDA fund-
ing (at almost zero interest) based on the precondition of low level of per-capita income and lack of
creditworthiness to borrow in the international capital market.
14IBRD refers to International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
15These guarantees are usually provided to the project special purpose vehicle (SPV) via the
government, thus making the government the primary obligor of all the liabilities emanating thereof
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found to be a major contributor to the demise of many PPP projects in particu-
larly Latin America and Caribbean region during the 1990s (Kaminsky et al.,
1998).
(iv) Providing Advisory Services
Multilateral institution also provide advisory services at different levels of
project implementation.
It is expected from the various contribution s outlined above, that the participation
of multilateral institutions in PPPs could help keep projects afloat and hence one
can hypothesised the following:
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, PPP projects with the participation of multi-
lateral institutions are likely to have lower risk of failure than those without.
5.3.2.3 Participation of Local Sponsors
The World Bank defines ‘sponsors’ in PPP arrangements as “private entities that
together have an equity participation of at least 20 percent in the project contract
for greenfields, brownfields, and management and lease contracts, and 5 percent
for divestitures. A foreign state-owned enterprise is considered a private entity al-
though a domestic state-owned enterprise is not.”16 In this context therefore, this
research refers to local sponsors as non-state-owned enterprises, domiciled in the
host country, that have equity participation in the project.
While local sponsors acting as active partners are playing significant role in the
successful delivery of PPPs, there is hardly any empirical acknowledgement to this
role. The role of local sponsors could be likened, to a large extent, to that played
by local banks participating in syndicated loan for project finance as articulated by
Berger et al., (2001) as well as Nini, (2004).
16Glossary of terms: Private Participation in Infrastructure Database
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At the front end, not only do local sponsors bring some of the needed capital into
the project, they are presumed to be better aufait with the local environment and
therefore, can be privy to certain information that are not readily available in finan-
cial statements and other documents. Their accumulated social capital can enable
them to navigate much easily the local legal system or administrative bottlenecks
that may threaten the survival of the project. They can also act as conduit between
the government and the project, in which case they can serve as political bond in
ensuring that the host government do not interfere in the project’s evolution (Mian,
2006; Nini, 2004), and also between the project and the local communities as well
as final consumers, thus preventing conflict or bringing an expeditious end to con-
flicts, which may otherwise stifled the successful implementation of the project.
At the back end, the fact that some local investors could receive part or all of their
investment proceeds in local currency could reduce the foreign exchange pressure
on the project, a factor that was found to contribute significantly to the failure of
many PPP projects in the 1990s (see Estache, 2003; Kaminsky et al., 1998).
Based on the above argument, the following can be hypothesised:
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, PPP projects with the participation of local
sponsor(s) are likely to have lower risk of failure than those without.
5.3.3 Country Characteristics and the Risk of PPP Failure
As mentioned earlier, the controlled variables considered for the country character-
istics relate to factors that could inhibit: (i) the public sector partner (the govern-
ment) from performing her obligations under the PPP agreement; (ii) the end-users
ability to afford the project output; and (iii) an atmosphere of stability for the smooth
operations of the project, all of which affect the survival of the Project. This section
discusses the relationship of the variables related to country characteristics and the
risk of PPP failure.
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5.3.3.1 Fiscal Constraint and the Risk of PPP Failure
It is normal practice for governments to take up certain obligations under PPPs in
order to ensure the success of the engagement. In fact many governments around
the world have gone ahead to legislate and/or institute policies on the types of obli-
gations that they are willing to accept, including: administrative obligation for land
expropriation for the project; financial obligations such as construction subsidies
and; compensation for bid costs as well as tax incentives.17
In general, the World Bank has classified government obligations into direct and
indirect obligations. Direct obligations are regarded as liabilities that are acquired
by the government that directly cover the project costs either in cash or in-kind, and
are certain to occur. These obligations can be a fixed or variable set of payments,
which are made either in instalments or in bulk depending on a specified formula.
Direct obligations are categorised into the following: 18
(i) Capital subsidy – these are cash subsidies for capital investments of the project
in order to cover the costs of the physical assets during construction.
(ii) Revenue subsidy – these are cash subsidies for revenue support to help the
private partner recoup her investment during the agreed duration of the part-
nership (concession period), such as availability payments or shadow tolls.
(iii) In-kind – these are in-kind contributions to the project, notably the transfer of
existing assets, including land, to the project’s special purpose vehicle (SPV).
Indirect government obligations could either take the form of contingent liabili-
ties or policies instituted to support the investment.19 These obligations are mainly
intended to replace the need to secure private insurance for some of the project
contingencies, which would have otherwise increase the overall cost of the project,
17See Public–Private Partnerships: Lessons from Korea on Institutional Arrangements and Per-
formance.
18Private Participation in Infrastructure Database: Glossary of Terms
19The occurrence of these liabilities depends on the crystallization of certain predetermined events
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thus making it unaffordable to the end-users. Some of these indirect obligations
include:20
(i) payment guarantees – such guarantees are encountered under the Birecik Hy-
dro power project in Turkey and the Paguthan and Dabhol power projects in
India. These projects are structured under Power Purchase Agreements (PPA),
for which the Off-taker (the public sector partner) guarantees the payments of
both capacity and output charges to the generator (the private sector partner);21
(ii) debt guarantee – this type of guarantees is provided in the Termopaipa power
project in Colombia. Under such guarantees the public sector partner assures
all debt providers of the servicing of their debt in the event of adverse shock
in the project cash flows;
(iii) revenue guarantee – the Concepción access road project in Chile and the M5
Motorway project in Hungary have revenue guarantees embedded in their
agreements. These guarantees are provided to compensate for shortfall in the
project revenue emanating from less than projected traffic against which the
investment proceeds of the private partner is forecasted;
(iv) exchange rate guarantee – under the North-South Express Way project in
Malaysia, the government provided exchange rate guarantee to assure the
availability of foreign exchange for the repatriation of investors’ funds and
the repayment of foreign debt;
(v) interest rate guarantee – the North-South Express Way project in Malaysia
also contains an interest rate guarantee clause in its agreement. This form of
guarantee is provided to protect the private sector partner against interest rate
volatility; and
20(See Dailami and Klein, 1998; Davis, 1996; Engel et al., 2013)
21Capacity charge is a charge that is levied to compensate for installed capacity and it is a fix cost,
while the output charge relates to the variable cost associated with the generation of power.
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(vi) tax deduction/tax credit – in which case the government provides tax incen-
tives or credit to encourage infrastructure development in specific sectors of
the economy.
Apparently, most of the obligations of governments under PPPs have the tendency
to pose both immediate and future budgetary challenges. Failure by governments
to fulfil these obligations could lead to early termination or failure of PPP projects.
Evidence suggest that some of the PPP projects that experienced the event of failure
reflect mainly the unwillingness and/or inability of governments to meet their obli-
gations that hitherto made these projects affordable to the end-users (Irwin, 2007).
As cited by Davis, (1996), the Paiton project in Indonesia, which is one of the largest
and most important power project in the country, failed because of the state’s in-
ability to honour its obligations under the project, while the Dabhol project in India
failed because of the unwilling of the government to continue honouring her obliga-
tions. Also, the recent energy crisis in Argentina is but another example where the
state provided heavy subsidies and other incentives to the energy sector in order to
keep the sector afloat. However, as the country faced fiscal and economic challenges
and the new government of President Mauricio Macri embarked on reforming the
sector by removing some of these subsidies, the resulting effect was a 500 percent
increase in electricity tariff, which put significant strains on consumers’ budget.
These changes led to several strike actions by trade unions and ordinary citizens,
thus laying the foundation for projects failure in the sector. 22
This research attempts to capture the capacity of the public sector partner to meet
her obligations under PPPs through two sets of variables: (i) public debt burden,
which assesses the ease with which the public sector can meet her external obliga-
tions and hence, secure further access to debt financing in the event of unanticipated
shocks or the crystallisation of contingent liabilities emanating from PPP projects;
and (ii) government revenue as a percentage of GDP, which assesses the revenue
22See http://www.bubblear.com/argentinas-impossible-energy-conundrum/
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generating capacity of the government.
Following the works of Bahl and Duncombe, (1993) and Buso et al., (2016) as well
as the joint World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt sustainabil-
ity framework for low and middle income countries, public debt burden is captured
through stock/solvency and flows/liquidity indicators. The solvency indicator that is
often used is the public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt as a percentage of nom-
inal GDP (DstockGDP), which attempts to capture governments’ ability to meet all
long-term external debt obligations.23 For the liquidity indicator, the study uses
external debt service payments as a percentage of exports of goods and services
(DSerExp). This indicator is widely applied by the World Bank to capture the abil-
ity of governments to generate foreign exchange as well as to meet all short-term
external debt service obligations.
Based on the foregoing, the following hypotheses are formulated to reflect the im-
pact of government fiscal constraints on the risk of failure of PPP projects:
Hypothesis 5: Ceteris paribus, the higher the government revenue, the lower
the likelihood of the risk of PPP projects failure.
Hypothesis 6: Ceteris paribus, the lower the public sector debt burden, the
lower the likelihood of risk of PPP projects failure.
5.3.3.2 Macroeconomic and Market Constraints on the Risk of PPP Failure
The macroeconomic and market controlled variables are put into two groups, the
pricing group and the output demand group.
The pricing group relates to variables that directly affect the PPP output tariff and
hence, affordability by the end-users and/or the fiscus. This group includes, inflation
23The World Bank also uses present value(PV) of debt in order to account for the level of conces-
sionality in loans given to especially IDA-only countries.
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and exchange rates. These two variables are used extensively when forecasting
PPP projects cash flows, the latter more so when the private sector partner is not
a resident of the country where the project is implemented or when huge amount
of foreign debt is used in the financing of the project. It is normal for the financial
models for PPP projects to stipulate a band within which these variables are allowed
to fluctuate without affecting the output tariff. However, outside this band, the
output tariff is allowed to adjust accordingly based on a pre-specified formula or a
mutually agreed rate. In the event of severe adverse shock in these variables, the
ensuing increase in output tariff could either be absorbed by the public sector partner
or the end-user, which in either case could culminate in project failure. Based on
this argument therefore, the following can be hypothesised:
Hypothesis 7: Ceteris paribus, the higher the inflation rate and exchange rate
devaluation/depreciation, the higher the likelihood of PPP projects failure.
The demand group attempts to investigate whether there is demand for the PPP
project output and if so, whether this demand is effective, both of which could pose
significant challenge for the long term survival of the project (see Osei-Kyei and
Chan, 2015). Investors are vividly aware that without long term demand for the
project output, particularly when it comes to long term arrangement like PPPs, it
will be difficult to recoup their investment amidst changing government policies
and technological innovation. In fact, the study conducted by Basi, (1963) refer-
enced the extent of a nation’s market potential as one of the most important factors
in the decision making process for foreign direct investment, which most often con-
stitutes PPPs. The variables included in the demand group are: (i) the country’s
population, which attempts to capture potential demand, and (ii) the country’s GDP
per capita, which attempts to demonstrate the ability of end-users to purchase the
project output. In line with the above argument, the following hypothesis is formu-
lated:
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Hypothesis 8: Ceteris paribus, the higher the population and real GDP per
capita, the lower the likelihood of risk of PPP projects failure.
5.3.3.3 Political Stability and the Risk of PPP Failure
Several studies have emphasised the role of political stability in the decision mak-
ing process and risk of failure of long-term investments such as PPPs (Basi, 1963;
Bennett and Green, 1972; Singh and Jun, 1995; Yair, 1966). Countries with high
propensity for violence, especially fragile states, will sooner or later experience a
permanent halt or even total destruction of most of their long term infrastructure
investment and most often than not, incapacitate the government in meeting her
obligations under most of these investments as well as ordinary citizens in generat-
ing income to continue purchasing the outputs of these investments. Sierra Leone,
for example, has huge outstanding private sector debts, which were accumulated
during the country’s 11-year civil conflict (1992 to 2002). These debts emanated
from trade credits as well as unpaid bills for infrastructure and related services de-
livered by private investors, which the government was unable to honour due mainly
to the conflict. Even now that the conflict is over, the government still do not have
the capacity to clear these arrears given other pressing social challenges, instead it is
in the process of collaborating with the World Bank to undertake a second commer-
cial debt buy-back programme with the intention of buying back these outstanding
private sector debts at deep discount, possibly 90 percent.24
Based on the above argument and the fact that political instability has the propensity
to cause early termination of PPP projects, the study included the variable, political
stability and absence of violence and terrorism in the model, which is an index
24Government of Sierra Leone Public Debt Management Bulletins and Sierra Leone Enhanced
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative Completion Point Document and Multilateral Debt Relief
Initiative
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computed by the World Bank (see the World Governance Indicator). Relatedly, the
following hypothesis is formulated:
Hypothesis 9: Ceteris paribus, the more politically stable a country is, the
lower the likelihood of risk of PPP projects failure.
5.4 Data Description and Methodology
As reflected in Section 5.3, the main hypothesis of this chapter is that PPP projects
that confer residual facilities ownership on the public sector have lower risk of ex-
periencing failure or rather, greater chances of survival, than those for which the
private sector retains ownership. To test this hypothesis, which is concerned with
‘whether’ and ‘when’ an event of PPP project failure occurs, the research employed
Duration Analysis.25 The choice of this methodology is in line with the recommen-
dations of several researchers, including Cox and Oakes, (1984) and Singer and
Willett, (2003), that when dealing with event history data, it is more appropriate
to use duration analysis since other techniques perform poorly in the presence of
censored data.
According to Cox and Oakes, (1984, p. 6), a common approach used by clinicians
when dealing with event history data is to dichotomize based on survival and non-
survival at a critical period, say five years. Although this binary data approach is
often satisfactory to compare survival rates of subjects in various groups, Cox and
Oakes note that such technique however, has two shortcomings: (i) concentration
of data on a single point on the survival curve leads to a waste of information;
and (ii) calculation of survival rates as simple proportions is directly possible when
no subjects are censored during the critical period, otherwise comparison between
censored and uncensored subjects could be misleading. They also indicate that
25Survival Analysis and Duration Analysis are used interchangeably in this study.
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under such dichotomization, and with quantitative explanatory variables, discrimi-
nant analysis is sometimes used to identify the variables that are related to survival.
However, this approach is considered useful only when the survival of each subject
is classified as very short or very long, otherwise if potential censoring times are
related to the explanatory variables, discriminant analysis will give biased results.
In addition, the inclusion of the actual event time as an explanatory variable in a
discriminant analysis will create some errors as the event time is expected to be part
of the response and not the factor influencing the response.
In the absence of censoring, Hosmer Jr and Lemeshow, (1999) suggest that multiple
regression can be used to analyse the dependence of event time on the explanatory
variables. However, because event times are non-negative, the error component of
such an approach will most likely have a skewed distribution rather than a sym-
metric one. This obstacle can however, be resolved using duration analysis since
the systematic component of duration models yield fitted values that are strictly
positive.
Given the advantages of duration analysis over the other techniques when dealing
with censored event history data, the methodology is therefore adopted for this re-
search. This section describes the data used to analyse the components of duration
analysis and the predictors of the risk of PPP projects failure as well as identifies the
most appropriate empirical model to test the various hypotheses and conducts ro-
bustness checks to ascertain the efficacy of the relationship between residual facility
ownership and the risk of PPP project failure.
5.4.1 Sample Selection and Data Description
The research utilises the Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) dataset for the
year ending 2014, which constitutes longitudinal data for projects that have private
sector participation from 1980 to 2014 for low, lower middle and upper middle
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income countries across six different regions: East Asia and Pacific (EAP), Europe
and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and
North Africa, South Asia (SA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).26
The entire PPI dataset for 2014 consists of a total of 6530 projects, implemented
across 139 countries. However, the final sample for this research consists of a to-
tal of 2721 projects, implemented across 114 countries. The reason being that to
construct the final data sample, the following restrictions were made:
(i) exclude countries that do not have comprehensive macroeconomic, fiscal and/or
political data, eg., Cuba, Eritrea and Democratic Republic of Korea;
(ii) retain only 4 out of 12 PPI sub-types;27
(iii) exclude from the above subset all projects with no reported investment amount.
TABLE 5.1: Regional Distribution of Projects
Total Number of Total Leading Country in Region
Region Countries Projects Investment % Country Project Investment
EAP 14 1041 217,662.8 24.6% China 750 70,813.7
ECA 19 162 83,322.2 9.4% Turkey 68 55,926.4
LAC 23 896 267,562.9 30.2% Brazil 435 138,924.0
MENA 11 88 67,159.2 7.6% Egypt, Arab Rep. 15 17,253.0
SA 8 345 170,480.2 19.3% India 237 130,687.3
SSA 39 189 79,076.4 8.9% Nigeria 16 28,007.7
Total 114 2721 885,263.6 100.0% 1521 441,612.1
Note: Investment is in millions of US dollars
Table 5.1 provides a summary of the regional distribution and total investment
amount of the selected sub-types of PPI projects. The table shows that the EAP
region has the highest number of projects (1041), but the LAC region accounts for
the greatest investment (30.2%). However, in terms of the average investment per
country in a region ((Total Investment in the Region)/(No. of Countries in Region)),
SA (US$21.3 billion) has the highest, followed by EAP (US$15.5 billion). The
26See Chapter 3 for an exploratory data analysis of the PPI dataset
27Two of the selected four PPI sub-types; BOT and BOO, are considered as the typical PPP
projects (based on the narrow definition of PPP discussed in Chapter 2) and thus form the basis of
this research, while the remaining two; ROT and Mct, are used for robustness checks
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MENA region has the lowest number of projects (88), but its per country invest-
ment (US$6.1 billion) is greater than both ECA (US$4.4 billion) and SSA (US$2.0
billion). By far, China has the largest number of projects (750) in its region and
amongst the countries under consideration, while Brazil accounts for the greatest
investment amount (US$138.9 billion). Nigeria and Egypt have the highest PPI
investment in their respective regions.
In terms of sectoral distribution, the energy sector accounts for most of the projects,
totally 1326 projects in all the regions, followed by the transport sector (664), while
the water and sewerage, and telecom sectors account for 17 and 10 percent respec-
tively (see Figure 5.2).
FIGURE 5.2: Sectoral Distribution of Projects
The status field of the dataset indicates whether the project is concluded, cancelled,
merged, operational, distressed or under construction. The bar chart in Figure 5.3
shows that majority of the projects in all the regions are operational or under con-
struction. The LAC region has the highest number of both cancelled (68) and con-
cluded (72) projects, while MENA has the lowest number and with no project in
distress. According to the adopted definition of project failure in this study as re-
flected in Section 5.4.2, which includes cancelled, merged and distressed projects,
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ECA region has the highest percentage of failed projects (20%), followed by SSA
(15%)(see the line graph in Figure 5.3)
FIGURE 5.3: Project Status
A total of 375 projects have the participation of multilateral institutions, such as
the World Bank and its constituent organisations, the Asian Development Bank, the
African Development Bank etc., in the PPI arrangements, while 918 projects have
the participation of local sponsors.
The final data sample contains only 4 out of the 12 sub-types of PPI projects, two
of which, BOT and BOO, are regarded as typical public private partnership (PPP)
greenfield projects and thus, form the crux of this research.28 There is a total of
1370 and 629 BOT and BOO projects respectively in the sample with EAP region
accounting for most of these projects followed by the LAC region as shown in Table
5.2.
28A greenfield project involves the construction of entirely new facility. In other words, It is an
arrangement that is not constrained by any pre-existing work
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TABLE 5.2: Regional Distribution of PPI Sub-types
Types of PPI EAP ECA LAC MENA SA SSA Total
Build, operate, and transfer (BOT) 680 45 424 44 138 39 1370
Build, own, and operate (BOO) 120 42 259 15 135 58 629
Merchant (Mct) 21 47 28 22 44 68 230
Rehabilitate, operate, and transfer (ROT) 220 28 185 7 28 24 492
Total 1041 162 896 88 345 189 2721
5.4.2 Components of Survival Analysis
According to Allison, (2010, p. 413), survival analysis is a collection of statistical
methods that are used to describe, explain, or predict the occurrence and timing
of events. In other words, survival analysis attempts to quantify the possible time
varying risk for a subject to experience an event of interest in the presence of all
available information. This definition therefore, culminates into four basic actions:
(i) identifying the event(s) of interest that is (are) to be modelled; (ii) determining
whether the data should be censored and/or truncated; (iii) determining whether to
treat all events the same or to distinguish different types of event; and (iv) determin-
ing whether the event happens on a continuous or discrete time, which means that a
time origin must be unambiguously specified (Cox and Oakes, 1984, p. 1)
5.4.2.1 Determining the Event of Interest
Recalling, the aim of this research is to determine whether or not PPP projects for
which residual facility ownership is retained by the private sector have lower prob-
ability of survival, or rather, have higher risk of experiencing failure than those for
which ownership is conferred on the public sector. Therefore, the event of interest
is ‘project failure’, which is defined in this study as the deviation of a PPP project
outcome from its original conceptualisation by the partners. In other words, any
form of hiccups encountered by the project after financial closure which changes
the structure and/or brings the project to an untimely end, is considered an event
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of failure. Accordingly, a project is said to have experienced the event of failure if
either of the following states apply:
(i) it is in distress - which, according to the World Bank, the government or the
sponsor (the private partner) has either requested contract termination or are
in international arbitration, thus paving the way for an untimely end of the
project;
(ii) it is merged with another during operations - this changes the structure of the
original project; and
(iii) it is cancelled - which leads to an abrupt end of the project.
It is possible to treat each of these statuses that constitute the event of failure as
separate events. For example, merged could be one event, while cancelled, another.
However, given the infrequent occurrence of these observations (see Table 5.3),
having them as multiple event types may lead to fewer observations being available
to estimate each set of parameters, which can lead to substantial loss of statistical
power (Jenkins, 2005). As a result therefore, the event of failure constitutes merged,
cancelled and distressed projects, thus giving a total of 253 failed projects in the fi-
nal data sample. The line graph in Figure 5.3 shows the percentage of failed projects
by region, which indicates that ECA has the highest, followed by SSA.
5.4.2.2 Censoring of the Data
Censoring occurs whenever it is impossible to determine the exact time when a
subject experiences the event of interest, which in this case is when a PPP project
failure occurs (see Gail and Wong, 2007). Jenkins, (2005) identified three main
types of censoring, including:
(i) right censoring - this occurs when the study comes to an end without the sub-
ject experiencing the event of interest, or when the subject drops out during
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the study period because something other than the event of interest occurred.
Right censoring is regarded as the most common form of censoring.
(ii) left censoring - this occurs when the initial time at risk for the subject is un-
known. That is, the subject experienced the event prior to the commencement
of the study.
(iii) interval censoring - this is a combination of both right and left censoring. In
this type of censoring, it is known that the event of interest occurred between
two time points, but the exact time of occurrence of the event is unknown. For
example, if a project is reported as being operational at period 1 of a panel
study but failed at period 2, then the failure time is interval censored as it
happens between two time periods.
According to Singer and Willett, (2003), censoring could also be informative or
non-informative. Informative censoring relates to the type of censoring that occurs
because the subject has experienced the event or has a high chance of experienc-
ing the event in the future. In non-informative censoring, the subject is censored
because it has met certain conditions that were specified in advance of the study.
The issue of censoring arises in this study because some PPP projects did not expe-
rience the event of failure during the period of the study (1986 - 2014). Most of the
projects in the final dataset are classified as either operational or under construction
(i.e., in the pipeline) as at the end of the study period. Therefore, one cannot tell
whether or not these projects would experience the event of failure in the future.
Furthermore, there are some projects that are classified as concluded, which means
they moved out of the study without experiencing the event of failure. In short, cen-
sored projects constitutes projects that are classified as operational, construction
and concluded in the dataset.
The left panel of Figure 5.4 shows censored projects from the final dataset. The
figure indicates that a huge number of projects were censored, some of which were
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FIGURE 5.4: Distribution of the number of years of project opera-
tions by censoring and event occurrence status for the PPP project
level data
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in operation for more than 20 years before being censored. This could partly reflect
the long-termed nature of PPP arrangements and partly the fact that some projects
reached financial closure, which is assumed to be the start year of the project, late
into the study period. Figure 5.5 demonstrates right censoring. Line A shows a
project that reached financial closure in 2012 and is indicated to be operational at
the end of 2014, and hence was right censored. Line B shows a project that has
complete spell but without experiencing the event of failure, i.e., the project was
successfully concluded within the study period and hence, was right censored.29
Line C shows a project that has a very early entry, coinciding with the start year of
the study, yet was indicated to be operational as at the end of the study period and
therefore, was also right censored.
29The project did not experience the event of failure
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FIGURE 5.5: Demonstration of Censoring of Selected Projects
Produced by Author (using PPI dataset)
As a whole, the type of censoring encountered in this study is right censoring and
therefore, each project has a potential censoring time Ci or a potential lifetime Ti,
which makes the observation, Yi = min(Ti, Ci). This means that the survival time
of a project is considered to be at least as long as the duration of the study period.
The censoring indicator δ shows whether or not the project is censored or experi-
enced the event of failure and is given as:
δi =

0 if Ti > Ci (censored)
1 if Ti ≤ Ci (event of failure)
In line with the recommendations of several researchers, including, Allison, (2010),
Broström, (2012), Jenkins, (2005), and Singer and Willett, (2003), the censored
projects were not discarded from the final dataset because doing so would introduce
bias in the analysis as most of the information about PPP projects longevity would
have been lost in the process, noting that a large number of PPP projects survived
for long period of time before being censored.
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5.4.2.3 The Nature of Time in Duration Analysis
A fundamental step for the selection of an appropriate model for testing the various
hypotheses in the study is to determine the nature of time. That is, to ascertain
whether time should be treated as continuous or discrete. It is recommended in
the empirical literature that time should be treated as continuous when the exact
time of the event occurrence is known, otherwise if only the month or the year is
known and there is the presence of large number of ties, then time should be treated
as discrete (Allison, 2010; Broström, 2012; Fox, 2002; Jenkins, 2005; Singer and
Willett, 2003).30
In this research, the exact time of occurrence of PPP project failure is unknown, but
it is recorded on a yearly basis. It is not unusual for a PPP project to have failed long
before the partners agree to make such declaration. They usually would try to work
together to exhaust all possible remedies, including making claims on insurance
and calling on guarantees, before acknowledging failure and even when failure is
acknowledged it takes time for it to be formally registered, thus missing the exact
time of failure.
In the PPI dataset from which the data for this research were sourced, there is no
field that explicitly shows the year of project failure. To determine the event year
therefore, information is utilized from the following known fields:
(i) Contract Period - this is sometimes referred to as the concession period, which
is the expected implementation period of the project.
(ii) Termination Year - this is the anticipated end year of the project as stated in
the agreement signed between the partners.
(iii) Investment Year - this is otherwise known as the disbursement year. It is ba-
sically a period over which funds are released into the project. Funds can be
30A tie occurs when two or more projects experience the event of failure at the same recorded
time.
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released in annual granularity up to several years.
(iv) Date status updated - this shows the date when the World Bank’s PPI team
updates the status of the project.
(v) Project Status - this indicates whether the project is, for example, cancelled or
concluded.
One cannot simply take the termination year to be the event year because it is pos-
sible that the project will not survive up to its anticipated end date, nor would one
take the date status updated without due care for other factors because on that date
the project status might indicate that the project is ‘operational’, meaning that it did
not experience the event of failure as at the end of the study period. Furthermore,
nearly all of the above fields have missing data at one point or the other. Therefore,
to have a field indicating the year of project failure or censoring, one or more of the
above fields had to be used, while referencing the others. For example:
• if the project status indicates ‘cancelled’, which occurs prior to the expected
terminal year of the project, the year of the most recent date when the project
information is updated as shown in the date status updated field is used as the
event year.
• if the project status indicates ‘concluded’, the terminal year, which can also
be derived by adding the contract period to the financial closure year, is used.
• if the project status indicates ‘merged’, the the year shown in the date status
updated is used if available, otherwise one year after the final investment year
is assumed as the event year.
• if the project status indicates ‘construction ’ or ‘operational ’, the year 2014
is used as the censoring year.
After determining the event year, it was observed that there is a large number of ties
(this is also reflected in the right panel of Figure 5.4) in each year, except for three
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particular years. For example, in the 5th year there are 48 incidents of the event of
failure, thus further confirming the discrete nature of time in the study.
5.4.2.4 Survival and Hazard Functions
As explained earlier, the main aim of survival analysis is to describe and predict the
occurrence and timing of events. In this study, the event is PPP project failure and it
is assumed to occur in discrete time. The fundamental quantities used to assess the
risk of project failure in each discrete time are the hazard and survival functions.
Related to this study, the hazard function, represented by h(tij), is the function
that gives the instantaneous potential in each year in operation for a PPP project
i to experience the event of failure, given that it has survived up to year j (Gail
and Wong, 2007). This means that the hazard function assesses the unique risk
associated with each year of project operation (Singer and Willett, 2003, p. 334).31
To clearly explain the concept of the hazard function, the final data sample is used
to construct a life-table (see Table 5.3), which is a table that gives a summary of
the sample distribution for event occurrence. The first column of the table gives
the number of years of project operation. The second column gives the number of
projects at risk of experiencing the event of failure in each year of operation. The
third column shows the projects that failed in each year of operation. For example,
48 projects failed after being in operation for a period of 5 years. The fifth and sixth
columns, headed Hazard Rate and Survival Rate respectively, are derived from the
other columns.
The estimated discrete-time hazard function for year in operation j is given as:
hˆ(tij)= (No. of failed projects in year in operation j)/ (No. of projects at risk of
failure in year in operation j)
31The notations used here are traditional notations for survival analysis. Interested readers could
reference the following texts: (1) Applied Longitudinal Data Analysis; Modeling Change and Event
Occurrence by Judith D.Singer and John B. Willett, 2003; (2)Event History Analysis with R by
Göran Broström, 2012
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TABLE 5.3: Life Table for PPP Projects
Number of
Years in Projects Failed Censored Hazard Survival
Operation at Risk Projects Projects Rate Rate
0 2721 9 87 0.003 0.997
1 2625 16 125 0.006 0.991
2 2484 17 152 0.007 0.984
3 2315 33 157 0.014 0.970
4 2125 48 107 0.023 0.948
5 1970 16 114 0.008 0.940
6 1840 21 148 0.011 0.929
7 1671 12 179 0.007 0.923
8 1480 13 162 0.009 0.915
9 1305 19 168 0.015 0.901
10 1118 9 116 0.008 0.894
11 993 6 138 0.006 0.889
12 849 4 124 0.005 0.885
13 721 2 103 0.003 0.882
14 616 10 126 0.016 0.868
15 480 4 51 0.008 0.861
16 425 4 72 0.009 0.852
17 349 1 104 0.003 0.850
18 244 1 75 0.004 0.847
19 168 4 60 0.024 0.826
20 104 0 41 0.000 0.826
21 63 1 23 0.016 0.813
22 39 1 9 0.026 0.792
23 29 0 3 0.000 0.792
24 26 1 11 0.038 0.762
25 14 0 10 0.000 0.762
26 4 0 2 0.000 0.762
27 2 1 1 0.500 0.381
Note: This table cumulates all projects from 1986 to 2014 and then group
them according to the number of years for which they survived before
experiencing the event of failure or are censored. For example, out of
the 2721 project in the dataset, 9 experienced the event of failure while 87
were censored within 1 year of operation. The table does not demonstrate
the year when the event of failure or censoring occurred.
which is essentially the ratio between the number of projects that experienced the
event of failure to the total number of projects at the start of each year in operation
j which are at risk of experiencing the event of failure. For example, the estimated
discrete-time hazard rate in year in operation 5 (i.e, for projects that survived for up
to 5 years) is
hˆ(5) =
48
2125
= 0.023
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The estimated hazard function is represented graphically in Figure 5.6, which shows
that the risk of PPP project failure escalates after every 5 years of project operation.
To formalize the hazard function, let Tij represents the time period j when PPP
project i experiences the event of failure. The probability that the event of failure
will occur in the current time period, given that it must occur now, or sometime in
the future is formally written as:
FIGURE 5.6: Estimated hazard probability
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h(tij) = Pr[Ti = j | T ≥ j] (5.4.1)
The set of discrete-time hazard probabilities expressed as a function of time, la-
belled h(tij), is known as the population discrete-time hazard function (Singer and
Willett, 2003, p. 332).
On the other hand, the survival function, denoted as S(tij), assesses the probability
that project i will experience the event of failure after surviving up to year j. In
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other words, the survival function cumulates the period-by-period risks of project
failure and it is formally written as:
S(tij) = Pr[Ti > j], (5.4.2)
The estimated discrete-time survival function can be written in terms of the hazard
function as:
Ŝ(tij) = [1− hˆ(1)]× [1− hˆ(2)]× · · · × [1− hˆ(j − 1)] (5.4.3)
= Sˆ(j − 1)× [1− hˆ(j − 1)] (5.4.4)
Column six of Table 5.3 gives the estimated discrete-time survival function. For
example, the survival probability for PPP project i after 5 years in operation is
computed as follows:
Ŝ(5) = [1− 0.003]× [1− 0.006]× [1− 0.007]× [1− 0.014]× [1− 0.023]
= 0.948
The curve for the estimated survival function is given in Figure 5.7. Unlike the
curve for the hazard function, which can take any shape, the curve for the survival
function is always downward sloping as the function itself is monotonically non-
increasing with time (Singer and Willett, 2003).
5.4.3 Description of the Response and Explanatory Variables
This section describes both the response and predictive variables, all of which are
defined for each project i and for each year j until the project experiences the event
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FIGURE 5.7: Estimated survival probability
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of failure or is censored. Table 5.11 gives a summary of the description of the
variables and a priori expected signs.
5.4.3.1 Response/Time Variable
As noted earlier, the study seeks to explain the survival of PPP projects. As is the
case with survival models, the response variable consists of two parts: the first part
gives a binary outcome, indicating whether or not the event of failure occurs, while
the second part shows the time in year until project failure or censoring. If, for
example, a particular project reaches financial closure in the year 2000, but failed
in 2010, the censoring indicator (which in this study is represented by the variable
Failedij) will show the value 0 from 2000 to 2009, indicating the event of failure
hasn’t occur, and 1 for 2010, when the event occurs. If on the other hand this
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project did not experience the event of failure in 2010, then 0 is also recorded for
2010 instead of 1 (see examples in the project-year data shown in Table 5.6).
5.4.3.2 Main Explanatory Variable
Since the objective of the study relates to the relationship between residual facilities
ownership and the survival or risk of failure of PPP projects, the main explana-
tory variable, PPP Sub-types, is a dichotomous variable with 1 representing a BOO
project and 0, a BOT project. The data for this variable is a subset of the data in the
‘PPI-Subtype’ field of the World Bank’s PPI dataset.
5.4.3.3 Control Variables
As mentioned in Section 5.3, the research utilised two sets of control variables in
order to account for potential confounding and to provide further insight on how the
survival of PPP projects relates to other substantive predictors commonly used in the
literature of PPPs (see Buso et al., 2016; De Vries and Yehoue, 2013). The first set
of control variables reflects the specific characteristics of PPP projects as contained
in the PPI dataset, which includes: the size of the project and the participation of
multilateral institution(s) as well as local sponsor(s) in the project arrangement.
The second set of control variables relates to the characteristics of the country where
the project is implemented. These variables are selected because of their tendency
to inhibit the ability of the public sector and/or the end-users to meet obligations
under PPP arrangements or afford the PPP project output, which may culminate
in early project failure. The data for this set of variables were directly obtained
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) and World Governance
Indicator (WGI) databases.
Project Size
The size of a project is considered to be an endogenous variable, which could make
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the estimated coefficient binding the relationship between residual facilities own-
ership and the risk of PPP project failure to be likely biased and not directly in-
terpretable (see Nini, 2004). To mitigate this problem of endogeneity, a dummy
variable was created for project size through the following process:
• First, the total investment under each project was divided by the average of the
four years annual GDP falling within the period of funds disbursement. The
choice of the four-year average GDP is to allow for consistency with the average
disbursement period for the sampled PPP projects, which was found to be around
four years.32 For example, a particular project could reach financial closure in the
year 2000 with an indicated total investment of US$100 million, but this amount
was not disbursed one-off, rather, over a four year period. Therefore, instead of
just using the GDP for the year 2000 to deflate the entire US$100 million, the
average GDP for the period 2000 to 2003 is used for consistency and to capture
nominal changes.
• Second, endpoints near sample percentile values were used to create a trichoto-
mous dummy variable for project sizes; small, medium and large. Small size
projects are those with investment to GDP ratio falling below the 34th percentile
( or 4.002e−05). For medium size projects, the ratio lies from the 34th to the 63rd
percentile (from 4.002e−05 to 7.2989e−04) inclusive, while for large size projects
the ratio is above the 63rd percentile (7.2989e−04).
Participation of Multilateral Institutions
The aim here is to check whether or not there is the participation of multilateral in-
stitution(s) in the PPP project arrangement. This means that the variable of interest
is one of a binary nature with 1 representing the presence of multilateral institu-
tion(s) and 0 otherwise. The field ‘Multilateral Support’ in the PPI dataset makes
provision for this kind of assessment.
32Recall, the disbursement period refers to the period over which investment amounts are made
available for project use
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Participation of Local Sponsors
Similar to multilateral institutions, local sponsors participation in PPPs is a dichoto-
mous variable with 1 representing the presence of local sponsor and 0 otherwise.
The PPI dataset gives a field for Sponsors, which provides information on the name
of the sponsors and countries of domicile as well as the percentage equity contribu-
tion of the various sponsors. A project could have foreign or local or both foreign
and local sponsors. As noted in Section 5.3.2.3, a local sponsor refers to non-
parastatal that is domiciled in the host country of the project.33 Since the dataset
combines both foreign and local sponsors, the following steps were undertaken to
determine whether or not a project has the participation of local sponsor(s):
1. check the country of origin or incorporation of the sponsor - if this country
is the same as the host country of the project, then a value of 1 is recorded
against the project, indicating the presence of local sponsor, otherwise a value
of 0 is recorded.
2. if the country of the sponsor is not available in the ‘Sponsors’ field, a search
is made using the name of the indicated sponsors for the project on Google
and other websites, including that of the sponsor’s, to get information on
the sponsor’s country of incorporation. Once this determination is made, the
appropriate value is then assigned against the project.
Fiscal Control Variables
The fiscal control variables attempt to capture the government’s ability to directly
meet obligations under PPPs. As noted in Section 5.3, PPPs often create significant
contingent liabilities for governments, which when crystallized could cause enor-
mous fiscal stress. The ability of governments to withstand such fiscal pressure is
captured in this study through two sets of variables: the public debt burden and the
government revenue as a percentage of GDP.
33Parastatal is another name for state-own enterprise
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Following the works of Bahl and Duncombe, (1993) and Buso et al., (2016) as well
as the joint World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt sustainabil-
ity framework for low and middle income countries, public debt burden is captured
through stock/solvency and flows/liquidity indicators. The solvency indicator that
is often used is the public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt as a percentage of
nominal GDP (DstockGDP).34 According to the World Bank, Public and publicly
guaranteed external debt comprises long-term external obligations of the public sec-
tor, including the national government, political subdivisions (or an agency of ei-
ther), and autonomous public bodies, and external obligations of private debtors
that are guaranteed for repayment by a public entity. For the liquidity indicator, the
study uses external debt service payments as a percentage of exports of goods and
services (DSerExp).
Macroeconomic and Market Control Variables
The macroeconomic and market control variables are put into two groups:
(i) Pricing group - this includes inflation and exchange rates, which are variables
that directly affect the pricing of the PPP output. Inflation (Infl) is measured
by consumer price index (CPI), while exchange rate (ExRate) is a measure of
a country’s currency relative to the United State dollars.35
(ii) The output demand group - This includes GDP per capita (GDPPC) and pop-
ulation (Popn) of the country where the project is implemented.
As a first step in the preparation of the data for the fiscal, and macroeconomic and
market control variables, a visual inspection of the distribution of the data for each
variable was performed as well as the correlation between the variables (see Chart
5.21). Furthermore, univariate tests for normality for each of the variables using the
34The World Bank also uses present value(PV) of debt in order to account for the level of conces-
sionality in loans given to especially IDA-only countries.
35The CPI measures price change from the perspective of the purchaser.
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Shapiro-Wilk’s method (S-W) was conducted. 36,37 The null hypothesis of the S-W
test is that the sample distribution is normal. If the test is significant, it implies that
the distribution is non-normal and the research could consider log transformation
of the data (Royston, 1982). Table 5.4 presents the result of the S-W normality test,
which shows high level of significance (all P-values < 1%) for all the variables,
thus indicating non-normality. As a result, the study took the log transformation of
all the communal variables, except inflation, which transformation does on make
significant changes to the variable distribution.
TABLE 5.4: Shapiro-Wilk normality test for the continuous explana-
tory variables
Variable Abbreviation W-statistic P-value
Debt Stock to GDP DstockGDP 0.642 2.20E-16
Debt Service to Exports DSerExp 0.583 2.20E-16
Gross Domestic Product Per Capita GDPPC 0.829 2.20E-16
Inflation Infl 0.055 2.20E-16
Exchange Rate ExRate 0.276 2.20E-16
Population Popn 0.260 2.20E-16
Revenue to GDP Rev_GDP 0.731 2.20E-16
For ease of construction of interaction terms between the continuous covariates in
the model, the variables were all centered relative to their respective means, For
example, centered DstockGDP (CDstockGDP) = DstockGDP - mean (DstockGDP).
According to Broström, (2012), the interaction term for two continuous covariates
is constructed through a new covariate which is the product of the two covariates.
The main effects emanating thereof have specific interpretation as they measure
the effect of one covariate when the other covariate is zero. This means that zero
should be included in the natural range of the covariates and that is made possible
through centering. It is noted however, that the results derived from the centered
and non-centered models are the same.
36See Appendix for visual graphs
37There are several ways of conduction normality test, including the Kolmogorov- Smirnov nor-
mality test and Shapiro-Wilk’s test. However the latter is recommended as it provides better power
properties over a broad range of non-normal distributions and excellent properties for detecting non-
normality associated with skewness (D’agostino et al., 1990, p. 316)
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Political Control Variables
As a way of capturing political instability in countries that are implementing PPPs,
the study utilises the variable, political stability and the absence of violence (PSAV).
This variable is an index compiled by the World Bank (in the world governance indi-
cator database), which ranks countries in ascending order of better political stability
and absence of violence.
5.4.4 Empirical Strategy
After describing the hazard function for all PPP projects in Table 5.3 and in figures
5.6 and 5.7 in Section 5.4.2, the question that remain, which forms the crux of
this chapter, is, do BOT projects have lower risk of failure than BOO projects?
This section attempts to provide an answer to this question by fitting an appropriate
statistical model of hazard to the variable representing the types of PPP projects
along with all identified control variables. To motivate the development of this
empirical model, a non-parametric exploratory analysis is performed using hazard
and survival functions to check the relationship between the event of PPP project
failure and each of the substantive predictors, especially the main predictor, PPP
Sub-type, and those relating to the characteristics of PPP projects.
5.4.4.1 Non-parametric Models
In the literature of survival analysis, there are two main types of non-parametric es-
timators of the hazard and survival functions: the Kaplan-Meier (KM) and the Life-
table estimators. Both estimators have been encountered in Section 5.4.2, however,
this section puts more emphasis on the KM estimator because it is more commonly
used as it incorporates information from all of the observations, whether censored
or uncensored (Bosco Sabuhoro et al., 2006).
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The KM survival function for PPP project is given by the product of one minus the
number of projects that experienced the event of failure in year j of operation, dj ,
divided by the number of projects at risk of experiencing failure in that same year,
nj (i.e. the number of projects at risk of ending their spell immediately prior to time
tj). This can be written as:
Ŝ(tj) =
∏
j|tj<t
(
1− dj
nj
)
(5.4.5)
where dj
nj
is the ratio of the number of failed projects to the number of projects at
risk of experiencing the event failure. This ratio is also referred to as the hazard
rate.
FIGURE 5.8: Hazard Functions for BOT and BOO Projects
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Using non-parametric analysis, Figure 5.8 illustrates the hazard functions for BOT
and BOO projects. From the figure, BOO projects appear to be riskier than BOT
projects as they have higher odds of experiencing the event of failure. The figure
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FIGURE 5.9: Survival Functions for BOT and BOO Projects
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also shows that the risk of failure for BOO projects is elevated after every five
years, while for BOT projects, the risk gradually dissipate after the first five years
of operations. On the whole however, the hazard functions for both BOT and BOO
projects appear to have multiple distinctive peaks and troughs, which may indicate
non-monotonicity. Figure 5.9 illustrates the survival functions for the two types
of PPP projects, which clearly suggests that BOT projects have higher chances of
survival compared to BOO projects.
The survival functions of the other predictors are presented in Section 5.5. For
example, the survival functions for the within-groups of the Size variable indicate
that small size projects have the highest survival rate, followed by medium size
projects.
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5.4.4.2 Discrete-time Hazard Models
The model adopted for analysing the relationship between residual facility own-
ership and PPP project survival reflects the suggestion of Cox, (1972a), that is,
discrete-time hazard, which is a conditional probability, should be transformed ei-
ther into odds or log odds (otherwise known as logits) in order to preserve its lower
and upper bounds of 0 and 1 respectively. Following from this and the recom-
mendations of Allison, (1982) and Singer and Willett, (2003), a logit transformed
model was adopted for this study. Unlike the odds transformation, which tends to
increase the distance between two hazards over time, the logit transformation tries
to maintain identical distance between them. For example, if two values of hazard
are small, the resulting odds and logit transformation increase the distance between
them, however, if the two values of hazards are large, while the odds transforma-
tion further increase the distance between them, the logit transformation reduces the
distance. This ability to change the gap between within-group functions gives logit
transformation an edge over its odds counterpart (see Singer and Willett, 2003). The
effect of the transformation is illustrated by comparing Figure 5.8 against Figures
5.10 and 5.11. The logit transformation tends to maintain a proportional distance
between the BOT and BOO hazard curves, while the gap widen for the odds trans-
formation.
In general, transformation improves the distributional behaviour of variables. For
example, variables with skewed distribution can be transformed to a symmetric
distribution (Box and Cox, 1964; Mosteller and Tukey, 1977), and in the case of
discrete-time hazard survival analysis, can also: (i) prevent specification of inad-
missible values; and (ii) render disparate values of hazard more easily comparable
(Singer and Willett, 2003, pp. 362-363).
The final specification for the empirical model therefore, is based on a set of as-
sumptions dictated by the data as well as the literature. According to Singer and
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FIGURE 5.10: Logit Transformation
0 5 10 15 20 25
−
7
−
6
−
5
−
4
−
3
−
2
Number of years in operations
Es
tim
at
ed
 L
og
it
−
7
−
6
−
5
−
4
−
3
−
2
 
BOO Projects
BOT Projects
Willett, (2003), there are three basic assumptions inherent in discrete-time hazard
models, these are:
(i) for each value of the predictor, there is a postulated logit hazard function -
if the predictor is dichotomous, it is postulated that the population comprises
two functions, and if the predictor is continuous, it is postulated that there are
as many hazard functions as there are predictor values;
(ii) each of these logit hazard functions has an identical shape, albeit there is great
flexibility in the specification of the shape; and
(iii) The distance between each of these logit hazard function is identical in every
time period - regardless of the common shape of the postulated logit hazard
functions, the differences in level for the different values of the predictors
remain the same, which means that the effect of predictors on the log odds of
event occurrence is hypothesized to be constant over time (p. 367). This is
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FIGURE 5.11: Odds Transformation
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also referred to as the proportionality assumption.
To proceed with the development of the empirical model, the following were taken
into consideration:
(i) the study covers the period 1986 to 2014, thus giving a total of 29 years of
observation;
(ii) all the variables related to the characteristics of PPP projects (e.g., size, partic-
ipation of multilateral institutions in the project arrangement and participation
of local sponsors in the project arrangement) are time invariant, which means
their values do not change with time as shown in Table 5.6;
(iii) most of the variables that are related to country characteristics, including, pop-
ulation and inflation, are time varying. This means that they can take on dif-
ferent values over time. To incorporate these time varying variables into the
project dataset, the project dataset was transformed from project-level dataset,
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where the details of one project is dedicated to only one row, to project-year
dataset, where several rows are dedicated to the details of a single project con-
sistent with each year of survival of the project. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 present
excerpts of the project-level and project-year datasets respectively. While Ta-
ble 5.5 shows only two rows for the two projects, Table 5.6 shows thirty rows
for the same two projects.
(iv) the need to account for regional and sectoral heterogeneity.
After selecting the logit transformation as the link function (i.e., the function that
“links” predictors to outcomes (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989)) and taking into ac-
count the above notes, the discrete-time hazard model for all projects can be written
as:
logit[h(ti)] =
n∑
j=1
αjDij + (ϕ1Z1i + ϕ2Z2i + · · ·+ ϕmZmi)
+ (β1X1ij + β2X2ij + · · ·+ βpXpij)
(5.4.6)
TABLE 5.5: Project Level Data
Region Country Prim_Sec Project ProjectStatus EnterNo ExitNo Mult_Support Total_Invest
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Durban Wastewater Operational 13 29 0 11.9
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Siza Water Company Pty. Operational 13 29 0 45
Source: World Bank PPI Dataset for Period Ending 2014
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TABLE 5.6: Project Period Data
Region Country Prim_Sec Project ProjectStatus EnterNo ExitNo Mult_Support Total_Invest DSerExP DstockGDP GDPPC
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Durban Wastewater Operational 13 29 0 11.9 0.03 0.06 5970.7
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Durban Wastewater Operational 13 29 0 11.9 0.06 0.07 6069.3
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Durban Wastewater Operational 13 29 0 11.9 0.07 0.07 6106.9
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Durban Wastewater Operational 13 29 0 11.9 0.05 0.13 6257.9
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Durban Wastewater Operational 13 29 0 11.9 0.05 0.10 6360.4
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Durban Wastewater Operational 13 29 0 11.9 0.03 0.08 6563.5
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Durban Wastewater Operational 13 29 0 11.9 0.06 0.08 6818.0
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Durban Wastewater Operational 13 29 0 11.9 0.05 0.08 7100.9
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Durban Wastewater Operational 13 29 0 11.9 0.03 0.07 7377.6
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Durban Wastewater Operational 13 29 0 11.9 0.04 0.07 7505.0
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Durban Wastewater Operational 13 29 0 11.9 0.04 0.08 7282.5
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Durban Wastewater Operational 13 29 0 11.9 0.03 0.10 7392.9
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Durban Wastewater Operational 13 29 0 11.9 0.03 0.10 7520.4
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Durban Wastewater Operational 13 29 0 11.9 0.04 0.14 7568.5
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Durban Wastewater Operational 13 29 0 11.9 0.07 0.15 7623.1
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Durban Wastewater Operational 13 29 0 11.9 0.03 0.16 7623.1
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Siza Water Company Pty. Operational 13 29 0 45 0.03 0.06 5970.7
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Siza Water Company Pty. Operational 13 29 0 45 0.06 0.07 6069.3
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Siza Water Company Pty. Operational 13 29 0 45 0.07 0.07 6106.9
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Siza Water Company Pty. Operational 13 29 0 45 0.05 0.13 6257.9
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Siza Water Company Pty. Operational 13 29 0 45 0.05 0.10 6360.4
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Siza Water Company Pty. Operational 13 29 0 45 0.03 0.08 6563.5
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Siza Water Company Pty. Operational 13 29 0 45 0.06 0.08 6818.0
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Siza Water Company Pty. Operational 13 29 0 45 0.05 0.08 7100.9
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Siza Water Company Pty. Operational 13 29 0 45 0.03 0.07 7377.6
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Siza Water Company Pty. Operational 13 29 0 45 0.04 0.07 7505.0
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Siza Water Company Pty. Operational 13 29 0 45 0.04 0.08 7282.5
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Siza Water Company Pty. Operational 13 29 0 45 0.03 0.10 7392.9
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Siza Water Company Pty. Operational 13 29 0 45 0.03 0.10 7520.4
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Siza Water Company Pty. Operational 13 29 0 45 0.04 0.14 7568.5
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Siza Water Company Pty. Operational 13 29 0 45 0.07 0.15 7623.1
SSA South Africa Water and sewerage Siza Water Company Pty. Operational 13 29 0 45 0.03 0.16 7623.1
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where the first term on the right hand side, the α′s multiplied by their respective
time indicator (time dummies) D, act as multiple intercepts, one per period, which
as a group represents the baseline logit hazard function, i.e., the value of logit haz-
ard when all substantive predictors are zero. The ϕ′s and β′s multiplied by their
respective substantive predictors, represent the shift in the baseline logit hazard
function corresponding to unit differences in the associated predictors while hold-
ing the other predictors constant. Z1i represents the time-invariant covariates, while
X1ij represents time varying covariates.
Using the variables in this study, equation 5.4.6 could be written as follows:
logit[h(ti)] =
29∑
j=1
αjDj + ϕ1PPI_ Subtypei + ϕ2Sizei + ϕ3L_ Spon_ Parti
+ ϕ4Mult_ Parti + ϕ5Regioni + ϕ6Prim_ Seci + β1DstockGDPij
+ β2DSerExpij + β3GDPPCij + β4Inflij + β5ExRateij
+ β6Popnij + β7Rev_ GDPij + β8PSAVij
(5.4.7)
The model stipulates that project i’s value of logit hazard in period j depends on
the value of all time-invariant covariates, which remain constants across time, and
all the values of the time-varying covariates in time period j. All the time varying
covariates in this model are communal, which means that they take different values
in each time period.38
From equation 5.4.12, time is treated as a categorical variable with a category for
38Time-varying covariates can take the following forms:
• Factor - for e.g., civil, status, which indicates whether someone is married or not. This status
may change over time.
• Continuous covariates - this is a time-dependent variable that changes over time but these
changes are exactly known, e.g., age, election cycle etc. This type of time-varying covariate
has the danger of reversed causality as explained by Singer and Willett, (2003, p. 436)
• Communal (external) covariates - these are time-varying covariates that vary in time outside
the control of the subject(exogenous). It is a special case of a time-varying covariate, but
without the danger of reversed causality (see Broström, 2012, p. 68).
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each year of project operation, leading to a step function. However, using 29 time
dummies in the presence of large project-year dataset may make the model perform
poorly, yielding a baseline hazard function that may fluctuate erratically in the later
periods and inestimable in the one early period when no project is reported as failed
(see Singer and Willett, 2003). It is therefore, recommended for other specifications
of time to be explored (Allison, 1982; Singer and Willett, 2003). Some special cases
include linear, quadratic and other polynomial specification as proposed by Mantel
and Hankey, (1978). Below are some of the specifications:
αDtj = α0 + α1j : (Linear) (5.4.8)
αDtj = α0 + α1j + α2j
2 : (Quadratic) (5.4.9)
αDtj = α0 + α1j + α2j
2 + · · ·+ αpjp : (pth orderpolynomial) (5.4.10)
αDtj = α0 + α1logj : (log) (5.4.11)
TABLE 5.7: Representation of Time
Difference in deviance
in comparison to ...
Representation number Previous General
of TIME Parameter Deviance Model Model AIC
constant 1 2716.1 377.2 2718.1
linear 2 2404.0 312.1 65.1 2408.0
quadratic 3 2396.9 7.1 58.0 2402.9
cubic 4 2393.8 3.1 54.9 2401.8
fourth order 5 2393.0 0.8 54.1 2403.0
log 2 2428.4 -35.4 89.5 2432.4
General 29 2338.9 – – 2394.9
5% Critical Value = 3.84
Table 5.7 presents a comparison of the deviance and Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) statistics for various time specifications. The specification with the lowest
deviance and AIC statistics is normally selected as the preferred specification. But
this selection is backed by a test of difference in deviance statistics to a specific
critical value drawn from a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal
to the difference in the number of parameters between the time specifications in
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question. Column 4 of Table 5.7 gives the difference in the deviance statistics of
the current time specification and the one immediately following, while column 5
gives the difference in the deviance statistics between the current specification and
the general time specification (General).
As can be seen, the constant time specification has the highest deviance and AIC
statistics relative to all the other specifications, followed by the log specification.
The difference in the deviances amongst the various specifications, albeit decreas-
ing, remain positive from the constant time specification right down to the fourth or-
der time specification, indicating an improvement in time specification as more time
parameters are added. The AIC statistic on the other hand, stopped decreasing after
the cubic specification, which may suggest that apart from the general specification,
the cubic specification could be an appropriate alternative choice. However, a test
of the difference in deviance statistics to a 5 percent critical value of a chi-square
distribution with 1 degree of freedom shows that the cubic specification is not sig-
nificantly superior to the quadratic specification because the difference in deviance
between the two specifications is 3.1, which is lower than the resulting chi-square
test statistic of 3.84. Based on this therefore, the study adopted the quadratic spec-
ification, which has one less parameter and yet not significantly different from the
cubic specification, to fit the final empirical model, which is given as:
logit[h(ti)] = ONE + (Spell − 5) + (Spell − 5)2 + ϕ1PPI_ Subtypei + ϕ2Sizei
+ ϕ3L_ Spon_ Parti + ϕ4Mult_ Parti + ϕ5Regioni + ϕ6Prim_ Seci
+ β1DstockGDPij + β2DSerExpij + β3GDPPCij + β4Inflij
+ β5ExRateij + β6Popnij + β7Rev_ GDPij + β8PSAVij
(5.4.12)
where ONE is a matrix of figure 1, included specifically to explicitly show the
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constant term in the model and Spell represents each year of project survival. The
number 5 is specifically selected to center time (spell) because the hazards of BOO
and BOT have their first peak during the fifth year of project operations and while
the hazard for BOO projects elevates approximately every five years thereafter, the
hazard of BOT projects gradually dissipate.
5.4.4.3 Estimation Technique
To estimate discrete-time hazard models, Cox, (1972b) proposes a partial likelihood
(PL) method similar to that for continuous-time data. However, Allison, (1982)
notes that this method is extremely demanding computationally in the presence of
large number of ties, i.e., when several projects are experiencing the event of failure
at the same time. The proposed alternative is to use the more conventional method of
maximum likelihood (ML), which seeks to estimate population parameters (which
in the case of this study are α′s, ϕ′s and β′s) that maximise the likelihood of ob-
serving the sample data. This section follows the procedure outlined by Singer and
Willett, (2003) for ML estimation on pages 381 - 384.
The likelihood model expresses the probability that one will observe the exact pat-
tern of 0’s and 1’s for the variable ‘Failed’ in the project-year dataset.39 Because
each project has Ji observations (one per period of risk), each contributes Ji terms
to the likelihood function. As a result, the likelihood function is composed of as
many terms as there are records in the project-year dataset.
The particular value that project i contributes for year j depends on its true value
of hazard in that year, h(tij), and whether or not it experienced the event of failure
in that year (Failedij). To determine the value of each contribution, the study used
the following logic similar to Singer and Willett, (2003):
39The variable ‘Failed’ represents the censoring indicator as described in Section 5.4.2.2 where 0
denotes censored and 1 denotes the occurrence of the event failure.
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• The probability that project i experiences the event of failure in year j, given
it has not failed before, is h(tij). In the year when project i experiences the
event (when Failed = 1), it contributes h(tij) to the likelihood function.
• The probability that project i does not experience the event of failure in year
j, given it has not failed before, is (1−h(tij)). In all those years when project
i does not experience the event of failure (when Failed = 0), it contributes
(1− h(tij)) to the likelihood function.
Censored projects only contribute (1−h(tij)) and projects that experience the event
of failure contribute one term of (h(tij)) and Ji−1 terms of (1−h(tij)). From this,
the likelihood function (Lik) for the discrete-time hazard model can be written as:
Lik =
n∏
i=1
Ji∏
j=1
h(tij)
Failedij(1− h(tij))(1−Failedij) (5.4.13)
The two product signs (
∏′ s) ensure that the likelihood function multiplies the con-
tributions of each record in the project-year dataset across all projects (through the
first product sign) and all years for each project (through the second product). Be-
cause the indicator for the event of failure must be either 0 or 1, but not both, only
one of the two terms contributes to the likelihood function in each project-year
record. In a year when the event of failure does occur for project i, only the first
term on the right hand side of equation 5.4.13 remains and the second term reduces
to 1. In a year when the event does not occur for project i, only the second term
remains because the first term likewise reduces to 1. Equation 5.4.13 can be written
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in terms of Equation 5.4.6 as follows:40
Lik =
n∏
i=1
Ji∏
j=1
[
1
1 + e−{[ηj+(β1X1ij+···+βpXpij)+(ϕ1Z1j+···+ϕpZpj)]}
]Failedij
×
[
1− 1
1 + e−{[ηj+(β1X1ij+···+βpXpij)+(ϕ1Z1j+···+ϕpZpj)]}
](1−Failedij) (5.4.14)
where ηj is the time specification for modelling the baseline hazard function.
It is a normal practice for statisticians to take the logarithm of the likelihood function
so as to make the mathematics of estimation more tractable. The log-likelihood
function (LLik) for equation 5.4.13 is written as:
LLik =
n∑
i=1
Ji∑
j=1
Failedijlogh(tij) + (1− Failedij)log(1− h(tij)) (5.4.15)
5.4.5 Robustness Checks
Robustness checks are aimed at improving the confidence in the findings from the
empirical model. Apart from the normal checks of alternative model specifications
vis-a-vis the final empirical model, the final data were manipulated in the attempt to
investigate whether it is still possible to establish the relationship between residual
facility ownership and the risk of PPP project failure. Firstly, a matching strategy
was employed to match BOT to BOO projects in order to ascertain causal inference
of residual facility ownership on the risk of failure of PPP projects. Secondly, two
additional PPI Sub-types were included into the model to verify whether indeed
projects that confer residual ownership to the public sector have lower risk of failure.
These two scenarios are discussed below.
40See Singer and Willett, (2003, p. 376) for logit scale to probability scale(
Probability = 1
1+e−logit
)
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5.4.5.1 Matching Strategy
The main objective of this research is to investigate how the ownership of residual
facility in PPP project arrangements affects the survival of PPP projects. To this
end, the focus is on the two main sub-classification of typical PPP projects: (i) build,
operate and transfer (BOT), where the residual facility of the project is transferred
to the public sector after the expiry of an agreed concession period and; (ii) build,
operate and own (BOO), in which case the private sector retains residual facility
ownership.41 These two PPP sub-categories have similar structures, except mainly
for the ownership of the residual facility. They both bundle project construction
with operation under a concession agreement that stipulates the period over which
the public sector is obligated to assure the recuperation of the investment of private
sector partner.
Notwithstanding the main difference between BOT and BOO projects (residual fa-
cility ownership), to insinuate causal inference emanating thereof can be somehow
misleading as countries do not just randomly select PPP projects for implementa-
tion. In other words, the estimation of the effect of residual facility ownership on
project survival/failure may be biased by the existence of confounding factors (see
Becker and Ichino, 2002). For example, if the participation of multilateral insti-
tution and/or local sponsor in the partnership arrangement influence the selection
of the sub-category of PPP projects, then bias would be induced. The elimination
of such bias to establish valid causal inference is achieved through the process of
randomization, which has three related critical features: (i) random selection of the
project; (ii) random assignment of the each project to a treatment or control group;
and (iii) large sample size (see Ho et al., 2007). According to Ho et al., feature
(i) leads to the avoidance of selection bias, while combining features (i) and (iii)
ensures that the chance of something going wrong in the selection process becomes
41The selection of these two sub-categories is consistent with the narrow definition of PPP as
referenced in Chapter 2
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negligible. However, as noted by Ho et al., the process of randomization is only
applicable in experimental and not observational research such as this one.42 For
observational data therefore, the alternative is to mimic randomization.
Rosenbaum and Rubin, (1983) propose the use of propensity score matching (PSM)
as an alternative method to reduce the bias in the estimation while controlling for
the existence of confounding factors. The idea here is that the bias is reduced when
the comparison of outcomes is performed using BOO and BOT projects that are
as similar as possible. This technique has been applied in many fields of study
including, economics (Abadie and Imbens, 2006; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002,1999),
statistics (Braitman and Rosenbaum, 2002; Rubin, 2006) and medicine (Christakis
and Iwashyna, 2003; Rubin, 1997) .
As a first step to applying the propensity score matching technique in the study,
the final dataset was inspected with the aim of comparing the number of BOT and
BOO projects. It was observed that there are approximately twice as many BOT
projects (1370) as BOO (629) projects, which makes it more effective to match the
BOT (control) against BOO projects rather than the other way round as it allows
each BOO project to be matched against one or more BOT projects (see Ho et al.,
2007).43 In this case, therefore, the propensity score is the conditional probability
of assignment to a particular BOO project given a vector of observed covariates
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The main underlying assumption from this defini-
tion is that projects with the same propensity score must have the same distribu-
tion of observable characteristics, while all unobservable characteristics are ignored
(Rubin, 1978).44 This means that for a given propensity score, the BOO and BOT
projects should be, on average, observationally identical.
42Ho et al., (2007, p. 206) defines observational data collection mechanisms as any process of
generating data that does not meet all three features of a classical randomized experiment.
43This makes BOO the treatment group while BOT, the control group
44This assumption is referred to as conditional independence assumption
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After determining the direction of matching, the propensity score p(Z) is then es-
timated using the following logistic regression: p(Z) ≡ Pr(D = 1|Zi) = ψ(Zi),
where D = (0, 1) is the indicator to determine whether a project is BOT (0) or
BOO (1), ψ denotes the logistic cumulative distribution function and Zi is the vec-
tor of covariates, which are specified linearly without interactions or higher order
terms (see Becker and Ichino, 2002; Sugihara, 2010).45 It is noted that p(Z) can lie
between 0 and 1 (inclusive).
Referencing Nielsen et al., (2011), propensity score matching relies heavily on the
ability to observe, measure and condition on the variables that induce endogeneity
between residual facility ownership and the survival of PPP project. To this end
and to ensure meaningful matching pairs, the propensity scores for BOO and BOT
projects were estimated on the basis of the following four covariates: (i) the size
(LInvest-GDP) of the project; (ii) the regional placement (Region) of the project;
(iii) the sectoral classification (Prim-Sec-level) of the project; and (iv) the financial
closure year of the project (EnterNo).46
Once the propensity scores are estimated, it is possible to choose from a list of
techniques to match the BOT to BOO projects, including: 47
(i) nearest neighbour (NN) - in this method each BOO project is matched to the
comparison BOT project with the closest propensity score.
(ii) caliper/radius method - One of the shortcomings of the NN method is that
the difference in propensity scores for a matching pair may be very high and
thus, resulting in poor matches. The caliper method attempts to alleviate this
45 ψ = 1
1+e
−{ z−µs } where µ is the mean, and s is a scale parameter proportional to the standard
deviation
46As noted by Austin, (2011) and Ho et al., (2007), it is possible to have as many covariates in
the computation of the propensity score, but this may not lead to meaningful matches as observed in
this study when we tried to include the participation of local sponsors and multilateral institutions as
possible candidates for the calculation of the propensity scores
47More matching techniques, including genetic matching are also been proposed. This technique
automatically finds the set of matches which minimize the discrepancy between the distribution of
potential confounders in the treatment and control (Sekhon, 2011)
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problem by imposing a threshold on the maximum propensity score distance
between the matching set.
(iii) stratification method - This procedure puts projects with similar propensity
scores into strata or intervals and estimate the impact of the predictor on the
response variable within each stratum. A weighted average of these interval
impact estimates yields the overall causal inference.
(iv) kernel method - One risk identified with the stratification method is that only
a small subset of non participants will ultimately satisfy the criteria to fall
within the common support and thus construct the counter factual outcome.
Non parametric matching estimators such as kernel matching uses a weighted
average of all non participants to construct the counterfactual match for each
participant (Khandker et al., 2009).
This research utilises the caliper matching technique in an attempt to secure very
close matches that may improve the quality of the results, albeit at the risk of los-
ing some of the observations when compared to the NN technique.48 This can be
formally represented as follows:
Cm(i) = {pk | ‖ pi − pk ‖≤ r} (5.4.16)
where Cm(i) denotes the set of BOT projects matched to BOO project i and it
implies that all the BOT projects with estimated propensity scores falling within a
radius r from pi are matched to BOO project i.
To conduct the caliper matching, the study utilises the MatchIt package, which is a
matching package for causal inference that is built for R-programming (Ho et al.,
2011). Using this package, one-to-one propensity scores for the BOT and BOO
projects were first estimated applying the NN technique. After which, the standard
48It is noted that no one matching technique is optimally superior. However, the advise given by
many researches as a means of robustness checks, is to explore more than one technique
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deviation of these propensity scores was computed, which is then multiplied by
0.25 to give the radius r.49 The caliper procedure then involves matching with
replacement only among propensity scores that fall within this estimated radius.
Table 5.8 presents a summary of the results for the caliper matching. The bottom
segment of the table shows that a total of 1370 BOT projects were matched against
629 BOO projects and matches were found for about sixty one percent of the BOO
projects. Similar to the work of Ho et al., (2007), three balance measures were eval-
uated after matching for each covariate as well as their percentage improvement.
Basically the percentage improvement reflects the differences between the balance
of pre-matched BOT to BOO projects and post-matched BOT to BOO projects. If a
large number of the matching criteria show positive improvement, it demonstrates
the efficacy of the matching technique. From the table, the sample mean differences
are extremely small, while their percentage improvement are very large except for
financial closure year, which shows moderate deterioration. The mean of the em-
pirical quantile measure also show very similar results.
Figures 5.12 and ?? provide further support for the efficacy of the caliper match-
ing technique. Figure 5.12 shows histograms for the before and after matching,
which reflects great similarities between the two sets of distribution after matching
(Matched) BOT (Control) and BOO (Treated) projects compared to before matching
(Raw). Likewise, Figure ??, which gives the quantile-quantile (QQ) plots, shows
that after matching the BOT and BOO projects, most of the observations were seen
lying on the 45o degree line, which further indicates that there is close similari-
ties between the distributions of the two sub-categories after matching. Figure 5.13
illustrates the distribution of the propensity scores derived from the caliper match-
ing.50
49The rule of thumb for the computation of the radius is to multiply the standard deviation of the
propensity scores derived from the nearest neighbour approach by 0.25 (Cochran, 1968; Ho et al.,
2007). In this study therefore, r=0.25 x 0.2758= 0.0690.
50As a further means of checking the efficacy of the Caliper technique, a comparable NN matching
technique was also conducted and the output is shown in Figure ??. The Figure, shows most of the
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FIGURE 5.12: Matching Outcome (Histogram)
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FIGURE 5.13: Matching Outcome (Jitter Plot)
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TABLE 5.8: Balance Results from Caliper Matching
Empirical Quantile Measure
Mean Difference Mean Difference Max
Imbalance % Improvement Imbalance % Improvement Imbalance % Improvement
Estimated Propensity Score 0.01 98.46 0.01 98.34 0.02 97.04
EnterNo (Financial Closure) 0.27 -1.96 0.81 27.76 3.00 0.00
LInvest_GDP (Size) -0.21 92.63 0.24 91.36 1.86 41.88
Energy 0.00 99.11 0.00 99.11 1.00 0.00
Telecom 0.00 99.39 0.00 99.39 1.00 0.00
Transport -0.01 98.16 0.01 98.16 1.00 0.00
Water and Sewerage 0.01 96.49 0.01 96.49 1.00 0.00
ECA 0.01 87.16 0.01 87.15 1.00 0.00
LAC 0.01 88.24 0.01 88.23 1.00 0.00
MENA -0.01 53.57 0.01 53.67 1.00 0.00
SA 0.03 84.73 0.03 84.73 1.00 0.00
SSA -0.01 91.22 0.01 91.22 1.00 0.00
Sample Size
Control (BOT) Treated (BOO)
All 1370 629
Matched 521 521
Unmatched 849 108
Discarded 0 0
5.4.5.2 Additional PPI Sub-types
As mentioned above, as part of the robustness checks, the study incorporated the
data for two additional PPI Sub-types. The first PPI Sub-type is rehabilitate, oper-
ate and transfer (ROT), under which the public sector owns both the initial as well
as residual facilities of the project, while the second PPI Sub-type, merchant (Mct),
reflects total facilities ownership by the private sector. The latter PPI Sub-type is
usually considered as a pure private sector venture where the private sector partner
assumes nearly all the risks and rewards associated with the project. The aim there-
fore, is to see whether the risk of failure is lower for both ROT and BOT projects
compared to BOO and Mct. A total of 492 ROT projects and 230 Mct projects were
used in the analysis.
data lying outside the 45o degree line, thus supporting the decision to use the caliper technique to
conduct the matching
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FIGURE 5.14: Distribution of Propensity Scores (QQ plots)
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5.5 Empirical Results and Analysis
The study utilises duration models to analyse the risk to failure of a sample of 2721
PPI projects, implemented over the period 1986 to 2015 in 114 low- and middle-
income countries from across: Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC); Europe and
Central Asia (ECA); South Asia (SA); East Asia and Pacific (EAP); Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) and; Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Over the study period,
a total of 253 projects experienced the event of failure (i.e. projects whose status
indicate cancelled, merged or distressed) and the remainder were right censored
because they did not experience the event. Of the failed projects, 148 and 105 were
BOO and BOT projects respectively, representing about 24 and 8 percent of their
respective total.
This section presents the empirical results which attempt to explain the relation-
ship between residual facilities ownership and the survival or risk of failure of PPP
projects while controlling for factors that have the tendency of inhibiting govern-
ments’ ability to perform their obligations under PPP arrangements and/or the end-
users ability to afford the project output.
5.5.1 Results from the Kaplan-Meier Non-parametric Survival
Model
As a first step towards analysing the relationship between the covariates and the
risk of PPP project failure, the study utilises the Kaplan Meier non-parametric sur-
vival analysis, which incorporates information from all available observations (see
Section 5.4.4).
Starting with the main explanatory variable, PPP Sub-type, Figure 5.9 illustrates
that PPP projects which are structured as BOT, that is, projects that confer residual
facilities ownership on the public sector at the expiry of the contract, have higher
chances of survival than BOO projects, under which residual ownership is assigned
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to the private sector. Table 5.9 shows that, on average, BOT projects survive approx-
imately five years longer than BOO projects (using the Restricted Mean (R-mean)).
The Mantel-Haenszel and the Peto & Peto tests were used to check for the sig-
nificance of the difference between the two groups. In essence, these tests check
whether it is necessary to differentiate between the two PPP sub-types.51 Both tests
show highly significant difference between BOT and BOO projects in terms of their
survival rate.
TABLE 5.9: Logrank Test of Significance for Difference in Within-
groups Variables
R-mean
Mantel-Haenszel test (Rho = 0) †Peto & Peto (Rho = 1)
Chisq P-value Chisq P-value
PPP Sub-types 114 0.000*** 110 0.000***
BOO 21.1
BOT 26.4
Size 44.8 1.84e-10*** 44.3 2.42e-10 ***
Large 22.6
Medium 24.2
Small 25.7
Multilateral Participation 0.3 0.578 0.3 0.566
No 24.6
Yes 24.9
Primary Sector 162 0.000*** 158 0.000***
Energy 25.1
Telecom 18.8
Transport 25.0
Water & Sewerage 24.8
Local Sponsor Participation 18.1 2.05e-05*** 18.1 2.14e-05 ***
No 23.1
Yes 25.4
Region Grouping 60.3 1.08e-11*** 56.9 5.2e-11***
EAP 24.2
ECA 16.6
LAC 22.9
MENA 23.9
SA 23.0
SSA 22.2
†Peto & Peto modification of the Gehan-Wilcoxon test
As demonstrated in Figure 5.15, small size projects have higher probabilities of
survival than both medium and large size projects, and in turn, medium size projects
have higher probabilities of survival than large size projects. These differences
51The null hypothesis of the tests is that there is no difference between the within-groups. These
tests are chi-square tests with degree of freedom equal to the number of within-groups minus 1. For
example, the degree of freedom for PPP Sub-type is 1 and that of Size is 2.
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FIGURE 5.15: Kaplan Meier Result for Size
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in survival probabilities of the various sizes are also indicated to be significant as
shown in Table 5.9. On average, small size projects can survive approximately a
year and a half longer than medium size projects and three years longer than large
size projects.
Figure 5.16 suggests that the participation of local sponsors in PPP arrangements
increases the probability of survival of the project, while Table 5.9 indicates that
projects with local sponsor participation survive, on average, by extra two years
when compared to projects without local sponsors’ participation, a difference that
was also found to be significant.
The survival functions for multilateral institutions participation in PPP arrange-
ments indicate that there is no difference between a project that has the participation
of multilateral institutions and one that does not as the two curves in Figure 5.17
criss crosses each other with overlapping confidence intervals.52 To buttress this
point, Table 5.9 shows that multilateral participation in PPP project arrangement
only increase the survival of the project, on average, by about 4 months and both
52The 95% confidence intervals for the two sub-groups are shown by the shaded blue and red
colours in Figure 5.17
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FIGURE 5.16: Kaplan Meier Result for Local Sponsor Participation
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FIGURE 5.17: Kaplan Meier Result for Multilateral Participation
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the Mantel-Haenszel and Peto and Peto tests suggest this difference is not signifi-
cant.
FIGURE 5.18: Kaplan Meier Result for Regional Grouping
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In terms of regional grouping, Figure 5.18 shows that for the first 10 years of oper-
ations, the survival of PPP projects is very similar across all the regions, however,
beyond this period, project survival becomes very different with ECA registering
the lowest survival rates, followed by SSA, while SA and LAC remain almost in-
distinguishable and so are EAP and MENA until 20 years of operation. Table 5.9
further confirm the graphical output and indicates that there is a significant differ-
ence in project survival in the various regions with ECA on one extreme, registering,
on average, 16.6 years of survival and EAP on the other extreme, 24.2 years.
Finally, for sectoral grouping, Figure 5.19 shows that while the survival rates are
similar for energy, transport and water and sewerage sector (restricted mean year of
survival of around 25 years), the rate for telecom is distinctively and significantly
lower with a restricted mean year of survival of 18.8 years.
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FIGURE 5.19: Kaplan Meier Result for Primary Sector Grouping
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5.5.2 Results from the Discrete-time Hazard Models
The study evaluated five logit link discrete-time hazard models (see Table 5.12
through 5.14), which were estimated using maximum likelihood technique. The
aim is to select the most appropriate model for interpreting the relationship between
residual facilities ownership and the risk of PPP project failure, taking into account
potential confounding factors that may affect this relationship.
Model 1 is the starting model with only one explanatory variable, which is PPP
Sub-type, aiming to investigate the relationship between residual facilities owner-
ship (PPP Sub-type) and the risk of PPP project failure without consideration for
potential endogeneity.
Model 2 is an extension of Model 1, reflecting additional explanatory variables that
relate to the characteristics of PPP projects, including the project size, the participa-
tion of multilateral institution and local sponsors in the project arrangement as well
as the regional and sectoral placement of the project. The model helps to investigate
potential confounding factors arising from the project characteristics.
Model 3 is a nested model which incorporates Model 2 and variables that relate
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to the characteristics of the country where the project is implemented, including
fiscal, macroeconomic and market as well as political variables. Effectively, this
model checks for potential confounding factors arising from both project and coun-
try characteristics and it is considered as the most parsimonious model with all the
variables that are considered in this study. Like the earlier two models, Model 3
only contains main effect of PPP Sub-type and it assumes this effect to be identi-
cal in each year of project operation, thus yielding fitted hazard functions that are
equi-distance on the logit scale (see Singer and Willett, 2003). This assumption
is referred to as the proportionality assumption. It could be the case that hazard
functions are affected by time.
Model 4 is an extension of Model 3 with the incorporation of an interaction term
between residual ownership (PPP Sub-type) and time (Spell-5), thus allowing for
the difference between BOT and BOO projects to differ in each year of project
operations. The aim of this model is to investigate whether or not the hazards of PPP
Sub-type are non-proportional over time, that is testing whether the proportionality
assumption holds.
Model 5 is the same as Model 4, but the communal variables (these are the variables
that relate to the characteristics of the country where the project is implemented)
are stratified in attempt to investigate the possibility for non-linearity between them
and the risk of PPP project failure. Each communal variable is put into four equi-
distance sub-groups. If the coefficients of the sub-groups are relatively equal, then
it can be suggested that the relationship is linear otherwise, non-linear (see Singer
and Willett, 2003).
To evaluate whether there is an improvement from one model fit to another, a com-
parison is made between the difference in the deviances of two successive models to
a 5 percent critical value of a chi-square distribution with degree of freedom equal
to the difference in the number of parameters between the two models. In addition,
the AIC statistics of the models are inspected with the aim of selecting the model
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with the lowest AIC value.
Based on the selection criteria outlined above, Model 2, which has AIC and de-
viance values of 2141.9 and of 2109.9 respectively, appears to be better than Model
1 with AIC and Deviance values of 2343.8 and 2335.8 respectively. The highly
significant chi-square test value (225.9∗∗∗) of the difference in the deviance statis-
tics between the two models further confirm the superiority of Model 2. In turn,
Model 3 appears to be better than Model 2, thus indicating that in addition to project
characteristics, there are country characteristics that confounded the relationship be-
tween residual facilities ownership and the risk of PPP project failure in the model.
Notwithstanding, Model 4 provided sufficient evidence for the violation of the pro-
portionality assumption made in Model 3. Finally, Model 5 confirms that in addi-
tion to the violation of the proportionality assumption, the relationship between the
communal variables and the risk of PPP project failure is non-linear. As a result,
the study settled for Model 5 to interpret the relationship between residual facilities
ownership and risk of PPP project failure.
Because time is centered at 5, the coefficient of PPP Sub-type/BOO, 0.558, esti-
mates the differential between BOO and BOT projects in the fifth year of oper-
ations.53 Taking the inverse of the log of this coefficient (e0.5858) yields 1.7469,
which estimates that the odds of failure of PPP projects after five years of oper-
ations is about 75 percent higher for BOO than BOT projects. In addition, the
negative coefficient of the linear interaction term between PPP Sub-type and Spell
(BOT ∗ (Spell− 5) = −0.163) indicates that after 5 years in operations, the risk of
failure of BOT projects gradually dissipate. For example, in the sixth year, the odds
of BOT project reduce by about 15 percent (1 − 0.8492) and in the seventh year
the odds reduce by about 17 percent (1 − 0.8492 − 0.8492 × 0.8492).54 In short,
PPP projects for which residual facility ownership is conferred on the public sector
53As noted, period 5 is selected for centering because the hazards of both BOO and BOT had there
first peak around their fifth year of project operations (see Figure 5.8)
54Note that the odds of BOO project failure in year 5 is 1.7469, which is measure against a
benchmark of 1, reflecting the odds of BOT failure.
Chapter 5. Residual Ownership and the Risk of PPP Failure 230
(BOT) have lower risk of failure than those for which such ownership is conferred
on the private sector (BOO).
The result indicates that there is highly significant difference in the risk of failure
between small and large size projects. The odds of small size projects experiencing
the event of failure are about 36 percent of that of large size projects, while the odds
of medium size projects are about 72 percent of that of large size projects.
Both local sponsors and multilateral institutions participation in PPP project ar-
rangements were found to be insignificant in explaining the risk of project failure,
albeit the negative signs of their respective coefficients are consistent with a priori
expectations, indicating that their participation reduces the risk of experiencing the
event of failure.
Sectoral heterogeneity is found to be highly significant in explaining the risk of
PPP project failure. The odds of experiencing project failure in the telecom sector
are about 6 times that of the energy sector, while the odds of the other two sectors
(water and sewerage, and transport) are around 3 times that of the energy sector.
This means that projects implemented in the telecom sector are comparatively more
vulnerable to failure.
Amongst the different regions, it is only the MENA region that exhibits significant
difference with the benchmark region, EAP. The odds of PPP project failure in the
MENA region is about 23 percent that of the EAP region.
The effect of the market constraint variables, population and GDP per capita, on the
risk of project failure appears to be non-linear, albeit insignificant.55 In terms of the
macroeconomic variables, countries with high inflation rates have significantly high
risk of project failure, so are countries with high exchange rates.
55The linearity assumption is determined in this case by examining the pattern of parameters
(and accompanying standard errors) for the system of dummies. With equally spaced predictors
categories, a linear effect will lead to successive estimates being “equi-distance” (Singer and Willett,
2003, p. 450), which is not this case here, thus suggesting non-linearity
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Two out of the three fiscal constraints variables considered in this study, debt ser-
vice to exports and government revenue to GDP, were found to be significant in
explaining the risk of PPP project failure. Consistent with a priori expectations,
high revenue to GDP ratios have decreasing effect on the risk of project failure. The
odds of project failure for countries with revenue to GDP ratios falling within the
highest stratum (KC_LRev_GDP(0.527,1.03]) are about 9 percent of those whose
ratios fall in the benchmark stratum. On the other hand, higher debt service ratios
have increasing effect on the risk of project failure. Countries with debt service ra-
tios falling within the highest stratum (KC_LDSerExP(0.821,1.27]) have the high-
est risk of project failure with the odds of experiencing the event of failure being 4
times that of countries with ratios falling within the lowest stratum.
The coefficient of the Political constraint variable, PV.EST, appears to have the right
sign consistent with its a priori expectation, albeit insignificant in explaining the
risk of project failure.
5.5.3 Results from Robustness Checks
As mentioned earlier, the aim of the robustness checks is to further improve the
confidence as to whether indeed the ownership of the residual facilities by the public
sector under PPP projects arrangements leads to lower risk of project failure than
when such ownership is conferred on the private sector.
5.5.3.1 Matching Strategy for Causality Inference
As indicated in Section 5.4, an attempt to ascertain causality between residual own-
ership and risk of PPP project failure is made through the utilisation of propensity
score matching using the caliper/radius matching technique. To recall, a total of
1370 BOT projects were matched against 629 BOO projects, which resulted in 521
matched pairs. It was shown that the matching pairs of projects are similar in terms
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of their sizes, the period when they reached financial closure, the sector as well as
the region where they were implemented. As an additional test, all control variables
used in the matching process were also used in the discrete-time logit hazard model.
Table 5.16 gives the results of the matched dataset, which shows that the odds for
BOO projects experiencing the event of failure are about 3 times (e1.0489 = 2.854)
that of BOT projects, a result that is not substantially different from that in Model 2,
(e0.9261 = 2.525), which contains the same set of predictive variables (only variables
relating to project characteristics). The size and sector variables were also found to
be highly significant with small size projects and projects in the energy sector hav-
ing comparatively lower risk of failure. As a whole, the results suggest evidence of
causality between residual facilities ownership and the risk of PPP project failure.
5.5.3.2 Inclusion of other Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Projects
As elucidated in Section 5.4, another way of verifying whether indeed PPP projects
which confer residual facility ownership on the public sector have lower risk of
failure than those for which such ownership is conferred on the private sector is by
incorporating additional categories of private participation in infrastructure projects
in the model and see whether the categories that confer residual ownership to the
public sector still have lower risk of failure. The additional two PPI Sub-types
are: Rehabilitate, Operate and Transfer (ROT), and Merchant (Mct). In the former,
both the initial and residual facilities are owned by the public sector and this sector
allows the private sector to rehabilitate and operate the facility for an agreed period
of time and then transfer the facility back to the public sector (this is referred to in
the literature as brownfield projects), while in the latter both the initial and residual
facility are owned by the private sector.
The results from the Kaplan Meier non-parametric discrete-time survival function,
which is illustrated in Figure 5.20, indicates that both PPI Sub-types that allocate
ownership of residual facilities to the public sector (BOT and ROT), have higher
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FIGURE 5.20: Four PPI Sub-types
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TABLE 5.10: Restricted Mean of the Four PPI Sub-types
Number of
PPI Sub-types Observation *rmean *se(rmean)
Build, Own and Operate (BOO) 629 21.6 0.701
Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) 1370 25.5 0.175
Merchant (Mct) 230 19.7 0.694
Rehabilitate, Operate and Transfer (ROT) 492 25.2 0.288
* restricted mean with upper limit = 27
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survival probabilities than those for which the private sector retains residual owner-
ship (BOO and Mct). The restricted mean shown in Table 5.10 indicates that ROT
and BOT projects have similar restricted mean year of survival of approximately
26 years, while BOO and Mct have approximately 22 and 20 years of survival re-
spectively. By anti-logging the coefficients of the PPI Sub-types in Table 5.17 it
can be seen that the odds of project failure for ROT (1) and BOT (0.68) are lower
than those of both BOO (1.86) and Mct (1.61).56 This further confirms that the con-
ferment of residual facilities ownership to the public sector reduces the risk of PPP
project failure.
5.6 Discussion of Results
The results in this chapter provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that PPP
projects which are structured to confer residual facility ownership on the public
sector have lower risk of experiencing failure or rather, have higher survival rate,
than those that confer such ownership to the private sector. The conferment of resid-
ual facility ownership on the public sector has several implications for the longevity
of the project.
Firstly, as elucidated by Hart, (2003), granting of residual rights or ownership to a
particular party in an agreement motivates that party to increase her ex-ante invest-
ment in the relationship. This could be the case when residual facilities ownership
is conferred on the public sector, which could incentivise the sector to provide more
support in order to ensure the success of the project thus securing access to the fa-
cility, particularly if the project has positive residual value that is of the nature of a
public good. The motivation for optimal public sector ex-ante investment could also
come from the fact that governments that have successful implemented infrastruc-
ture projects for which they retain ownership have been able to use this achievement
56ROT is the reference PPI Sub-type category against which the other PPI Sub-types are measured
and therefore, it odds are 1.
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to gain political capital. A case in point is the campaign strategy employed by the
party of the current government of Sierra Leone (All People’s Congress (APC)).
When campaigning during the 2007 elections, the APC party was able to impress in
the minds of the electorate that most of the existing public infrastructure in the coun-
try were actually constructed during its tenure in the 1970s and 80s and if given the
opportunity they will construct more. This was acknowledged by many commenta-
tors as one of the reasons why the party won the elections in 2007. Since winning
the elections, the party has embarked on elaborate infrastructure programme (espe-
cially roads), mostly through PPP framework, in an effort to consolidate its political
gains.
Secondly, it could be the case that the PPP project will not end up with positive
residual value as noted in Section 5.3. PPP arrangements are usually long termed
with average tenure of around 30 years and therefore, one cannot absolutely de-
termine ex-ante whether or not at the expiry of the project concession period, the
party upon whom residual ownership is conferred will acquire an asset or a liability.
For example, if the PPP project involves the installation and operations of a ther-
mal plant for the provision of electricity, with the rapid innovation in technological,
such project might not be cost effective or environmentally friendly 30 years down
the line. The option available to the owner of the residual facility in such scenario
will be to decommission the facilities immediately at the end of the contract period,
which could have serious cost implications. Given that the private sector is moti-
vated by profit, if allocated the residual facilities, any anticipated risk associated
with the facilities would be adequately costed and reflected in the project output
tariff. This might not necessarily be the case if the public sector assumes the risk
of residual facilities ownership (residual value risk). Therefore, private sector own-
ership of the residual facilities could culminate into increase in projects cost and
hence, affect output affordability, which could lead to premature termination of the
project. On the other hand, because the public sector is assumed not to be motivated
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purely by profit, but rather, citizens’ welfare, it has the tendency of absorbing some
of the cost of the project and therefore, if the ownership is given to this sector’s
partner, there is high chance that the cost of decommissioning of the project might
not be directly borne by the end-users, thus making the project affordable and hence
durable.
The results also show the importance of PPP project size on the risk of project
failure. Small size projects were found to have lower risk of failure, followed by
medium size projects.57 This outcome buttresses the point made about project af-
fordability to the end-users and/or the fiscus. Large size projects normally result in
higher output tariffs, which could prove unaffordable and have the tendency in the
medium to long term to restrict public policy choices or final consumer demand for
cheaper alternatives in the presence of technological advancement. This is the case
of the Dabhol Power project in India, which was a very large/expensive project that
was considered unaffordable to the end-users and for which the government was
unwilling to provide subsidies (Davis, 1996).
The role of multilateral institutions and local sponsors on the risk of failure of PPP
projects is yet to be realised as the data show that their participation have only been
recently gaining momentum.
The results show significant sectoral heterogeneity on the risk of PPP project failure.
Projects implemented in the energy sector, which are mostly structured as BOT,
exhibit the lowest risk of failure, followed by the transport sector. Projects in the
telecom sector, which are mostly structured as BOO, have the highest risk of failure.
The telecom sector is characterised by merging and sales of asset as operators try
to gain greater competitive edge or profitability.58 As noted by Chan-Olmsted and
Jamison, (2001, p. 2), since the passage of the Telecommunications Act in 1996,
the United States has witnessed multiple mergers of leading telecommunications
57Recalling, size is measured as a ratio of the total investment in a project to the GDP of the
country where the project is implemented
58It should be recalled that the definition of failure in this research includes merged projects.
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companies, including between TCI, Media One and AT&T and MCI Worldcom and
Sprint, all in an attempt to gain “competitive advantages through strategic combi-
nations of resources and presence in multiple product and geographical markets”.
In Sierra Leone, telecommunication companies have changed many hands. For ex-
ample, Millicom Sierra Leone was re-branded to Tigo and later Tigo was sold to
Africell.59 Likewise, Celtel Sierra Leone was transformed to Airtel Sierra Leone.
The period until the sale of the project asset or merger in the telecommunication
industry is regarded in this study as the survival period of the project and therefore,
if there is rapid changes in this regard, it implies shorter project duration.
The results also suggest that PPP projects implemented in the MENA region have
the lowest risk of experiencing the event of failure. The high risk of project failure
in the the EAP region, followed by the LAC region, could be attributed to the early
embracement of the PPP framework by these regions, at a time when the framework
was least understood and mistakes abound. Project implemented in regions such as
MENA and SSA show relatively lower risk of failure as these regions started imple-
menting PPP projects much later and therefore, had the opportunity to learn from
the mistakes of early implementers. Since the results are based on averages, the
failures in earlier years could bias recent achievements made by the EAP and LAC
regions, which are now considered as the leading regions in the implementation of
PPPs.
To buttress the importance of government supports in ensuring the success of PPP
projects, the variables representing government’s ability to meet its obligation un-
der PPP arrangements were found to be highly significant. The public debt service
to GDP ratio, which indicates the government’s ability to quickly raise debt, espe-
cially from non-residents, to meet liquidity shortfalls, was highly significant and
demonstrates a positive relationship with the risk of project failure. This means that
a country that finds it difficult to raise debt to meet emergency liquidity problems,
59See http://awoko.org/2009/07/30/africell-buys-tigo/
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e.g., the crystallisation of contingent liabilities, are at greater risk of experiencing
PPP project failure. In the same light, countries that can generate more revenue
have lower risk of PPP project failure.
Unlike the market variables (population and GDP per capita) the macroeconomic
variables (inflation and exchange rate) were found to be significant, thus emphasis-
ing the need for project affordability. Countries with high inflation and exchange
rates are more vulnerable to experiencing PPP project failure as increase in these
two quantities directly lead to higher output prices, which could be unaffordable to
the end-users and hence, serve as catalyst for project failure.
Political instability was not found to be a significant factor in explaining the risk of
PPP project failure. As noted, several PPP arrangements, especially those with the
involvement of multilateral institutions, are putting in place mechanisms to insure
against temporal political instabilities. For example, the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency of the World Bank involves in PPPs mainly to provide politi-
cal risk insurance and credit enhancement guarantees to facilitate project success,
particularly in developing and emerging countries.60
One thing that came out clearly from the shape of the discrete-time hazard function
is that the risk of PPP project failure spikes after every five years of project opera-
tion, more especially for BOO projects, consistent with the political cycle of most
of the countries in the study. Further to this, the MENA region, where until recently
most of the countries, including Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Jordan, have unlimited
political term limits, has the lowest risk of project failure. This may suggest that a
more stable and predictable political system with uninterrupted PPP policies could
reduce the risk of project failure.
60See https://www.miga.org/Pages/Who%20We%20Are/Overview.aspx
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5.7 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
This section presents the conclusions and policy recommendations emanating from
this research which attempts to explain the importance of residual facility owner-
ship on the risk of failure, or rather, the survival of PPP projects in developing and
emerging market economies across the six regions of the world.
5.7.1 Conclusion
The insights of this study has implications for the question as to whether residual
facility ownership in PPP project arrangements affects the risk of project failure.
The existing literature on this stems from the work of Grossman, Hart and Moore
(see Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995; Hart and Moore, 1988) on incomplete
contracting theory, which posits that when contracts are incomplete the ensuing
hold-up problem emanating from incentive-compatibility leads to sub-optimal out-
put in a relationship-specific investment, such as PPPs.61 To alleviate this problem
and maximise the partners’ ex-ante investment and hence, the partnership joint out-
put, it is advocated that the residual facility (or residual control rights) should be
allocated to the partner with the greatest investment (in the case of a private private
partnership) or greatest valuation (in the case of public private partnership) (Bennett
and Iossa, 2006).
This research built on the above literature to develop its main hypothesis, which
relates to the role of residual facility ownership on the risk of PPP project failure, or
more specifically, the survival of PPP projects. The main tenet of this hypothesis is
that because of the residual value risk associated with the ownership of the residual
facility in a long term relationship like PPPs, such ownership should be bestowed
61See Section 5.3
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upon the partner that is less likely to translate the cost of the residual value risk into
the overall project cost, thus enhancing project affordability and hence longevity.
In this chapter, the hypothesis was empirically tested using a sample of 2721 projects
sourced from the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database.
These projects were (some are still on-going) implemented in four major infrastruc-
ture sectors (Energy, Telecom, Transport, and Water and Sewerage) across 114 de-
veloping and emerging countries in the six regions of the world (EAP, ECA, LAC,
MENA, SA and SSA). Due to the fact that a preponderance of the projects were
censored (see Section 5.4.2.2) and there is a lot of ties in the occurrence of the event
of PPP project failure, an econometric duration model, in particular a discrete-time
hazard model, was applied to the data using related packages in R Programming.
The results provide sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that in the case of
a long term relationship-specific investments like PPPs, the risk of project failure
could be mitigated if residual facility ownership is conferred ex-ante on the public
rather than the private sector, particularly when the partners cannot determine ex-
ante whether or not there is residual value risk associated with such ownership. The
focus was on “greenfield” projects, which shows that the odds of failure for BOO
projects, which are structured to confer residual facility ownership on the private
sector, is almost twice the odds of BOT projects, which confer such ownership on
the public sector.
On another note, the study investigated some variables that may potentially con-
found the relationship between residual facility ownership and the risk of PPP
projects failure. These variables relate to the project characteristics as well as
the characteristics of the countries where the projects are implemented. Prominent
amongst the findings related to these variables include:
(i) the selection of an appropriate project size is very crucial for the survival of
the project as large size projects appear to be more susceptible to failure than
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small size projects. An example is the case of the Dabhol Power Project in
India (see Davis, 1996)
(ii) energy sector projects, which are mainly structured as BOT, have lower risk
of failure than telecom sector projects, most of which are structured as BOO
and are characterised by frequent merging and resale.
(iii) the MENA region, where until recently most of the countries have unlimited
political term time and where as well most of the countries have only recently
began embracing the concept of PPP, has the lowest risk of PPP projects fail-
ure compared to EAP and LAC, both of which adopted the concept much
earlier when it was least understood and mistakes abound. This may indicate
that unhindered public sector support and learning from the lessons of ear-
lier implementers could actually reduce the risk of project failure, an area that
requires further exploration.
(iv) the risk of PPP projects failure is mitigated when governments have strong
ability to generate revenue or raise debt within the shortest possible period to
meet contingent fiscal obligations, particular those arising from the crystalli-
sation of contingencies under PPPs.
(v) macroeconomic variables such as inflation and exchange rates, which directly
affect the PPP project output tariff and hence, output affordability, were found
to have significant effects on the risk of PPP projects failure. High exchange
and inflation rates increase the propensity of PPP project failure, thus further
buttressing the point that the cost of the project is very crucial for its survival.
5.7.2 Policy Recommendations
As initially stated, one of the reasons for undertaking this research is to proffer
recommendations to policymakers and practitioners alike on how to structure PPP
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projects in order to mitigate the risk of failure. On this front, some of the recom-
mendations derived from the study include the following:
(i) Contrary to Bennett and Iossa, (2006) as discussed in Section 5.3, residual
facility ownership should be given ex-ante to the public sector partner, partic-
ularly if the anticipated duration of the project is very long, while an embed-
ded option could be written in the project agreement granting the transfer of
the facility to the private sector partner based on mutually agreed terms and
conditions in the event that the residual facility end up with positive residual
value that is of the nature of a private good. Such arrangement could lead to
a reduction in the output tariff as the government stands to bear the residual
value risk, while at the same time incentivises the optimal investment of the
private sector partner because of the promise of asset transfer at the expiry of
the contract, thus enhancing project longevity.
(ii) Special attention should be paid to the selection of an appropriate project size
(see the discussing in Section 5.3), which in this study effectively relates to
the level of project investment as percent of GDP. When a project is too big
relative to potential demand and affordability by the end-users and/or the fis-
cus, there is high likelihood of failure because of its tendency to restrict public
sector policy choices and end-users’ demand for cheaper alternatives in the
presence of technological advancement.
(iii) Governments seeking to engage in PPPs should ensure that it has the buy-in
of all the different arms of government as well as the general public in order
to avoid future reversal of project agreements that may affect the welfare of
the private sector partner in the event of ex-post renegotiations.
(iv) while not significant in the study, the signs are that countries seeking to achieve
PPP project longevity should endeavour to co-opt the participation of both
multilateral institutions and local sponsors in the project arrangement. Their
Chapter 5. Residual Ownership and the Risk of PPP Failure 243
involvement could lead to expeditious end in temporal cash flows and political
shocks that may otherwise culminate in project failure.
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TABLE 5.11: Variables Description
Variable Abbreviation Definition
A priori
Note
Expectation
Dependent Variable
Project Failure Failedij Equal to 1 if the project i failed at time j
and 0 if the project does not fail
Independent Variables
(1) Variables on project characteristics
PPP Sub-type
BOO Build Operate and Transfer Positive Relative to BOT
BOT Build Own and Operate Negative Relative to BOO
BOT*Spell Interaction between PPP Sub-type
and operation period (in years )
Project Size
Size_medium Medium size project Negative Relative of Large Size
Size_small Small size project Negative Relative of Large Size
Participation of Multilateral Institutions (Yes=1)
Mult_Part(0) No multilateral participation Positive Relative to Mult_Part (1)
Local Sponsor Participation (Yes=1)
L_Spon_Part(0) No local sponsor participation Positive Relative to L_Spon_Part (1)
Sector
Telecom Telecommunication
Transport Transport
W & S Water and Sewerage
Region
ECA Europe and Central Asia
LAC Latin America and the Caribbean
MENA Middle East and North Africa
SA South Asia
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
(2) Variables on country characteristics
Macrket Variables
LPopn log of population negative In the model all of
LGDPPC log of GDP per Capita negative these variables have the
Fiscal Constraint Variables prefix C and some KC.
LDSerExP log of debt service to positive The C means that the
export of good and services variable is centered
LDstockGDP log of debt stock to GDP from its mean and the
LRev_GDP log of government revenue to GDP negative KC means the variable
Macroeconomic Constraint is both centered and
infl inflation positive categorized, which helps to
LEXRate log pf exchange rate positive determine whether the
Political Constraint effect of the variable
PV.EST Political stability and negative is non-linear
absence of violence
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FIGURE 5.21: Correlation Matrix
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TABLE 5.12: Main Empirical Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Constant ONE -4.006*** 0.110 -4.231*** 0.281 -3.698*** 0.318 -3.496*** 0.318 -4.836*** 0.937
Time in years
(Spell - 5) -0.262*** 0.027 -0.350*** 0.029 -0.356*** 0.030 -0.254*** 0.037 -0.283*** 0.039
(Spell - 5)2ˆ 0.004. 0.002 0.006** 0.002 0.007** 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003
PPP Sub-type (reference = BOT)
BOO 1.055*** 0.135 0.926*** 0.233 0.829*** 0.233 0.636** 0.234 0.558* 0.242
Project Size (Reference = Large)
Size_medium -0.454** 0.175 -0.403* 0.189 -0.318. 0.191 -0.331. 0.190
Size_small -1.221*** 0.244 -1.072*** 0.275 -0.969*** 0.277 -1.023*** 0.283
Interaction with Time
BOO*(Spell - 5) 1.178*** 0.040 1.163*** 0.041
Multilateral Institution Participation (reference = no)
Mult_Part (yes) -0.071 0.200 -0.128 0.206 -0.151 0.205 -0.196 0.208
Local Sponsor Participation (reference = no)
L_Spon_Part (yes) 0.091 0.150 -0.030 0.156 -0.018 0.155 -0.081 0.156
Sector (reference = Energy)
Telecom 2.385*** 0.219 2.033*** 0.227 1.791*** 0.227 1.817*** 0.239
Transport 1.357*** 0.252 1.056*** 0.256 1.099*** 0.255 1.102*** 0.262
Water & Sewarage 1.505*** 0.270 1.264*** 0.271 1.242*** 0.270 1.231*** 0.276
Region (reference = EAP)
ECA -0.098 0.250 0.045 0.326 -0.023 0.327 -0.318 0.344
LAC 0.084 0.185 -0.290 0.274 -0.305 0.272 -0.176 0.268
MENA -1.314** 0.481 -1.146* 0.523 -1.202* 0.524 -1.479** 0.534
SA -0.655** 0.248 -1.105*** 0.302 -1.130*** 0.297 -0.398 0.383
SSA -0.776** 0.273 -1.135*** 0.331 -1.086*** 0.325 -0.518 0.360
Population
C_Lpopn 0.004 0.078 -0.009 0.077
KC_LPopn(-1.44,0.308] 0.520 0.581
KC_LPopn(0.308,2.06] 0.193 0.580
KC_LPopn(2.06,3.81] 0.000 0.617
. . . .continue on the next page
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TABLE 5.13: Main Empirical Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Variable Parameter Robust Parameter Robust Parameter Robust Parameter Robust Parameter Robust
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
GDP per capita
C_LGDPPC -0.069 0.157 -0.111 0.154
KC_LGDPPC(-1.1,-0.0366] 0.240 0.415
KC_LGDPPC(-0.0366,1.03] 0.440 0.451
KC_LGDPPC(1.03,2.1] -0.076 0.491
Debt Service Payment to Export of Good and Services
C_LDSerExP 1.086*** 0.247 1.170*** 0.244
KC_LDSerExP(-0.08,0.371] 0.148 0.183
KC_LDSerExP(0.371,0.821] 0.336 0.273
KC_LDSerExP(0.821,1.27] 1.441*** 0.355
Debt Stock to GDP
C_LDstockGDP 0.065 0.237 0.012 0.233
KC_LDstockGDP(-0.597,0.228] 0.125 0.192
KC_LDstockGDP(0.228,1.05] -0.105 0.348
KC_LDstockGDP(1.05,1.88] -0.583 0.736
Government Revenue to GDP
C_LRev_GDP -0.598* 0.283 -0.579* 0.281
KC_LRev_GDP(-0.473,0.0273] -0.146 0.227
KC_LRev_GDP(0.0273,0.527] 0.220 0.276
KC_LRev_GDP(0.527,1.03] -2.400* 1.063
Inflation
C_Linfl 0.022* 0.010 0.023* 0.010
KC_Infl(-3.97,4.78] -0.241 0.178
KC_Infl(4.78,13.5] 1.015*** 0.256
KC_infl(13.5,22.3] 0.686* 0.289
Exchange Rate
C_LEXRate -0.001 0.033 -0.004 0.033
KC_LEXRate(-2.18,0.888] 0.834** 0.285
KC_LEXRate(0.888,3.95] 0.032 0.344
KC_LEXRate(3.95,7.03] 0.336 0.374
. . . .continue on the next page
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TABLE 5.14: Main Empirical Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Variable Parameter Robust Parameter Robust Parameter Robust Parameter Robust Parameter Robust
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Political Stability and Absence of Violence
PV.EST 0.083 0.127 0.159 0.128
K_PV.EST(-1.89,-0.79] 0.311 0.364
K_PV.EST(-0.79,0.31] 0.024 0.385
K_PV.EST(0.31,1.41] 0.020 0.488
Goodness-of-fit
Deviance 2335.8 2109.9 2056.3 2032.5 1984.9
No. of Parameters 4 16 24 25 41
AIC 2343.8 2141.9 2104.3 2082.5 2066.9
Diff. in Deviance Test (Chi-square test) 225.9*** 53.6*** 23.8*** 47.6***
Notes:
1) ’***’, ’**’, ’*’ and ’.’ denote significant estimate at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
2) The models presented here are all nested models. Model 1 has PPP Sub-type as the only explainatory variables; Model 2 added project characteristics; Model 3 added characteristics; Model 4
added PPP Subtype interaction with time; and Model 5 investigates for non-linearity in Model 4.
3) The various models are tested using difference in deviance test and the result show that Model 5 is superior to the other models. The model also has the lowest deviance and AIC statistics.
4) The standard errors are robust, computed using the Sandwich Package in R Programming as explained in Section 4.4.3 of Chapter 4
5) The prefix C infront of the variable means that the variable is centered from the median while KC means the variable is both centered and categorised.
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TABLE 5.15: Odds Ratios of the Parameters
Predictor Estimated Parameter (b) Estimated Odds Ratio (eb)
ONE -3.458 0.031
(Spell − 5) -0.308 0.735
(Spell − 5)2 0.004 1.004
BOO 0.068 1.070
Size_medium -0.331 0.718
Size_small -1.023 0.360
BOT*Spell -0.163 0.850
Mult_Part (yes) -0.196 0.822
L_Spon_Part -0.081 0.922
Telecom 1.817 6.153
Transport 1.102 3.010
Water & Sewarage 1.231 3.425
ECA -0.318 0.728
LAC -0.176 0.839
MENA -1.479 0.228
SA -0.398 0.672
SSA -0.518 0.596
KC_LPopn(-1.44,0.308] 0.520 1.682
KC_LPopn(0.308,2.06] 0.193 1.213
KC_LPopn(2.06,3.81] 0.000 1.000
KC_LGDPPC(-1.1,-0.0366] 0.240 1.271
KC_LGDPPC(-0.0366,1.03] 0.440 1.553
KC_LGDPPC(1.03,2.1] -0.076 0.927
KC_LDSerExP(-0.08,0.371] 0.148 1.160
KC_LDSerExP(0.371,0.821] 0.336 1.399
KC_LDSerExP(0.821,1.27] 1.441 4.225
KC_LDstockGDP(-0.597,0.228] 0.125 1.133
KC_LDstockGDP(0.228,1.05] -0.105 0.900
KC_LDstockGDP(1.05,1.88] -0.583 0.558
KC_LRev_GDP(-0.473,0.0273] -0.146 0.864
KC_LRev_GDP(0.0273,0.527] 0.220 1.246
KC_LRev_GDP(0.527,1.03] -2.400 0.091
KC_LInfl(-3.97,4.78] -0.241 0.786
KC_LInfl(4.78,13.5] 1.015 2.759
KC_Linfl(13.5,22.3] 0.686 1.986
KC_LEXRate(-2.18,0.888] 0.834 2.303
KC_LEXRate(0.888,3.95] 0.032 1.033
KC_LEXRate(3.95,7.03] 0.336 1.399
K_PV.EST(-1.89,-0.79] 0.311 1.365
K_PV.EST(-0.79,0.31] 0.024 1.024
K_PV.EST(0.31,1.41] 0.020 1.020
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TABLE 5.16: Results from Matched Data
Parameter Estimate Std.Error z-value Pr(>|z|)
Constant
ONE -3.722*** 0.394 -9.452 0.000
Period in Operation
(Spell − 5) -0.255*** 0.052 -4.930 0.000
(Spell − 5)2 0.004 0.005 0.731 0.465
PPI Sub-type ( BOT)
BOO 1.049*** 0.288 3.638 0.000
Size (Large)
Medium -0.933** 0.294 -3.168 0.002
Small -1.312** 0.424 -3.097 0.002
Multilateral Participation (no)
Mult_Part (yes) -0.273 0.335 -0.815 0.415
Local Participation (no)
L_Spon_Part (yes) -0.466. 0.257 -1.814 0.070
Sector (Energy)
Telecom 1.438* 0.586 2.455 0.014
Transport 1.598** 0.566 2.824 0.005
Water & Sewerage 1.616*** 0.424 3.813 0.000
Region (EAP)
ECA -0.355 0.499 -0.713 0.476
LAC 0.083 0.312 0.265 0.791
MENA -15.542 578.024 -0.027 0.979
SA -1.357* 0.580 -2.340 0.019
SSA -0.646 0.512 -1.263 0.207
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
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TABLE 5.17: Results from the Four PPI Sub-types
Parameter Estimate Std.Error z-value Pr(>|z|)
Constant
ONE -3.889*** 0.347 -11.211 0.000
Period in Operation
(Spell − 5) -0.351*** 0.029 -11.985 0.000
(Spell − 5)2 0.006** 0.002 2.629 0.009
PPI Sub-type ( ROT)
BOT -0.382. 0.224 -1.711 0.087
BOO 0.621* 0.299 2.074 0.038
Merchant 0.474 0.379 1.251 0.211
Size (Large)
Medium -0.457** 0.174 -2.617 0.009
Small -1.226*** 0.242 -5.056 0.000
Multilateral Participation (no)
Mult_Part (yes) -0.057 0.200 -0.283 0.777
Local Participation (no)
L_Spon_Part (yes) 0.081 0.150 0.540 0.589
Sector (Energy)
Telecom 2.487*** 0.280 8.887 0.000
Transport 1.308*** 0.256 5.103 0.000
Water & Sewerage 1.417*** 0.278 5.097 0.000
Region (EAP)
ECA -0.128 0.252 -0.510 0.610
LAC 0.064 0.185 0.346 0.730
MENA -1.300** 0.482 -2.699 0.007
SA -0.656** 0.248 -2.643 0.008
SSA -0.800** 0.273 -2.927 0.003
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Introduction
This thesis has articulated the infrastructure challenges faced by developing coun-
tries, more especially for those in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and worse still for
fragile states where the propensity for economic and political instability is very
high. It examined the public private partnership (PPP) framework as an immedi-
ate option for these countries to accelerate the delivery of public infrastructure and
related services. While acknowledging the numerous criticisms of the framework,
this thesis has sought to contribute to the ongoing discourse on resolving some of its
challenges and finding solutions for countries to enhance their chances of attract-
ing more private investors, both local and international, into public infrastructure
programmes. Under this broad objective, the thesis was divided into three thematic
areas. The first comprised of an exploratory analysis of the World Bank’s private
participation in infrastructure (PPI) database, which constitutes the main source of
data for most research on PPPs. The aim here was to provide an in-depth analysis
of the dataset in an attempt to inform more sophisticated confirmatory analyses.
The second research area focused on the estimation of the relationship between
countries’ attractiveness for PPPs and the characteristics of the countries, including,
economic, governance and experience in PPPs, with the aim of providing a unique
understanding of the factors that determine private investors’ decision to participate
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in a country’s PPPs and the decision on the level of participation or the US dollar
amount invested in the partnership.
The third research area was aimed at utilising a very unique concept which is at the
heart of economics and finance, ‘incomplete contracting and residual ownership’, to
help suggest ways on how PPPs can be structured in order to enhance their longevity
or success.
This final chapter summarises and evaluates the various research that has been car-
ried out and presented in this thesis. A summary of the key findings is presented
immediately below under the three research areas highlighted above, followed by
an evaluation of their implications for policy making, and recommended areas for
future research.
6.2 Exploratory Analysis of the PPI Dataset
The exploratory analysis examined the PPI dataset for the period ending 2014,
which contained longitudinal data from 1980 to 2014 on public infrastructure projects
that have the participation of the private sector. These projects are implemented in
the four major infrastructure sectors (telecom, transport, energy, and water and sew-
erage) in low and middle income countries across the six regions of the world. The
following summarises the key findings arising from the exploratory data analysis:
(1) The concept of private participation in public infrastructure has gained signifi-
cant foothold across the regions of the world, more especially in Latin America
and the Caribbean, and East Asia and the Pacific, two of the regions that are
considered to be the earliest implementers of the framework. An average of
192 projects are implemented each year in all the regions put together.
(2) The PPP framework became widespread around the mid 1990s with South Asia
making significant inroads in attracting private investors and investments into
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public infrastructure development.
(3) The majority of the PPP projects are still ongoing, some of which have been
in operations for over 20 years, thus alluding to the idea that PPP projects are
long-termed projects. This is followed by projects which are indicated as being
under construction.
(4) Most of the PPP projects are implemented in the energy sector and are mainly
structured as build, operate and transfer in which case the residual facility of
the project is conferred on the public sector after the private sector partner has
been allowed to recoup her investment.
(5) Most of the PPP projects in SSA are implemented in the telecom sector. This re-
gion also registered almost zero growth in the number of projects implemented
when comparing the periods 2005 - 2014 to that of 1995 - 2004.
6.3 Countries Attractiveness for PPPs
In this chapter, we analysed four main channels through which countries gain their
attractiveness for PPPs, including: macroeconomic and market; fiscal constraints;
regulatory and governance; and experience in PPPs. Each of these channels is com-
posed of a group of factors, for example, the macroeconomic and market channel
constitutes inflation, exchange rate, international reserves in months of imports, real
GDP per capita and population.
The main variable used to measure countries’ attractiveness for PPPs is the number
of sponsors/private investors that took part in PPP projects. However, to enhance
robustness and policy making, the research also used two additional measures of
countries’ attractiveness, including the number of projects and the US dollar invest-
ment, consistent with the works of Hammami et al., (2006) and Yehoue, (2013).
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The methodology used to measure the relationship between the variables rests on
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial model (ZINB) and Cragg’s Double Hurdle model.
The former model separates the participation and consumption decisions for PPPs
in the presence of discrete count dependent variable (number of sponsors, and num-
ber of projects), while the latter does so for continuous limited dependent variable
(US dollar investment). The results were analysed in two parts. In the first part,
which was referred to as Combined Sector Analysis, the analysis was done for all
PPP projects irrespective of the sector in which they were implemented, while the
second part, which was referred to Sectoral Analysis, took sectoral heterogeneity
into consideration. In the next sections, we summarise the key findings under these
two sub-categories.
6.3.1 Summary of Combined Sector Findings
The key findings under the combined sector include:
(1) When the number of sponsors was used as dependent variable
The macroeconomic and market channel emerged as the most important chan-
nel for incentivising private sector participation into PPPs, suggesting that the
market for PPP outputs, both in terms of size (population) and potential de-
mand/purchasing power (real GDP per capita), and macroeconomic stability
contribute immensely to countries’ attractiveness for PPPs.
Specifically, the research found that a unit increase in population and real GDP
per capita will increase countries’ attractiveness for PPPs by a factor 1.73 and
1.41 respectively. At the same time a unit increase in inflation and exchange
rate (depreciation of the country’s exchange rate) will decrease countries’s at-
tractiveness by a factor of 0.98 and 0.99 respectively. Additionally, a unit in-
crease in foreign exchange availability, measured by international reserves in
months of imports, will increase countries attractiveness by a factor of 1.04.
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The next most important channel was found to be the experience channel, which
when improved by a unit will enhance countries’ attractiveness for PPPs by
a factor of 1.42, followed by the regulatory and governance channel. Under
this latter channel, the variables Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality and Politi-
cal Stability were all found to be statistically significant, increasing countries’
attractiveness for PPPs by a factor of 1 each. However, Control of Corrup-
tion, which is under the same channel and which has attracted the attention of
many development scholars, was found to be insignificant in explaining coun-
tries’ attractiveness for PPPs, while at the same time, countries with ineffective
governments have attracted more private sector participation in PPPs.
With the exception of solvency risk (external public debt stock in percent of
GDP) for which a unit increase was found to reduce countries’ attractiveness
for PPPs by a factor 0.85, the rest of the variables under the fiscal constraints
channel were found to be insignificant.
In terms of regional heterogeneity, it was found that Europe and Central Asia,
and Latin America and the Caribbean have on average attracted more private
sector investors into PPPs for public infrastructure development and related ser-
vices than to Sub-Saharan Africa.
(2) When the number of PPP projects was used as dependent variable
Similar results to the above were found when the number of projects was used
to measure countries’ attractiveness for PPPs, except that under the fiscal con-
straints channel, the only significant variable was natural resource rent which
exhibited positive relationship with countries’ attractiveness.
(3) When the US dollar investment was used as dependent variable
The results from this variable were also similar to the other two variables men-
tioned above. Again, the macroeconomic and market channel emerged as the
most important determinant of countries’ attractiveness for PPPs.
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6.3.2 Summary of Sectoral Findings
The key findings at the sectoral level include:
(i) Private investors are only concerned about four risk factors when it comes to
investing in telecom PPP projects. Three of these factors are under the macroe-
conomic and market channel (inflation, exchange rate and market size) while
the fourth, regulatory quality, is under the regulatory channel, which suggests
that private investors desire governments with the ability to implement sound
regulation that permit and promote their development. Factors such as coun-
tries’ experience in PPPs and corruption are of no consequence to them, nor
factor relating to government constraints. This outcome was found to be con-
sistent with many research, including Hammami et al., (2006) and Sirtaine
and Foster, (2005), who suggest that the potential for huge profitability in the
sector outweighs investors’ perception of the risk in the sector. Also, as noted
in Chapter 4, some private investors have managed to combat certain risk fac-
tors in the telecom sector, such as corruption, by putting in place a corporate
governance structure that impede some of these risks.
In terms of regional heterogeneity, SSA has, on average, faired significantly
better in attracting private sector participation in telecom PPPs than both EAP
and LAC, the two leading regions for PPPs.
(ii) Regulatory and governance factors, and countries’ experience in implement-
ing PPPs play significant role in incentivising private investors’ participation
in transport, and water and sewerage PPPs in addition to market factors (mar-
ket size an purchasing power). Evidence suggests that rule of law, and regu-
latory quality increase countries’ attractiveness, consistent with a priori ex-
pectation. This means that private investors are not only concerned about
governments’ ability to formulate sound regulations that permit and promote
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their development, but also for them to abide by these regulations, particu-
larly with regard to the enforcement of property right. The variable control of
corruption, albeit significant, appeared to exhibit a contrary relationship with
countries’ attractiveness for PPPs as the evidence seem to suggest that coun-
tries with less control on corruption have succeeded in attracting more PPPs
in these two sectors.
(iii) In addition to market factors and countries’ experience in implementing PPPs,
evidence suggests that private investors are concerned about two other factors,
foreign exchange reserve (under the macroeconomic and market channel) and
potential revenue sources of governments, measured by natural resource rent
(under the fiscal constraints channel). As indicated in Chapter 4, it is common
for governments to take exchange rate availability risk under energy PPPs,
which makes private investors concerned about their ability to honour such
obligation. Additionally, proceeds from natural resources have been ringed
fence to serve as collateral against private sector investments, especially for
Chinese investment in PPPs in some developing and emerging countries (see
Cassel et al., 2010; Kolstad and Wiig, 2012).
6.4 Residual Ownership and Risk of Project Failure
In this chapter’s research, our main argument was that PPP projects which are struc-
tured to confer residual facility ownership to the public sector, such as build, operate
and transfer, have, on average, lower risk of failure, or rather, higher probability of
survival, than those that confer such ownership to the private sector on account of
the residual value risk associated with such long-term arrangements. To test this hy-
pothesis, which is based mainly on the theory of incomplete contracting proposed
by Grossman and Hart, (1986) and Hart and Moore, (1988), a discrete-time duration
model was applied.
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In support of the above argument, we found that after 5 years in operations, the
odds of failure for PPP projects that confer residual facility ownership to the public
sector, are about 75 percent lower than the odds of those that confer such ownership
on the private sector. This evidence therefore, suggests that the risk of failure is
lower for the former than the latter category of PPP projects.
Other main findings include:
(1) The size of the PPP project matters as the odds of failure for small and medium
size projects are 36 and 72 percent respectively of the odds of large size projects,
which means that large size project fail faster than medium size project and in
turn than small size project.1
(2) Although multilateral institutions and local sponsors participation in PPP ar-
rangements were not found to be significant in the parametric model, the signs
of their coefficients as well as the results of the non-parametric model suggest
that their participation has a reducing effect on the risk of PPP project failure.
(3) In terms of sectoral heterogeneity, the energy sector was found to be the least
susceptible to failure, while the telecom sector was the most susceptible. It
has been suggested that the level of support provided by the public sector to-
wards energy PPPs could partly explain project longevity in that sector. Further-
more, evidence suggests that the telecom sector is characterised by merging and
change of ownership, two of the conditions that constitute the event of failure
in this research (see also Chan-Olmsted and Jamison, 2001).
(4) Macroeconomic variables, such as high inflation and exchange rates, which
could directly increase PPP project output tariff, are found to increase the risk
of PPP projects failure, while fiscal variables such as high revenue and low debt
servicing burden, reduce the risk of PPP projects failure.
1Size is measured by US dollar investment as a ratio of GDP. See Chapter 4
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(5) In terms of regional heterogeneity, there is no significant difference in project
failure among the various regions, except for Middle East and North Africa,
which appears to have significantly lower risk of project failure compared to all
the other regions.
6.5 Main Contributions, Policy Implications and Rec-
ommendations
The thesis aimed at achieving two things: (i) to suggest ways of bringing together
the public and private sectors into a partnership for infrastructure development and
related service delivery; and (ii) suggest ways of ensuring the longevity or success
of the partnership. To the end, we have highlighted some of the policy implications
and recommendations below:
6.5.1 Bringing the Private and Public Sectors Together
A significant number of literature has prioritised good institutions for countries’ at-
tractiveness for private sector investment into infrastructure development (Glober-
man and Shapiro, 2009; Yehoue, 2013). However, the proliferation of PPPs in re-
cent years, especially in countries with questionable institutions, has created doubt
as to whether governments should prioritise investment in institutional over other
factors, especially if the aim is to enhance private sector participation in infrastruc-
ture development.
The thesis has therefore provided the following suggestions to guide policy makers
in the area of sequencing reforms that could enhance private participation in the
development of public infrastructure and related services. Firstly, while not forget-
ting institutional development, which effect takes long time to become visible and
related perception to change, government should prioritise activities that enhance
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macroeconomic stability and the accumulation of international reserve. Govern-
ment should ensure a reasonable level of international reserves that will assure the
availability of foreign exchange for capital repatriation. While policies on market
factors such as population and purchasing power of final consumers could take time
to have their desired effects, in the interim, governments should be able to convince
private sector investors of a perceptible demand for PPP outputs.
Second, countries experience in implementing PPPs has been highlighted as a very
crucial channel for countries’ attractiveness. Experience suggests that it is some-
times quite difficult for countries with no PPP experience to close PPP deals and
many a time these countries had to contend with unbearable level of risks and costs
just to close their first deal. However, as they develop a cadre of expert negotia-
tors and create relationship with funding agencies, these risks and costs are reduced
dramatically as investors confidence improves.
6.5.2 Assuring the Survival of the Partnership
Under this sub-heading the structure of PPP projects is crucially important for their
survival. This thesis recommends that, where possible, PPP projects should be
structured to confer ex-ante residual facility ownership to the public sector because
of the possible residual value risk associated with such long-term arrangements,
which could impact ex-ante on project affordability and hence, project survival (see
Chapter 5). While such ex-ante conferment is made, an option could be embedded
within the project or concession agreement to transfer such ownership to the private
sector when it can be adequately determined that the residual facility will yield pos-
itive private value. Doing so could create incentive for the private sector partner to
maximise her efforts, particularly those that are non-contractible, in order to assure
the success of the project and hence, secure the residual facility.
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Another recommendation relates to the determination of the appropriate size of PPP
projects. Most often governments have been tempted to undertake very elaborate
projects, which could prove unaffordable to them directly as well as end-users, thus
culminating in early project failure (see Davis, 1996). Selecting the right size of
PPP projects consistent with the country’s GDP will go a long way to assure the
success of the project.
Finally, governments should endeavour to solicit the participation of multilateral
institutions in PPP projects arrangements. These institutions contribute in several
areas that will enhance the success of PPPs, including the provision of partial risk
guarantee, which could alleviate temporal project cash flow problems, and political
risk guarantee, which could help keep the project afloat amidst temporal political
shocks, as well as providing loans and taking direct equity stake in the project,
which could assure the financing of the project.
6.6 Limitations and Areas for Further Research
Although this thesis has succeeding in achieving its objectives, we are still aware of
some unavoidable shortcomings. This section discusses some of the limitations of
this thesis and recommends areas for further research in PPPs for public infrastruc-
ture development and related services delivery.
6.6.1 Limitations
The following are some of the limitations identified in this thesis:
(1) Given that most of the projects in the PPI dataset started around mid 1990 and
that PPPs are normally long-term arrangements with average duration of around
30 years, the percentage of projects that completed their cycle or indicated as
cancelled prior to their anticipated completion date, over the study period, was
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small compared to projects that were indicated as operational. In fact, the num-
ber of projects that were considered in Chapter 5 to have experienced the event
of failure was only about 9 percent of the total sampled projects for that par-
ticular research. This relatively small number of event occurrences may affect
the standard error, and hence the statistical significance of the results (Allison,
2014; Sy and Taylor, 2000). However, in the robustness checks, which support
the outcome of the main result, the percentage of event occurrences was greatly
increase through a matching process that eliminated some of the projects, espe-
cially those that were indicated to be operational.
(2) The data on some of the explanatory variables, such as inflation and exchange
rate, were missing for some countries, including Syria and Zimbabwe. The
thesis therefore, approximated these missing observations by taking the closest
period observations. Furthermore, in the sponsors field of the PPI dataset, the
names of some of the sponsors were not mentioned, instead the word others
was used. Since the primary dependent variable in the research in Chapter 4 is a
count of the sponsors, for uniformity, the thesis allocated a count of 1 wherever
others is indicated in the sponsors field.
(3) One of the main shortcomings of survival analysis is informative censoring (Al-
lison, 2014). In Chapter’s 5 research, we applied right censoring to the project
data because some of the projects did not experience the event of failure over
the study period as they were indicated as completed, in operation or under con-
struction. As noted by Allison, (2014), right censoring is normally presumed to
be non-informative, which roughly speaking means that the project is censored
at particular point in time, but does not tell us anything about that project’s
risk of the event. However, the censoring could be informative if it occurs at
varying times as is the case in Chapter 5 where some of the project drop out
of the study not because they experienced the event of failure, but because they
were successfully completed. Such scenario could lead to biased estimates of
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the parameters. Unfortunately, some scholars, including Allison, (2014), have
highlighted that there is no test for the non-informative assumption and little can
be done to correct for bias due to violation of this assumption, but advised that
survival studies should be designed and executed so as to minimize censoring
due to drop outs, which this thesis has done.
6.6.2 Areas for Further Research
There are a number of recommendations concerning future research areas, includ-
ing:
(1) One thing which this thesis attempted to do was to analyse the effect of the
ability of governments and/or end-users to pay for the PPP output and not the
willingness for them to pay, an issue which has been identified by Davis, (1996)
as an impediment to the successful implementation of PPPs. For some coun-
tries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, such unwillingness could be informed
by culture as people still believe that public services should be provided free
of charge, giving way to pilfering activities and destruction of public assets in
the event they are asked to pay for these services. A scenario like this could
not only impede private sector investment in public infrastructure, but could
lead to early termination of existing investments. Therefore, conducting an in-
depth study on societies’ culture to pay for public infrastructure and related
services, could be very important to policy makers, practitioners as well as pri-
vate investors. Perhaps the Hofstede’s cultural dimension framework, which
describes the effects of a society’s culture on the values of its members, and
how these values relate to behaviour (Adeoye, 2014), could be a starting point
for this inquiry.
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(2) The thesis did not investigate unobserved heterogeneities, such as those emanat-
ing from regional and sectoral grouping of projects. It could be the case that cer-
tain unobservable regional characteristics could affect the country within which
the PPP project is implemented and hence, lead to the failure of the project. For
example, two countries, one in SSA and the other in LAC, could have very sim-
ilar observable characteristics, but because they are in different regions the risk
of failure of PPP projects could differ significantly between these two coun-
tries. An understanding of this effect could help the decision process in private
investment in public infrastructure. As noted by Paccagnella, (2006), the main
objective of social research is not only to investigate relationships between in-
dividuals, but also among social groups to which they belong.
(3) Another area for possible research, which this thesis briefly threw light on, is the
effect of political term time on the survival of PPP projects. A good number of
studies, including Bolton and Rosenthal, (2002) and Minor, (2003), have sug-
gested that succeeding governments tends to renege or renegotiate contracts that
were hitherto entered into by their predecessors. Countries were such practices
are commonplace could find it difficult to attract PPPs and if they succeeded
doing so, they will be doing it at very higher and most often unaffordable costs.
A research in this area will also be relevant to practitioners and policy makers
as it will help to enrich empirical evidence.
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